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Incentivizing Injustice: Why no high-level executive 




by Sari Krieger Rivera 
 
Adviser: Professor Charles Tien 
 
More than ten years after the financial crisis of 2008, which sparked America’s 
Great Recession, many citizens are still asking why no high-level bank executives were 
prosecuted for criminal fraud. This question becomes even more perplexing when they 
remember that many powerful executives did face jail time during the Enron-era 
accounting scandals of the early 2000s and the savings and loan crisis of the early 1990s. 
This sense of injustice Americans felt in the wake of the biggest economic disaster of 
their lifetimes has had reverberating political consequences, such as populist movements 
like Occupy Wall Street and populist political campaigns from Bernie Sanders and 
Donald Trump in 2016. Millions of Americans were left in financial ruin, but the banks 
were bailed out, with no lasting consequences for their leaders. If this represents a high-
water mark in recent memory for most citizens’ distrust and anger in their government, 




Commentators, journalists and lay people have offered seemingly plausible, yet 
shallow explanations over the years since the crisis. Many of these explanations say 
powerful, wealthy Wall Street people use campaign donations and lobbying connections 
to get bailed out by the politicians who take this money. However, this explanation falls 
short because wealthy campaign donors existed in the previous crises where they did face 
jail time for their fraudulent behavior. This study uses the lens of political science to 
attempt a deeper and more satisfying explanation for the phenomenon of “Too Big to 
Jail.” The popular idea that wealthy campaign donors bought their way out of trouble will 
be more thoroughly explored, as will the clubby atmosphere between Washington and 
Wall Street, and presidential leadership. However, I ultimately reject them as less 
compelling explanations in favor of the internal incentive structure of the Justice 
Department itself and external incentives for prosecutors.  
Prosecutors who are hired as civil servants, not political appointees, are 
responsible for the majority of the work in bringing cases. They are disincentivized to 
bring difficult and lengthy cases that they may lose, as this kind of high-profile loss may 
reduce their chances for private sector, high-paying partnerships in the near future. 
Prosecutorial discretion is an underappreciated and under studied topic in political 
science literature, considering its vast power and importance to American society. The 
discretion prosecutors have to bring cases and the incentives they face within the 
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“What the 2008 crisis exposed was a fragile underpinning of a highly leveraged financial 
system. Had bank capital been adequate and fraud statutes been more vigorously 
enforced, the crisis would very likely have been a financial episode of only passing 
consequence.” – Alan Greenspan, former Federal Reserve chairman, Financial Times, 
August 17, 2015 
 
“We need to value the public sector again,” Jon Lovett, Lovett or Leave It, June 1, 2018 
 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
After the $700 billion Wall Street bailout passed by Congress and signed by 
President Bush in October 2008, millions of middle class and poor Americans who lost 
their homes or jobs were seething with anger. People were tired of a government that they 
believed favored Wall Street millionaires at the expense of ordinary people suffering on 
Main Street. Nor was their plight quickly remedied. By January 2011, four million 
families had lost their homes, another four and a half million were in danger of 
foreclosure,1 and many others in constant fear of eviction continued to occupy their 
foreclosed homes. Later that year, the Occupy Wall Street movement sprang up in New 
York City, soon spreading across the country and propelled by the slogan, “We are the 
99%.” A few years later, this populist sentiment could be heard in the different but both 
populist-fueled presidential campaigns of Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders. Even 
Hillary Clinton, hardly known for populist rhetoric, invoked the applause line “there 
should be no bank too big to fail and no individual too big to jail.”2 
 
1 FCIC report, p. 402 




          In 2009, President Barack Obama and a Democratic majority in Congress swept 
into office on a wave of “hope” and “change.” Initially, the Obama Administration was 
preoccupied with stabilizing the economy before addressing reform. Then in 2010, he 
signed into law the Dodd-Frank financial reform bill, which was intended to reduce the 
likelihood of a similar crisis occurring in the future. However, new regulations were not 
the only possible remedy for the ills of the crisis. Nor were they the only action the public 
demanded. The American people wondered why no one prominent faced jail time. The 
Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (known as the bailout) 
successfully criminally prosecuted forty-four bankers between 2010-17, but none were 
responsible for the systemic failures of the financial crisis. They were largely executives 
from smaller banks, such as Brian Hartline, CEO and President of NOVA Bank, and 
Gary Patton Hall, CEO and President of Tifton Bank.3 Certainly, none had the notoriety 
and power of a major bank CEO, whose demise would have a real chilling effect on 
criminal behavior in the industry and mollify public resentment. Bankers and their 
institutions were unpopular with the American public during and after the crisis. Polling 
shows that public confidence in banks drops after crises and economic downturns. 
Americans’ confidence in banks dropped below thirty percent during the financial crisis 
of 2008 and has yet to recover. This is compared to sixty percent of Americans saying 
they have a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in banks in 1979, fifty-one percent in 
1985 and fifty-three percent in 2004.4 
 
3 SIGTARP Report to Congress, 2017 
4 McCarthy, Justin. Americans' Confidence in Banks Still Languishing Below 30%. 






Gallup Poll June 2016 Shows Americans’ Confidence in Banks Sinks5 
 
Prominent bankers had been demonized in the media with a ferocity not seen 
since the Great Depression. A CBS News MoneyWatch column from September 2010 
compared 2008 Wall Street executives with those of the Enron and savings and loan era 
who could be seen making “perp walks.” “Not so after the financial crisis. Forget perps - 




September 21, 2017 
5 McCarthy, Justin. Americans' Confidence in Banks Still Languishing Below 30%. 
Gallup News. Gallup Inc. 
http://news.gallup.com/poll/192719/americans-confidence-banks-languishing-
below.aspx?g_source=position1&g_medium=related&g_campaign=tiles, accessed 




flagellation we've gotten from many of the prime suspects. These apologies, cheap as tin, 
are also couched in the ready alibi that while "mistakes were made," everyone made 
them. In that moral equation, collective guilt amounts to collective innocence.”6 A 
Washington Post blogger wrote in 2013 “Of the rogues’ gallery who led the major Wall 
Street firms to the brink of the abyss, only to have a multitrillion-dollar taxpayer bailout 
pull them back, why have none become familiar with our nation’s federal prison 
system?”7 Questions remain years after the crisis, as evidenced by this July 2017 headline 
from The New Yorker; “Why Corrupt Bankers Avoid Jail.”8  
All this rhetoric suggests there were excellent partisan, political, and ethical 
reasons for vigorous criminal prosecutions of major bankers. However, under the Obama 
Justice Department, none of these prosecutions took place. This is in stark contrast to 
earlier financial crises of the late 20th century, such as the savings and loan crisis in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, during which hundreds of executives were criminally 
prosecuted. The lack of criminal prosecutions of prominent and systemically important 
executives after the recent Great Recession also contrasts with the CEOs and other 
executives who went to jail during the accounting scandals of the early 2000s, with 
 
6Sherter, Alan. September 10, 2010. No Time: Feds Have Given Up Trying to Send 
Bankers to Jail. CBS News MoneyWatch. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/no-time-feds-
have-given-up-trying-to-send-bankers-to-jail/, Accessed January 5, 2018 
7 Irwin, Neil. September 12, 2013. “This is a complete list of Wall Street CEOs 
prosecuted for their role in the financial crisis.” Washington Post: Wonkblog. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/09/12/this-is-a-complete-list-of-
wall-street-ceos-prosecuted-for-their-role-in-the-financial-
crisis/?utm_term=.d2277f1244de. Accessed January 5, 2018 
8 Keefe, Patrick Radden. July 31, 2017. “Why Corrupt Bankers Avoid Jail.” New Yorker. 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/07/31/why-corrupt-bankers-avoid-jail. 





Enron’s leaders being the most prominent example. Both of those crises saw executives 
criminally punished under Republican presidential administrations, while a Democrat, 
Barack Obama, saw no high-level executives face jail time on his watch. This defies 
conventional wisdom that Republicans are more pro-business than Democrats and 
therefore a Democratic administration would be more likely to prosecute finance industry 
executives. In this work, I seek to understand how this scenario came to be, and to tie it to 
larger theoretical frameworks. I will consider several alternative explanations.  
Firstly, as President Obama explained, “some of the most damaging behavior on 
Wall Street, in some cases, some of the least ethical behavior on Wall Street, wasn’t 
illegal.” In evaluating this explanation, I will examine the elements of the crime of fraud 
and consider the likelihood of obtaining convictions. Although I can only speak in theory 
and in hindsight, I will make a series of arguments for individuals who may have been 
charged successfully by Justice Department prosecutors with the incentives to do so. 
Capture/Interest Group Influence - Secondly, I will explore the popular 
explanation that top bankers escaped prosecution because they are rich and powerful, and 
politicians do not bite the hand that feeds them. In evaluating this explanation, I will 
inquire as to whether these bankers escaped prosecutions because they used monetary 
influence after the 2008 crisis, but not during the previous crises. I will consider whether 
finance executives sought to influence politicians across crises and political parties. I will 
address the common wisdom and academic research on capture.  
Presidency – Thirdly, I will consider the explanation that President Obama’s 
leadership style was that of compromise, consensus and caution, leaving him disinclined 




similarly cautious approach. I will also consider whether the president really can 
influence the decision of whether or not to prosecute and whether political party makes a 
difference in finance industry focus.  
Cultural Capture - A fourth explanation is that prosecutors were personally 
sympathetic to the bankers, viewing them as respectable high-status individuals who 
“made mistakes,” rather than as potential criminals who violated laws. In evaluating this 
explanation, I will examine whether attitudes towards bankers have changed across the 
crises and consider how much influence this idea could have. It could be said that cultural 
capture is simply a variation on or a subset of traditional capture or interest group 
influence. However, I argue that it deserves a separate treatment, as it goes beyond 
economic incentives to issues of social status and cognitive bias.  
Resources - A fifth explanation is that the Justice Department, heavily invested in 
terrorism in a post-9-11 climate, lacked the resources necessary to defeat the extremely 
talented, experienced, and well-funded defense teams hired by the top bankers. In 
evaluating this explanation, I will examine the Department’s resource allocation to white 
collar criminal prosecution both before and after the September 11, 2001 attacks. 
Justice Department Institutional Incentives/Prosecutorial Discretion - A sixth 
explanation considers the inner workings and incentive structure of the Justice 
Department and its employees. I will discuss what happened in the years leading up to the 
crisis when prosecutors were intimidated by recent high-profile defeats, which left them 
in no mood to take on risky prosecutions. Another explanation I consider is the idea that 
prosecutors avoided criminal actions against individuals because they believed this would 




United States Attorney’s Office and Justice Department prosecutors are a hot commodity 
at prominent white-collar defense firms. Those firms advertise their attorneys’ history 
prominently on the firm websites. However, a prosecutor who takes a risky swing at a 
difficult and high-profile case and loses, will not be so valuable in the private sector. 
Prosecutors place a premium on their win-loss records. If they can be assured of a win in 
a high-profile case, a rational prosecutor thinking about their future would likely proceed 
with the case. However, a high-profile loss in prosecuting someone like former Lehman 
Brothers’ head Dick Fuld, would be a major stain on the prosecutor’s record and would 
have taken much of their time and effort as a prosecutor, leaving them with little else to 
show for a win record. In evaluating this explanation, I will consider the career paths of 
prosecutors and the changing incentives they faced over time that made a private sector 
job even more attractive. As a safer alternative, federal government prosecutors heavily 
relied on plea deals with the corporations involved in the crisis (not the individual 
executives responsible for fraudulent actions). Certainly, the series of high-profile losses 
in the years leading up to the crisis and a decline in resources – mentioned earlier in this 
chapter - contributed to this strategy.  
While each of the suggested hypothesis has some merit, I will argue the evidence 
favors the theory that incentives faced by government prosecutors and internal Justice 
Department incentive structures can best explain the question of why no high-level 
executives were prosecuted for the 2008 financial crisis. I have researched these 
conclusions based on written records and interviews. I then examined what changed 




criminals in the 1980s, 1990s and early 2000s and when they declined to do so after the 
2008 financial crisis.  
 
Methodology 
The preceding hypotheses will be tested through a combination of approaches. 
Firstly, I sought to interview former or current Justice Department/ U.S. Attorneys' Office 
attorneys and/or former federal high-level regulators. Firstly, I focused on former 
government attorneys, as they are significantly more likely than current employees to 
speak candidly on Department practices. I also sought out others who might be 
knowledgeable on the subject, but were not necessarily former Department prosecutors, 
such as researchers or other former government employees. Before conducting any 
interviews, I completed a CUNY Internal Review Board application and was given 
expedited approval, based on the low-risk nature of my sources. I received this approval 
on July 11, 2016. I took all interview notes on my laptop computer.  
The list of questions I submitted to the IRB and began with on interviews were as 
follows. However, if the conversation naturally veered in a different direction, I let it take 
its course organically.  
 
-Why did the Justice Department pursue deferred prosecution and non-prosecution 
agreements against companies instead of criminal cases against individuals, as in 
the savings and loan crisis? 
 
-What explains the rise of deferred prosecution in the past ten years? 
 
-Why do you believe there were no case referrals to DOJ for criminal prosecutions 
for financial crisis fraud, when there were hundreds during the S&L crisis? 
 





-Were there adequate resources if the Department wanted to prosecute? If not, why 
not? 
 
-What went wrong for the government in the case prosecuting two Bear Stearns 
hedge fund managers? 
 
-Why prosecute insider trading instead of fraud? Didn’t the frauds have greater 
impact on the national economy, while insider training principally affects only 
investors? 
 
- How much do future career incentives, past work experiences or personal 
relationships factor into prosecutorial decision making? 
 
- How much of a role do you believe the president played in the decisions? 
 
-While at the Justice Department or before your time there, discuss the nature and 
extent of your social or professional contact with Wall Street officials? 
 
I began with a former Justice Department attorney whom I had interviewed when 
I worked as a reporter for the Financial Times group, covering asset-backed security 
litigation and regulation. This attorney worked in white-collar defense at the time of our 
interview and had worked at the Justice Department in white collar prosecution, making 
him an ideal candidate. We met for approximately an hour in the offices of his Manhattan 
law firm. 
As was consistent with my approach of a non-random snowball sample to collect 
narratives on how and why certain prosecutorial decisions were made, the first attorney 
recommended another person with a similar history who had also written publicly on 
financial crisis prosecutorial approach. I met with the second attorney at the Harvard 
Club in Manhattan, where the attorney is a member.  
I then interviewed Neil Barofsky, whom I had also met while working as a 




of New York. He also served as the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset 
Rescue Program, otherwise known as “The Bailout.” Subsequent to his experience as the 
“SIGTARP,” he wrote a book about his experience called “Bailout.” We met in his 
Manhattan law office. 
I conducted an in-person interview with Pulitzer-prize-winning journalist Jesse 
Eisinger, author of The Chickenshit Club, a book that provides a narrative discussion of 
the Obama Justice Department and its prosecutorial willingness in white collar cases.  I 
met with federal Judge Jed Rakoff, of the Southern District of New York, and 
interviewed him in his office for approximately 45 minutes. Rakoff has not only heard 
important post-financial-crisis cases in his courtroom, but has written publicly, such as in 
the New York Review of Books, about the lack of criminal prosecution in the wake of the 
crisis. Lastly, I conducted phone interviews with Dr. Henry Pontell, Professor William 
Black and Isaac Gradman, who had all written extensively on financial crisis topics from 
their perches as an academic, former banking regulator and an attorney, respectively.  
After collecting a variety of opinions, data and narratives through these 
interviews, I also sought out historical and recent textual records relevant to the financial 
crisis and the Justice Department’s response to white collar finance crime in recent 
decades. I also compared attorney salaries listed on Justice Department websites with a 
those reported in a respected legal industry journalistic publication for private sector 
corporate defense attorneys. I looked at both average numbers and partner-level or top 
prosecutor status numbers. 
The framework for analyzing all of the above data to discern why no top 




modern crises. Specifically, each theory was examined for whether it held constant across 
the savings and loan crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Enron and related 
accounting fraud scandals of the early 2000s and the 2008 crisis. In other words, since 
many prominent executives were criminally prosecuted during the earlier two crises, 
what changed between then and the 2008 crisis?  
The 2008 crisis will be explained in detail in a later chapter. What I am calling the 
“Enron-era” crisis occurred in the early 2000s, when “creative” accounting and 
misrepresentation of company profits to shareholders for the financial benefit of 
executives plagued corporate America, resulting in fraud cases against executives of 
companies such as energy company Enron Corporation, telecommunications company 
WorldCom, cable television company Adelphia Communications Corporation, and 
security systems company Tyco International plc. The “savings and loan” crisis occurred 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s when nearly one-third of America’s 3,234 savings and 
loan associations failed, partly due to fraudulent actions from their own officials. While 
these two economic crises and the 2008 crisis were not exactly the same in terms of 
economic scale, all three crises created significant economic losses for many Americans, 
a reverberation throughout the economy and a regulatory and law enforcement challenges 
for the United States government. However, the earlier two saw successful criminal 
prosecutions of many systemically important corporate executives for fraudulent 
behavior that contributed to the crisis, unlike the 2008 crisis.  
Firstly, I selected various case studies from the crisis to establish evidence that 
intentional fraud existed and therefore criminal prosecutions should have been conducted. 




government documents, media reports and those I had personally reported on as a 
journalist covering post-crisis litigation and regulation. I chose the cases with the most 
evidence available, as prosecutors would have been likely to do when seeking to make a 
winning case. These cases include Lehman Brothers Chairman and Chief Executive 
Officer Dick Fuld, Countrywide Financial Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Angelo 
Mozilo, AIG Financial Products Chief Executive Officer Joseph J. Cassano, Citigroup 
executives, and rating agencies executives. Information from Clayton Holdings, a 
company that analyzed the quality of mortgages used in securitized mortgage products, 
was also used in support of a pattern of fraud.  
Based on those analyses, I proceeded on the assumption that fraud did exist in 
2008, but was not prosecuted, unlike the earlier crises.  Ultimately, fraud is not entirely 
objective, unlike the crimes of shoplifting or murder. For the most part, someone either 
steals an object or not, or unlawfully kills someone, or not. Legal fraud, particularly in 
complex cases, is opaquer. Ultimately, in these cases, it matters what a prosecutor can 
prove to be fraud. This idea has been expressed by various prosecutors, and they certainly 
face an immense challenge proving fraud in finance cases that are difficult to explain to 
juries and top lawyers working to convince them otherwise. However, the savings and 
loan crisis and Enron-era accounting cases were both complicated for juries to understand 
and successfully prosecuted, making the “it’s too hard to prove to a jury” argument a 
flimsy one.  
The question remains, what is the difference between these earlier crises and that 




scenario stayed constant over time, and therefore could not explain a change, or was a 
variable that had changed itself and could explain the change in prosecutions.  
 
Crux of the Argument 
 
My argument is that a change in the incentive structures inside and outside the 
Justice Department provides incentives for prosecutorial decision-making. It is the “line-
prosecutors”, or those who aren’t politically appointed, who prosecute cases. The 
attorneys working on high-profile financial cases will most likely be located in New York 
City, in the United States Attorney’s Office in the Southern District of New York, which 
has a long track record of prosecuting the highest profile, white-collar cases, and 
therefore has the most institutional experience. In comparison, many of the other 93 
United States Attorney’s offices prosecute much less complicated, more parochial cases; 
one attorney called them “lobster cases,” referring to his temporary stint at a small New 
England U.S. Attorney’s Office. 9  However, some cases could have been brought from 
other offices, such as those located in Brooklyn, N.Y., Washington, D.C. or parts of 
California – all places with extremely high cost of living.  
Assistant United States Attorneys (A.S.U.A), faced a stark change in personal 
financial incentives over time. The cost of living in New York City is painfully high, as 
any resident knows all too well. An ambitious, smart, often Ivy-league educated A.U.S.A 
might want to work in government service as a prosecutor for his or her entire career. 
However, the moral or emotional satisfaction of this career path has become an 
impractical and unlikely choice over the much more lucrative choice of a private defense 
 




firm position, and eventually partnership. These firms prize attorneys with prosecutorial 
experience, as they have insider knowledge of how a government prosecution works. Top 
firms boast in their staff biographies any white-collar government experience. The firms 
are paying top dollar, but they wouldn’t value “unsuccessful” former prosecutors – in 
other words, those with a big loss on their record. 
In previous decades, according to my own analysis based on government and 
other publicly available data, the gap was much smaller between top federal prosecutor 
salary and what their private sector counterpart could earn as a partner. This change 
mirrors the time period when government prosecutors stopped being prosecutors and 
became negotiators. Settlement agreements with major banks and certain banking figures 
were standard practice for the 2008 crisis, while the previous crises saw a focus on 
prosecutions and jail time. The ability to make much more money in an increasingly 
economically unstable world and outrageously expensive city would be a powerful 
incentive to be more cautious, seeking a safer settlement agreement, rather than the more 
difficult and riskier prosecution. Firms want to see prosecutors who handled big name, 
complex cases, but not those who tried them and lost. Seeking settlement agreements is 
clearly the safer path for government prosecutors. They can garner headlines that sound 
like being tough on banks, splashing big dollar amounts on the news pages. However, it 
takes only a little knowledge to realize that paying a fine has become simply the cost of 
doing business for major banks who made vastly more money from the practices for 
which they are being fined. It is certainly not a deterrent for future criminal activity.  
 At the same time, the Justice Department experienced two major internal factors 




experienced a series of high-profile embarrassments in white collar cases. For example, 
when energy company Enron Corporation collapsed due to a major accounting fraud 
scandal, the Department prosecuted the accounting firm Arthur Anderson as Enron’s 
proverbial partner in crime. The firm subsequently went out of business due to 
reputational annihilation. The Supreme Court later overturned the conviction on 
procedural grounds. The Department took much of the blame for destroying the 
company, rightly or wrongly. Settlement agreements were not going to put a company 
out of business and put the Justice Department on the public opinion hook for the job 
losses experienced by many innocent employees. Therefore, the Department increasingly 
relied on them, and entirely so with the major banks responsible for the 2008 crisis. 
Somehow, a fear of holding individuals criminally accountable got lumped in with the 
more legitimate fear of prosecuting companies. Secondly, after the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001, federal criminal justice resources in terms of budgets and 
manpower, underwent a massive shift to counterterrorism from everything else. It 
became a better time to be a white-collar criminal, as the country was busy looking 
elsewhere.  
 The popular narrative that the banks and their executives buy themselves out of 
legal jams with campaign donations and lobbying is a compelling one. Certainly, the 
excesses of money in politics has powerful implications. However, the fact remains that 
during the previous crises, lobbyists and campaign influence was rampant from the 
business executives involved in criminal behavior and who were later prosecuted. 
Therefore, this is a constant and can’t explain the change in prosecutions. The same can 




atmosphere between many in Washington and the private sector. There simply isn’t 
enough change in those behaviors between crises to explain the vast difference in Justice 
Department behavior. Lack of resources by itself carries less weight as an answer than in 
conjunction with the greater prosecutorial incentive theory.  
 Ultimately, the weight of the evidence from these case studies provides 
compelling reasons to believe it is prosecutorial discretion that provides the answers that 
an enraged public and academic community still seeks. Specifically, prosecutors’ 
decision-making was informed by internal Justice Department institutional factors (a 
recent preference for caution and a lack of resources) and the personal incentives faced 
by government prosecutors. This will be a surprise to anyone pushing the popular 
narrative that the banks are simply too politically powerful. Certainly, there is a strong 
case to be made that they indeed are too powerful and “too big to fail,” causing perverse 
economic incentives for them and making them harder to regulate. However, that is a 
policy question. I am seeking to answer a question that is fundamentally about law 
enforcement; about crime and punishment; and about what are the best deterrents to 
crime. 
 It should be noted that I did not directly ask former government prosecutors why 
they or others leave government service and join the private sector. There are a few 
reasons for this approach. Firstly, people are not always honest about their intentions. 
They also may not remember a long-ago decision-making process when asked about it 
years later. People may not fully understand their own intentions even in the moment. 
Humans have a tendency to justify decisions they make based on whom they perceive to 




an attorney may say they left government service because of the more comfortable life 
afforded by a private defense firm. However, when asked by an interviewer from a 
university, they may say because they believed in the mission of the private firm. Both of 
these answers may be true, or at least true at the time they are spoken. In short, humans 
are not always reliable sources of their own motivations. In order to minimize human 
error, I chose to zoom out, looking at the incentive structures presented to these humans, 
rather than the individual humans themselves. This is a broader view and assumes that 
humans will likely make a range of predictable decisions give a certain set of incentives. 
It is a more rational way to examine the likelihood of making certain choices given a 
certain set of circumstances compared to asking people for explanations after the fact.  
 A just society demands constant self-reflection on its legal system. It should seek 
to deter would-be criminals through a fair application of the law. The current legal 
environment is even more fractious, yet government lawyers who are not political 
appointees do their best to cling to the rule of law. However, they can’t escape the 
personal and institutional incentives they face when exercising their prosecutorial 
discretion and we shouldn’t expect them to. Therefore, institutions must be designed to 
incentivize the behavior we as a society want to see. Adherence to justice and the rule of 
law is one of the foundations of American government and it must be incentivized in our 








Chapter 2: Literature Review  
 
Was there fraud? – Over exuberance or investment mistakes are not the same as 
conspiracy or fraud, say finance industry defenders, such as the defense attorneys in the 
2009 unsuccessful Bear Stearns hedge fund manager prosecution.10  Also, a successful 
case would be very difficult to prove to a lay jury “beyond a reasonable doubt,” due to 
the vastly complex nature of financial products and institutions, wrote prominent white 
collar defense attorneys Johnathan Sack and Elkan Abromowitz in the New York Law 
Journal.11  If there was no reason to believe fraud occurred or they had little chance of 
proving it, there is no need to look any further in answering the question of why 
executives were not prosecuted.  I will argue there could be ample evidence for a case, 
but I will discuss this idea in a later chapter devoted entirely to it. 
 
Capture/Interest Group Influence/Monetary Influence - Carpenter and Moss 
define regulatory capture as “the result or process by which regulation, in law or 
application, is consistently or repeatedly directed away from the public interest and 
toward the interests of the regulated industry, by the intent and action of the industry 
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itself.”12 Regulatory capture can result in less regulation to protect consumers or more 
regulation that favors some businesses over others. Utilities, trucking companies and rail 
roads have often been examples of industries benefiting from either deregulation or 
regulation favoring a particular firm or industry over others. 13  de Figueiredo and 
Richter, in their survey of lobbying literature, argue lobbying has a greater impact than 
direct campaign donations, with its spending exceeding campaign contributions fivefold. 
14 They define lobbying as “the transfer of information in private meetings and venues 
between interest groups and politicians, their staffs, and agents.” 15 Lobbying by 
corporations and trade associations account for approximately eighty-five percent of 
lobbying spending on both the federal and state level. Additionally, larger corporate 
groups are much more likely to lobby than smaller interests. 16  
Schattschneider’s classic work says that the Madisonian pluralist ideal of factions 
checking each other is inaccurate, as wealthier interests have inherent advantages and 
will capture government officials in a transaction or consumer-like approach.17 The idea 
that Wall Street firms and executives’ campaign donations have influence over 
lawmakers is no exception to this story. However, some political science studies fail to 
find measurable direct influence.18 Other authors point not to direct influence, but the 
agenda-setting power of interest groups to control what is and is not considered in the 
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legislative arena.19 Lowery challenges the traditional literature’s frequent historical 
conclusion that a connection between lobbying and policy outcomes cannot be found. He 
redefines the concept of influence and argues for a more inclusive methodology, claiming 
the focus on observable and measurable results may overproduce null results and miss 
important factors. In fact, influence may exist, but it is difficult to directly measure. 
Influence in all its forms is complex and diffuse, and the nature of academic research is to 
focus on direct effects, “narrowly observed.” 20 Simply because influence may be 
difficult to measure, does not mean we should discount it.21 Indirect influence is 
particularly relevant to the Justice Department, as there is no opportunity for interest 
groups to provide money to career prosecutors, but budgetary influence and campaign 
finance promises to political appointees for future campaigns offer opportunity for 
capture, albeit far removed.  
 Ernesto Dal Bo finds in a review of capture literature that capture is possible due 
to information advantages companies have over citizens, who likely are not 
knowledgeable about the relevant issues or even aware that policy is being considered. If 
government regulators are not lured to the private sector with exponentially higher wages 
and they are constantly monitored in their decision-making process, they may be less 
likely to make decisions that favor narrow interest groups over best practices or the 
public interest. However, Dal Bo finds this impractical alone and suggests institutional 
remedies, such as information sharing, legislative oversight and support for consumer 
groups. He does note that they are already in place to varying regional degrees in the 
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United States. 22 Additionally, interest groups may capture regulators by providing an 
abundance of information that plays in their favor and encouraging regulators who lack 
the time to research alternative views thoroughly to share their worldview. Dal Bo 
advocates for finding optimal term lengths for government regulators, as overly long 
tenures allow collusion with a firm and too short a time makes regulators fear “rocking 
the boat” too close to the time when they may seek a job with the industry. Elected 
regulators tend to have a more pro-consumer stance, as they are more responsive to 
popular will, he says. However, consumers may not be able to discern their own self-
interest when there is an information imbalance. Electing regulators is an option, but may 
have a different but powerful set of capture problems based on campaign finance 
concerns. Regulators with an industry background tend to be more lenient to industry, but 
“not particularly so” when controlling for party affiliation. The promise of an industry job 
only tended to impact leniency when the regulator’s tenure is almost over.23  
 
Presidency – Greenstein stresses the importance of personality when it comes to 
presidential leadership. The Constitution’s Article II gives little guidance as to how a 
president should lead and carry out the vaguely listed powers. Presidents as individuals 
have shaped the office dramatically, filling in the blanks and moving the institution of the 
presidency in various directions. Therefore, Greenstein looks at the various personality 
styles of presidents to examine how they have shaped the office. He considers the 
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cognitive style, emotional intelligence, public communication, organizational capacity, 
political skills and policy vision of presidents.24  
Greenstein says Barack Obama is a gifted public speaker, adept politically and 
organizationally. Obama also has a “first-rate temperament and a first-rate mind,” 
according to Greenstein. When it comes to vision, Greenstein says, Obama’s style is one 
of pragmatism and political compromise.25 In certain political environments, this would 
be a political asset. But in the partisan atmosphere that President Obama faced, it was 
unrealistic at times. When it comes to President Obama’s role in prosecutions, this 
cautious and compromising approach could have influenced his choices to run the Justice 
Department and the U.S. Attorney’s offices. It could be argued that he would choose 
individuals who were like-minded and would seek compromises and settlements, rather 
than be pugnacious and aggressive. Also, a president seeking bipartisan compromise 
would not focus on an aggressive task force to punish fraudsters, but would seek to 
problem solve and move on. It could be argued that the focus on the Dodd-Frank 
financial reform law of 2010, rather than a more aggressive reform law and prosecutions 
adhered to that prediction. Another practical reason for President Obama’s caution in 
certain policy areas may be that as the first black president, he was already pushing 
political boundaries and realized he could only push so far without backlash from the 
American public.  
Skowronek’s concept of political time is useful for this study, as well. This theory 
posits that instead of examining presidential administrations in terms of linear time, there 
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are predictable cycles, or political time periods, that presidencies go through. He begins 
with the reconstructive presidency, such as under Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, 
Abraham Lincoln, Franklin Roosevelt, and Ronald Reagan, which repudiate what came 
immediately before. These presidents disrupt existing approaches and reshape the office, 
which Skowronek calls the “politics of reconstruction.” The ability to do so depends on 
the authority the president has to reject what came before. Skowronek says it is no 
coincidence that great presidents usually follow inept ones. A prime example is the 
Democrat Franklin Roosevelt following a decade of rather passive Republicans. 
Roosevelt and the Democrats in Congress reshaped the entire concept of the federal 
government, despite extensive initial pushback from the Supreme Court, and “succeeded 
despite stunning defeats because he remained throughout the sponsor of an alternative to 
a bankrupt past.”26 Following reconstructive presidents are those who are successors 
continuing the new paradigm, such as Harry Truman and George H. W. Bush. 
Skowronek calls this the “politics of articulation.” Next are presidents, like Dwight D. 
Eisenhower and Bill Clinton, who represent a first shot at takeover by an opposition but 
operate within the established framework. He calls this the “politics of preemption.” 
Following this type of president is another president adhering to the established 
orthodoxy, like John F. Kennedy/Lyndon Johnson and George W. Bush. Next, there is a 
second attempt at challenging the orthodoxy, like Richard Nixon and most interestingly 
for this study, Obama. Lastly, is the “politics of disjunction” president, who clings to 
orthodoxy in the face of a mounting crisis that cannot be effectively addressed by the 
policies of the past. These tend to be the presidents we think of as failures, like Herbert 
 




Hoover, John Quincy Adams, Jimmy Carter, and James Buchanan.27 In an interview with 
The Nation on November 22, 2016, Skowronek opined on the Obama presidency in light 
of the 2016 election and his political time theory. Although Obama may have seemed to 
be a transformational president during his campaign of “hope and change,” we may have 
misunderstood what he meant by transformation. “The closer you look at what Obama 
was proposing in 2008, we see that what he meant was forgetting about transformation in 
the Jackson/Reagan mode and replacing it with a rational, problem-solving government,” 
Skowronek said.28 If Skowronek’s model is correct, Obama could not be truly 
transformational because of the still potent Reagan-era orthodoxy to the effect that 
government is the problem, not the solution, and the free market and business are 
sacrosanct. Additionally, his more rational, problem-solving style didn’t lend itself to 
calling for aggressive prosecutions. Impactful Wall Street prosecution may have simply 
not been ripe for Obama in political time.  
Stanley Renshon’s model of presidential analysis takes a psychological approach, 
“focused on three core elements - found in everyone, not just presidents - ambition, 
character integrity (ideals and values), relationships with others (relatedness), and their 
relationship to political leadership and decision making, the latter two being the twin 
cores of presidential responsibility.”29 According to Renshon, Obama saw the failed 
ambitions of his father and grandfather, leading him to aim high with his own ambitions. 
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He carried a sense of moral leadership, justice. and fairness from his mother, who also 
worked for these types of changes in Indonesian villages. These relationships influenced 
who the adult Obama would become. The roots of his deliberate and careful nature may 
be found in his relationship with his mother, who has been described as impulsive and 
reckless. She and Obama’s father did not know each other well when they married and 
had a child. After Obama’s father abandoned the family and moved back to his native 
Africa with another woman, his mother married another man and moved the family to 
Indonesia, a country that was foreign to her and had recently experienced a bloody coup. 
She also left Obama with his grandparents for a time to work on field research. Renshon 
points to this recklessness as “impacting his determined deliberativeness.”30 Obama is 
known for his cool, calm and rational persona and as a pragmatist. Renshon focuses on 
Obama’s assertive progressive agenda on health care and alternative energy, despite his 
pragmatism.31 These may be examples of his focus on social justice; however, it should 
be noted that the Obama administration did attempt to include Republicans and others in 
these efforts.32 More importantly for this study, it is Obama’s tendency to be cautious, 
perhaps overly so to compensate for the recklessness of his parents. This overly cautious 
tendency may help explain why he did not aggressively push for punishment of financial 
crisis-era executives.  
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Cultural Capture – James Kwak has posited a kind of capture based on cultural 
affinity – or sharing important aspects of one’s fundamental identity - describing three 
mechanisms through which this cultural capture occurs; identity, status, and relationships. 
First, regulators are more likely to trust or adopt the positions of those with whom they 
identify and perceive as being an in-group member.33 Kwak points to the revolving door 
between Wall Street and Washington as a key driver of this shared group identification, 
saying, “the normalcy of moving from an administrative agency to the financial sector 
and the sheer number of people making the transition imply that regulators and the 
representatives of financial institutions are really the same people, only at different points 
in their careers.”34  
In the decades leading up to the financial crisis, he claims, finance industry 
regulators often thought of themselves as stewards of an efficient free market system, not 
protectors of the public, identifying with bankers over consumers.35 Alternatively, it 
could be argued that some believed an efficient free market system – however abstract 
this idea may be - would benefit consumers, as regulation would increase the cost of 
borrowing for all.  
Secondly, people behave favorably toward those they perceive to be of a higher 
status. Kwak points to the glamorization of Wall Street in popular culture coming from 
The Bonfire of the Vanities, Wall Street, and Liar’s Poker. These may be problematic 
comparisons, as many people would describe the Wall Street men in those books and 
movie as despicable. However, many others may have seen them as ruthless but 
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successful alpha men winning in a social Darwinist society. In general, wealthy people 
are idealized as smarter and of a higher status. The increased technical nature of Wall 
Street products and operations also caused regulators, who may not have fully understood 
them, to defer to the bankers or prestigious academic economists, many of whom 
advocated free markets, self-regulation, and financial innovation.36 Wall Street may have 
been demonized after the collapse by many average Americans, but in professional legal 
and finance industry settings, everyone was still a respectable business professional, not 
“some common street criminal.” Somehow, they could not have been “real criminals,” in 
this view.  
Lastly, psychological studies have shown that the more frequently we interact 
with a person and the more that person can observe our behavior towards him, the more 
likely we are to treat him favorably. Kwak argues that the revolving door creates social 
connections between regulators and the regulated and may influence even those 
regulators.37 Considering cultural capture, it would be unlikely for a government 
prosecutor - who admires financially successful and prestigious Wall Street executives 
and sees himself as a fellow professional - to bring charges. These executives would be 
more likely to be given the benefit of the doubt with the explanation of “making bad 
business decisions” instead of acting illegally. In fact, this is the narrative many such 
people espoused after the crisis.   
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Resources  – Roe and Jackson take a multi-national look at the efficacy of 
security law enforcement. The resources a country devotes in terms of budget and 
staffing to enforcing securities laws is an important factor in this study.38 After 
September 11, 2001, a massive shift in resources at the FBI and Justice transferred to 
counterterrorism, at the expense of everything else, including white-collar crime. During 
the savings and loan crisis there were 1,000 FBI agents investigating crime in that 
industry. As of 2007, when the recent crisis hit, there were only 120 FBI agents covering 
mortgage fraud, with more than 1,800 agents, or nearly one-third of all agents in criminal 
programs, having moved to counterterrorism duties.39 This was despite the fact that in 
September 2004, the FBI warned of an “epidemic” of mortgage fraud. According to an 
investigation by the New York Times, in the early months of the financial crisis, the FBI 
requested more than 1,100 agents to investigate crimes not related to national security,40 
specifically asking Congress for more money to hire new white-collar crime agents, but 
was continually rebuffed. It is clear Congress was as yet unwilling to shift the FBI’s 
priorities. Likely, Congress members were simply responding to the political 
environment and pressures of the time to address terrorism, but a thorough analysis of 
Congress’ role in the crisis is outside the scope of this inquiry. The Times writes that the 
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bureau asked for an increase of $800 million during those years but received only $50 
million more. 41  
In addition to resources shifting to counterterrorism after September 11, 2001, 
prosecutors have had to use these more limited resources to tackle more potential cases. 
Sara Sun Beale points to an explosion of federal criminal statues since the late 1960s. An 
American Bar Association study found that more than forty percent of federal criminal 
laws passed since the civil war came between 1970 and 1998. 42 “The mismatch between 
the broad scope of federal criminal law and the relatively narrow scope of federal 
resources requires federal prosecutors to select a small fraction of cases to prosecute in 
federal court, leaving the remainder to be prosecuted under state law.”43 White collar 
defendants often have more resources to battle a government prosecution than street 
criminals, making these cases that much harder to prosecute in a constrained budgetary 
environment at the federal level and essentially impossible at the state level, with even 
less money and resources. Additionally, key federal criminal statutes can be ill-defined, 
leaving prosecutors with significant room for interpretation. A lack of resources and 
loosely-defined statutes are components of a modern federal law enforcement system that 
has shifted from an “adversarial trial-focused” one to an “administrative” system. The 
threat of harsh federal sentences (compared to those at the state level) give prosecutors 
leverage to make settlements, which is something they have come to rely on en masse as 
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an easier alternative in a resource-limited environment. “In contrast to the traditional 
expectation that the prosecutor will be subject to multiple checks in an adversarial 
process that ends in a public jury trial supervised by an independent judge … more than 
ninety percent of all federal convictions are obtained by a guilty plea.” Beale points to 
2004 as a case in point, during which 83,000 federal defendants’ cases were closed but 
there were only 3,346 federal criminal trials. 44 
Additionally, the Justice Department’s resources were lacking in the form of 
expertise and case referrals from regulatory agencies. During the savings and loan crisis, 
financial regulators referred hundreds of cases to prosecutors and helped the attorneys 
with information needed to successfully bring the cases. During the 2008 crisis, 
regulatory agencies did not play this role. Indeed, they did not refer any cases to Justice 
for prosecution.45  
Perhaps explaining the lack of referrals and overlapping with the capture theory, 
an investigative report written about the financial crisis by the U.S. Senate Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations (SPSI) concluded that regulators were too deferential to 
management in the years leading up to and even after the financial crisis struck. The 
report details how one regulator, the Office of Thrift Supervision, found many problems 
at Washington Mutual Inc. (WaMu), but continued to merely give recommendations for 
change, even after previous recommendations were ignored and risk continued to grow. 
Enforcement action was not even discussed for WaMu until 2008, and even these non-
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public actions “contained few mandatory measures or deadlines and weren’t enough to 
save the bank.” 46 
 
 Justice Department Incentives/Prosecutorial Discretion - The prosecutors at the 
Justice Department and the 94 U.S. Attorney’s Offices in the United States are tasked 
with bringing criminal and civil cases for federal offenses. Additionally, only they can 
bring criminal charges, while other agencies can work on civil cases. By definition, 
prosecutors have to choose which cases to bring, as there are a seemingly infinite number 
of criminal and civil violations of federal law and only so much time or money. A long-
standing norm in the United States says that criminal prosecutorial decisions should be 
made independently by these attorneys, without political influence, in order to uphold the 
rule of law. Political prosecutions are the purview of non-democratic countries. 
Therefore, this norm mandates that the President not try to influence the Justice 
Department’s prosecutorial decision-making. The strength of this norm has been tested 
by President Donald Trump’s efforts to thwart it. President Trump has repeatedly 
publicly stated which actions he believes the Justice Department should take and has 
expressed his frustration at not being able to have more control over it. In fact, he said 
this to the New York Times in December 2017: “I have absolute right to do what I want to 
do with the Justice Department,” he said, echoing claims by his supporters that as 
president he has the power to open or end an investigation. “But for purposes of 
 




hopefully thinking I’m going to be treated fairly, I’ve stayed uninvolved with this 
particular matter.”47 
Prosecutorial discretion and fairness also necessitate a good deal of independence 
from Congressional control. To be sure, Congress asserts its control over the federal 
bureaucracy through its lawmaking, oversight and budgeting powers. But Presidents have 
fought for control of the executive branch since George Washington and continue to do 
so. Lastly, prosecutorial discretion is made without judicial review. While a case may 
reach a courtroom, which would be controlled by judicial oversight, the decision about 
whom to charge with what crimes are not subject to judicial review. Judges will largely 
defer to prosecutorial discretion, except in clear cases in which motives based on race, 
religion or bad faith can be attributed to the prosecutor.48 Prosecutorial decision making 
is also not made public unless charges are filed. Considering that the vast majority of 
cases never reach a courtroom, as they are settled, and the decision-making process 
before charges are filed is not entirely made public even in cases that are filed, 
prosecutors operate outside of the public spotlight.  
This secretive process has caused the Justice Department and U.S. Attorney’s 
offices to receive less study than many other areas of the bureaucracy. However, the 
following literature argues that prosecutors are not solely calculators of whether or not a 
law was broken and if there is sufficient evidence available to make a case. In reality, 
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there are myriad factors that matter when a prosecutor decides when, where and against 
whom to file charges.  
Albonetti argues that prosecutors seek to minimize uncertainty when deciding 
whether to file charges, considering evidence, number of witnesses, defendant-victim 
relationship, gender, race, prior record, offense-type, victim-type and statutory severity.49 
Criminal procedural constraints, high caseloads, limited staffing and shared values and 
norms within the group of other prosecutors, judges and defense attorneys with whom 
prosecutors form working relationships are also important factors.50 Additionally, the 
prosecutors’ “self-concept” is as a lawyer, not as a law-enforcement official. Therefore, 
they will likely be cautious about embarrassing themselves by bringing a case lacking 
sufficient evidence, and less concerned with the practices of police investigative decision-
making.51  
Bibas found that instead of simply their perception of a suspect’s guilt or 
innocence, prosecutors may be motivated by personal incentives. “They may be 
extremely risk-averse to protect their win-loss records, which further their employment 
prospects and political ambitions. Thus, they may press their own agendas at the expense 
of victims and the public.”52  Wilson argues that professional norms and post-government 
service expectations can influence the way tasks are performed in an agency. However, it 
is not always the case that this desire to impress a private firm will result in industry-
friendly behavior. Rather, it is behavior that “conveys evidence of energy and talent.” In 
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some cases, a former government employee who “knows how to pull strings” or “thinks 
our way” may be favorable to industry, but it may also be one who simply knows how to 
win cases on the relevant subject matter. The latter applies to Justice Department 
attorneys well. “A law firm wishing to hire a government attorney who knows antitrust 
law will not hire a person who has lost a case against a big client of that firm, it will hire 
somebody who won such a case.”53 A very high profile and high risk case against a 
defense firm’s major client or one of its executives – such as a “Too Big to Fail” bank – 
may be too much of a risk to take for a government prosecutor.  
Not only will prosecutors and regulators act in their own self-interest; cognitive 
psychology offers a useful analysis of the decision-making processes they use as 
“irrational” beings – or imperfect calculators of all information and all possible outcomes 
without any self-interest. “All human decision makers share a common set of 
information- processing tendencies that depart from perfect rationality.”54 In fact, an 
understanding of cognitive biases may provide some predictability in the way people 
“distort perfect information processing.”55 Burke examines how cognitive bias impacts 
prosecutorial decision-making, looking at a racially-tinged rape and murder case, in 
which DNA evidence exonerated a convicted mentally impaired black farmhand but 
prosecutors continued to insist he remained a viable suspect.56 While prosecutors may 
exhibit confirmation biases in assuming the guilt of a mentally impaired black man 
accused of raping and murdering a white woman, they may exhibit such biases in favor of 
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other educated, professional men - like themselves – in the world of finance. “From both 
the cognitive and behavioral economics literature emerges a theory of bounded rationality 
that seeks to explain how cognitive biases and limitations in our cognitive abilities distort 
perfect information processing in nonrandom, predictable ways.”57  
Eisner and Meier, relying on a study of antitrust enforcement cases, argue that 
internal factors and not outside political control are the driving force in Justice 
Department decisions.58 When the antitrust approach of the Department changed in the 
1980s, they conclude that it was not the Reagan political agenda that was responsible, but 
instead a change in the internal structure of the Department itself, which relied 
increasingly on Chicago School economists’ advice in decision- making processes.59 
However, this argument must also consider the fact that the Reagan political agenda was 
certainly more sympathetic to free market advocates than conventional Democrats, which 
helped the Chicago school theories gain prominence.  
The law aids prosecutors by giving them options beyond simply the decision to 
prosecute. For example, deferred prosecution – an agreement between the government 
and the accused party to reform behavior to conform with the law in lieu of prosecution - 
was originally created as an alternative to prison for juvenile and drug offenders. 
Greenblum cites this practice as one that gives prosecutors too much power, with the 
result of unfair punishment for companies and innocent parties within companies, all 
outside judicial review.60  
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More generally, prosecutors may seek agreements in lieu of trials. Moohr argues 
that since approximately ninety-five percent of people charged with federal crimes settle 
out of court, the United States is not quite the adversarial legal system that we imagine. 
Instead, it bears some similarities to the French inquisitorial system, in which “the 
ultimate issue of guilt or innocence is determined through an official inquiry that is 
initiated and conducted by the state. In this system, the trial is most accurately 
characterized as a continuation of the official investigation. The investigation, rather than 
the trial, is paramount.”61 The French system also calls for more supervision in 
prosecutorial decision making, while American U.S. attorneys are largely unrestrained, 
with much deference to local concerns. U.S. prosecutors’ power to arrange guilty pleas 
outside the public light of a trial may result in inconsistent sentences, creating disrespect 
for and mistrust of the law, as well as the inability to publicly display and clarify often 
opaque white-collar crime, missing an opportunity to truly deter criminal behavior.62   
 On the other hand, Buell argues that prosecutors actually disclose a surprising 
amount of information on prosecutorial decision making when it comes to corporate 
crimes, despite the common notion that prosecutors are secretive. 63 Buell points to the 
series of “memos” created since 1999 guiding Justice Department attorneys on 
procedures for charging corporations.  Why would the Department be vocal about white 
collar prosecutions when they aren’t required to and why more so in the case of corporate 
crimes than other criminal categories? The idea that prosecutors attract press attention to 
influence jury pools or further their own careers is dismissed first. Influencing jury pools 
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with gory details in the press may backfire more than help. Most federal prosecutors, he 
argues, are not aiming for elected office that would lend itself to building a reputation in 
the press. More likely, they are seeking higher positions in the DOJ itself, a partnership at 
a “marquee” law firm – the kind that would have a lucrative white-collar defense practice 
- or a counsel position at a major corporation or investment firm. 64 Press coverage and 
name recognition may help in this quest, but it may not. What prosecutors seek, Buell 
says, is a resume with “big” prosecutions, “whether measured by complexity, size of 
settlement, importance of defendant, or seriousness and extent of wrongdoing.” 65 Citing 
Garrett and Eisenger, Buell points to the idea that career motivations have steered 
prosecutors to easy-to-win cases or settlements, rather than difficult cases against 
individuals. Although this assertion will play a major role in this study, Buell dismisses it 
as having any relevance to why criminal prosecutors are more public about their 
decision-making process in white-collar cases. Instead, he argues prosecutors seek to 
explain their work to a public that may want to punish corporations that have acted 
immorally but not criminally. The prosecutors may use these disclosures to prove they 
are as tough on crime as possible. They may also use charging guidelines to mollify 
Congressmembers who feel DOJ is too tough or too lenient on corporations, as 
Congressmembers are sensitive to the needs of corporate constituents. Prosecutors are 
also sensitive to the needs of corporations and the defense bar that represents them. Buell 
describes a situation in which white collar defense attorneys are treated with more respect 
and their clients are considered generally law-abiding citizens, as opposed to violent 
 
64 Buell, 16 




criminals. Therefore, federal prosecutors disclose more about their corporate charging 
procedures than they would for a mobster or drug dealer. Lastly, Buell considers that 
prosecutors may disclose more about corporate crime decision making to achieve a 
policy-making goal of deterring corporate crime in the future by giving firms guidance.66   
Stemen and Frederick place prosecutorial discretion within the context of criminal 
procedural constraints, high caseloads, limited staffing, and shared values and norms 
within the group of other prosecutors, judges, and defense attorneys with whom 
prosecutors form working relationships.67 Andrew B. Whitford argues that agency 
structure and design determine whether U.S. Attorneys respond most to national, local or 
personal considerations. Political appointees, such as United States Attorneys, determine 
some of the organizational structures that govern the boundaries of line prosecutors’ 
behavior. The U.S. Attorneys set guidelines for in-office conflict resolution, case-
clearance policies and hiring procedures. While Whitford argues that this design allows 
for more nationalized control of the geographically dispersed U.S. Attorneys’ offices 
across the country, it also shows that institutional design of the Justice Department has a 
significant impact on prosecutorial decision making. 68  
Rachel E. Barkow emphasizes the importance of institutional structures within the 
Justice Department in “mediating prosecutorial impulses” and writes that some are more 
successful than others.69 Institutional design influences the culture of an agency, which 
emphasizes some actions over others. The Justice Department’s structures favor a law 
 
66 Buell, 18 - 27 
67 Stemen & Federick, 2012 
68 Whitford, 2002, p. 5 




enforcement mission and appearing tough on crime over more long-term policy reforms 
or other interests. There is the imperative not only to bring prosecutions, but successful 
ones. 70 “Prosecutors want to make it as easy as possible for them to win at trial, and that 
will-to-win can create cognitive biases in even the most well-intentioned prosecutors.” 71 
They are also interested in maintaining their reputations and are therefore protective 
against scrutiny of their decision-making process.72 Barkow discusses this desire to avoid 
scrutiny of their decision-making process in terms of opposing clemency reforms, but it 
can also be applied to the desire not to have one’s reputation marred by a high-profile 
loss in a riskier case. Barkow writes that the Department itself is invested in the status 
quo and Congress seeks to keep powerful interest groups happy. In this case she is 
referring to law enforcement over criminal defendants and their allies, although she 
allows that white collar defendants are also powerful.  
A strong president with a popular mandate could at least attempt to make 
institutional changes to the Justice Department within the boundaries of path dependency 
and congressional control, as evidenced by President Trump’s willingness to publicly 
criticize and direct the it. Regardless of who directs reforms of prosecutorial decision 
making, as may be called for when one considers the 2008 financial crisis, Barkow 
argues prosecutors are likely to resist any change that seeks to reduce their power to win 
cases or make decisions. Currently, the institutional structure of the Justice Department 
encourages prosecutors to focus on winning cases and doing so quickly, as “judged from 
 
70 Barkow, 2013; Wilson 
71 Barkow, 2013, p. 313 




their perspective.” 73 Prosecutors may only make different decisions if they are 
incentivized to do so. Barkow argues that prosecutors shouldn’t be expected to make “the 
right policy decisions” while stepping “outside of themselves to reach decisions that may 
undercut their own interests.” Even if they are entirely acting in good faith, their own 
cognitive biases may favor certain interests over others. Institutional design needs to take 
these human attributes into account, Barkow argues in the case of street crime 
prosecutions. White collar cases have extremely powerful defendants compared to street 
crime cases, making strong institutional design even more important to allow prosecutors 
to achieve important policy goals. Incentivizing desired policy outcomes while 
accounting for the natural human instinct toward self-interest, even in the most dedicated 
individuals, is an essential feature of American government’s original design. 74  
Indeed, this is the motivation behind our entire system of government and the 
separation of powers. Unfortunately, these lessons were forgotten when DOJ 
began accumulating additional powers. But for a leader who wants to improve 
decision making, it is never too late to shift course. 75   
 
 James Eisenstein argued in a 1978 comprehensive study of the United States 
Attorneys’ Offices that personal values and career considerations motivate prosecutorial 
decision making. He argued most Assistant U.S. Attorneys did not intend to spend an 
entire career in that position, rather they sought to move on to private practice. Therefore, 
they preferred high-profile cases to prove themselves as valuable for defense firms.76 
Much subsequent literature agrees with Eisenstein’s assertion that assistant U.S. attorneys 
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looking for a lucrative private sector job will prosecute high-profile cases. Assistant 
United States Attorneys would benefit from a high-profile case if they desire a lucrative 
career in the private sector. They want to create a record that would look attractive to 
elite private firms, if that is their target. Therefore, historically, these attorneys would 
seek to prosecute an attention-grabbing, difficult case to make a name for themselves as 
tough, smart and talented. However, of course, they must not pick a case they believe is 




Prosecutorial discretion provides the most compelling theory for this study. With 
a change in resources providing additional context, a change in incentives for prosecutors 
in the form of salary disparity will be the evidence that best explains the change in 
prosecutorial behavior over time. Presidents have long been subject to political pressures 
from the powerful financial industry, as have other government officials in the form of 
potential interest group pressure or cultural capture. This consistency will be 
demonstrated in the forthcoming chapters. However, subsequent chapters will show that 
while government salaries may have consistently lagged behind private sector salaries, 
the gap between the top salaries in government versus private partnership has 
significantly widened in the time period in which high-level financial prosecutions have 
stopped.  
To be sure, resources diverted away from financial crime prosecution was a 
contributing factor, as well as a series of Justice Department embarrassments and 
accusations of overzealousness in the years leading up to the 2008 financial crisis. The 




shooters gun-shy. However, when a massive salary increase depends on precisely hitting 
a difficult target, a rational person would search for a safer shot, while still looking like a 
talented gunman. High-level financial prosecutions would be one chance at an extremely 





Chapter 3: Setting the scene - white collar crime  
To understand why the 2008 financial crisis saw no systemically important 
executives criminally prosecuted, we need to understand both the incentive structure 
inside the Justice Department and U.S. Attorneys’ offices, as well as examine how the 
government previously handled accused economic criminals.  
 
Blue Sky and Beyond 
To understand the Department, we need to look back at its institutional 
foundations, how its culture and incentive structures developed and the progress of white-
collar law itself. Before the Great Depression and the New Deal, the laws under which 
white-collar crimes could be prosecuted were generally limited to the state level, as was 
much governing in the United States of America. In the first three decades of the 
twentieth century, state government began regulating the stock market, as increasing 




from investors by passing “Blue Sky” laws, known as such because if they were not 
enacted, “financial pirates” would sell investors “everything but the blue sky.” 77  
However, enforcement of these laws varied and faced some fundamental 
challenges. Government officials were inexperienced and underfunded in their 
enforcement efforts. Even more significantly, fraudsters could simply pay off a 
complaining witness, and the government would be forced to drop the case for lack of 
evidence. The Investment Bankers Association told its members in 1915 that they could 
evade blue sky laws simply by operating across state lines. 78 States competed with each 
other to attract investors and they were reluctant to adopt stringent regulations that might 
discourage business. New York’s Martin Act, passed in 1921, for example, had potential 
to be an effective Blue Sky law, as much of the nation’s securities were originated in 
New York. However, New York also did not want to diminish its role as an investment 
hub, and lawmakers feared a too powerful law would encourage graft by officials 
enforcing the law.79 Additionally, stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange were 
exempted from Blue Sky laws. These early attempts at protecting investors and 
consumers were only a small step from the almost entirely lassies-faire economy of 
America prior. Lying about a financial product was still quite easy. 
In the 1920s, demand for securities continued to increase. Unscrupulous securities 
dealers created fake stocks to meet this demand. Other than promising quick riches, 
dealers gave little information when selling stocks to eager buyers, making fraudulent 
sales quite easy. Lawmakers estimated that approximately half the securities issued in 
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that period were “worthless.”80 Several bills were proposed in Congress to rectify the 
situation, but the Roaring Twenties’ exuberant mood made them unpopular until people 
began to lose money. In 1922, Illinois Congressman Edward Dennison proposed a law 
that would make it a crime to use the U.S. mail system to commit financial fraud, closing 
a major loophole in the Blue Sky laws. But some questioned the constitutionality of such 
a federal law, as the Supreme Court was narrowly interpreting the commerce clause, and 
the Coolidge and Hoover administrations were committed to keeping financial regulation 
at the state level.81  
By November 1929, the stock market had lost approximately $26 billion in value 
for a fifty percent decline. On October 28th, 1929, known as Black Monday, the Dow 
Jones Industrial Average declined thirteen percent that day alone.82 Frantic depositors 
demanded withdrawals from banks, causing “bank runs,” and thousands of banks closed, 
unable to meet withdrawal demands. In a time before deposit insurance, many Americans 
lost their life savings and commerce slowed dramatically. By 1932, approximately 
twenty-five percent of Americans were unemployed, and the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average was eighty-nine percent below its pre-crash peak.  83 84 
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President Hoover signed a bill creating the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to 
help railroads, banks, and other businesses that were illiquid but had collateral to borrow 
against. This quasi-public agency could provide discount loans to struggling institutions, 
as well as state and local governments. However, by the summer of 1932, the federal 
government reversed these expansionary activities that had been aiding a recovery, and 
the crisis returned by the next winter.85  
Hoover did ask the Senate Banking and Currency Committee to investigate stock 
market practices, and it began doing so in March 1932, nearly three years after the crash. 
At first, bankers stonewalled the process, evading questions and failing to produce 
internal documents. The Committee made little progress until the Republican Chairman, 
Peter Norbeck, hired a New York deputy district attorney and skilled investigator, 
Ferdinand Pecora, as chief counsel. Also, the new Democratic Chairman, Duncan 
Fletcher, in April 1933 offered a resolution to expand the scope of inquiry to private 
banking practices.86 A series of financial scandals, for example involving Richard 
Whitney, the head of the New York Stock Exchange, also helped effect change. 
The so-called “Pecora investigation” culminated in a 400-page report in June 
1934, highlighting the finance industry’s legal and ethical transgressions. It helped turn 
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popular sentiment against laissez-faire capitalism and “banksters,” who had been 
celebrities only a few years prior. Percora’s dogged investigations and these public 
hearings paved the way for Franklin Roosevelt and the new Democratic party majority in 
Congress to pass the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 – which 
created the Securities and Exchange Commission to regulate the industry - and the 
Banking Act of 1933, also known as Glass-Steagall, which separated investment banking 
from commercial banking and created deposit insurance.87 Roosevelt and Congress also 
passed the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 to regulate debt securities, the Investment 
Company Act of 1940 to minimize conflicts of interest in companies that both trade in 
and issue their own securities, and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to regulate those 
giving investment advice. The SEC is responsible for enforcement of these laws, as well 
as in part enforcing the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 and the Dodd Frank Act of 2010.  
A key provision of the Securities Act of 1933 was the registration statement, 
which required numerous disclosures to the federal government and a securities 
prospectus for buyers. Although some criticized these components as unhelpful for 
average investors, the requirement potentially empowered at least those who could read 
the documents or hire experts to understand them. Written disclosures also meant that 
they could be cited in a court of law. The law allowed civil and criminal penalties for 
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failing to release a compliant registration statement or releasing one with false or 
misleading information.88  
In the decades since, these laws have facilitated many criminal prosecutions. In 
fact, prosecutors have a variety of tools available and tremendous discretion about whom 
to charge with what. Including securities fraud under the above laws, prosecutors may 
bring charges of mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud, plus actions under the savings 
and loan crisis-era Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act 
(FIRREA) and other statutes. Fraud charges under most of these laws carry a five-year 
statute of limitations, as well as civil and criminal penalties. However, FIRREA law has a 
ten-year statute of limitations, so long as the government can show the defendant’s 
actions “affected a financial institution."89 Also, local Blue Sky laws, like the Martin Act, 
still apply, as well. More specifically, the SEC’s Rule 10b-5, authorized by the Securities 
and Exchange Act of 1934, is perhaps the most often cited tool in tackling financial 
crime. It specifically applies to “the purchase or sale of any security” and is used to 
prosecute both fraud and insider trading. Notably, it requires proof of “willfulness,” 
meaning intent to break the law, rather than simple negligence, meaning carelessness. 
Individuals found guilty under this rule can spend up to twenty years in prison and be 
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Punishing people for disobeying society’s rules is as old human civilization itself. 
However, punishing corporations is newer and less intuitive. Like many American 
institutions, the corporation was built upon its British beginnings. In England, only the 
crown could grant a corporate charter to certain preferred entities, mostly municipal 
governments. After the revolution, the founders democratized this process by changing 
these municipal corporations to cities, schools, and charitable organizations. American 
corporations became business enterprises, such as banks and infrastructure projects, 
which were limited in scope and time. Corporate charters granted by legislatures after 
successful citizen petitions delineated capitalization limitations, length of existence, 
operation, function, and election by shareholders of directors. These corporations could 
enter into contracts and enforce them in court. In the early nineteenth century, states 
passed laws allowing for general corporation processes, rather than having the legislature 
and governor chose each one based on petitions by citizens with access, seeking to 
further democratize and privatize the process. In the decades after the passage of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, courts heard many cases where plaintiff corporations sued over 
alleged violations of its equal protection clause.  
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A corporate charter also allowed limited liability, protecting shareholders from 
being held personally legally responsible for the deeds of the corporation. This provision 
encouraged investment and economic growth. 91 However, the legal rights of 
shareholders were quite minimal beyond limited liability. For example, there were few if 
any disclosure or reporting requirements, no accounting standards, and the rights of an 
average shareholder to sue directors was uncertain.92 By the turn of the twentieth century, 
corporate structure had changed from few shareholders who also managed the company 
to many diffuse shareholders and professional managers separate from ownership. 93  
This was also the era of the trust and industrial progress. At the same time the 
new masses of industrial workers who toiled in incredibly unsafe and by today’s 
standards inhumane conditions would band together and advocate for better treatment, 
supported by some politicians like President Theodore Roosevelt in what came to be 
known as the Progressive Era. Reforms arose in this environment, with new laws 
protecting workers and limiting some corporate excesses. In 1909, the United States 
Supreme Court declared in New York Central & Hudson River R. R. Co. v United States 
that a corporation, as an abstract legal entity, could form the necessary criminal intent 
vicariously, and, therefore, that criminal charges could be brought against it for the 
actions of its employees on behalf of the company.94 Over the years, federal courts have 
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clarified the conditions under which a company may be held vicariously criminally liable 
for the actions of its employees. In 1970, a court ruled that a company may be held liable 
for criminal acts committed by a subsidiary, even if the illegal acts began before the 
merger or consolidation.95 In 1972, a federal court said a company could be liable if a 
criminal act is committed by the employee in his or her general line of duty.96 In 1989, 
this was expanded to include acts committed on behalf of the company, even if they are 
against the company’s general policies or compliance programs.97 The company must 
take proactive measures to enforce these policies, as well.98 Legal criminal intent may 
take various forms, including willful blindness to the crime(s); collective knowledge of 
criminal behavior within the firm, even if no single agent had enough knowledge to be 
convicted of the crime; active concealment of criminal behavior; and conspiracy to 
commit a crime.99  
In the 1990s the idea of prosecuting a corporation received a boost in the form of 
an academic argument. A New York University professor, Ronald Goldstock, argued that 
prosecutors should focus on the criminogenic environment of corporations.  
Corporations, he maintained, are not simply collections of individuals; they also 
constitute environmental cultures, with incentive structures that may be conducive to a 
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wide range of behaviors. If these behaviors are criminal, the corporation should be held 
criminally liable.  
But this liability, he believed, should take a new form. Ideally, law enforcement 
officials provided victims and society with a sense of fairness, rule of law, and justice, as 
well as a deterrence of future crimes, by investigating and punishing human criminals. 
Goldstock argued that prosecutors should attempt to reduce illegal behavior by targeting 
the organizations whose cultures encouraged this behavior.  For example, in the case of 
certain types of crimes, like union corruption and mob influence, he argued that criminal 
prosecution of union leaders was not the best way to reduce criminality and in fact may 
be counterproductive. Instead, a more productive tool for these unions was court-ordered 
trusteeships to instill more democratic practices. These structural changes of 
criminogenic organizations, potentially aided by self-monitoring, private auditing firms, 
public opinion, and other restructuring mechanisms required by government, could prove 
more useful than simply putting criminals in jail, he argued.100  
Why look to prosecutors to change a criminogenic environment in a union, a city 
or a bank? Goldstock argued that prosecutors are uniquely situated to have extensive 
knowledge of relevant laws and alternative options for enforcement, may have sole 
access to data from electronic surveillance, and possess the requisite discretion to 
negotiate for various reform measures in a settlement agreement (like the settlement 
agreements used extensively to deal with banks after the 2007 financial crisis).101 Federal 
Southern District of New York Judge Jed Rakoff - who served as chief of the business 
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and securities fraud unit for the last two of his seven years (1973 – 1980) as an Assistant 
United States Attorney for the Southern District and then as a white-collar defense 
attorney until he was appointed to the bench in 1996 – said this idea of “prosecutor as 
problem solver” was adopted by federal prosecutors in recent decades. “It is the shift that 
has occurred, over the past thirty years or more, from focusing on prosecuting high-level 
individuals to focusing on prosecuting companies and other institutions,” he wrote in a 
2014 New York Review of Books article.  
Charging companies and individuals need not be mutually exclusive practices, but 
experience shows that the Justice Department at times may prioritize one over the other. 
The decade before the 2008 crisis saw the Justice Department take a rare turn to focusing 
on the idea of charging companies, but being afraid to do so. Instead they relied on 
settlement agreements with these companies. Holding high-level systemically-important 
individuals accountable seems to have been lost entirely in this decade. “It is true that 
prosecutors have brought criminal charges against companies for well over a hundred 
years, but until relatively recently, such prosecutions were the exception, and 
prosecutions of companies without simultaneous prosecutions of their managerial agents 
were even rarer,” Rakoff said. In an interview, he contrasted this trend with his tenure as 
division chief in the 1970s. “I used to say to my assistants … we used to think it was 
admission of defeat if we couldn’t find the individuals,” he said.  
Pulitzer prize-winning investigative journalist Jesse Eisinger echoed Rakoff’s 
assertion that the Southern District of New York - a hub of white-collar criminal 
enforcement – historically focused on prosecuting individuals until recent decades. 




gathering organization at Syracuse University – reported in July 2015 that white collar 










White Collar Crime Prosecutions as of July 2015 
 
Number Year-to-date 5,173 
Percent Change from previous year -12.3 
Percent Change from 5 years ago -29.1 
Percent Change from 10 years ago -11.2 
Percent Change from 20 years ago -36.8 
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So, why would the Justice Department make such a drastic shift in tactic just in 
time for the 2008 financial crisis? Firstly, the Justice Department focused more on a high 
conviction rate as the 20th century drew to a close. The “conviction rate,” defined as the 
percentage of cases closed by guilty plea or conviction at trial, has been tracked and 
reported by the Justice Department for decades. But in the last few years of the 20th 
century, the rate climbed. Whereas the Department reported a conviction rate in the mid-
eighty percent range previously, between 1995 and 2000, the rate steadily climbed until it 
remained over ninety percent in the new millennium.104 A higher conviction rate looks 
like success, but actually what it reflects more is caution. The more a prosecutor is 
willing to chase a difficult, but important case, the more he is likely to have some losses, 






















Secondly, by the turn of the 20th century, businesses and their defense attorneys 
complained of an increasingly aggressive approach to prosecuting corporation and felt 
that the Justice Department had no coherent policy for charging corporations. In 
response, Assistant Attorney General Eric Holder, who would later become the Attorney 
General under President Obama, responded to these complaints with a memorandum, 
attempting to articulate a consistent and coherent policy.106 The first in a series of memos 
that would by 2008 would evolve into a virtual “Get Out of Jail Free” card for executives, 
was written in 1999 as a directive to prosecutors and was known as the “Holder Memo.” 
It allows for the possibility of taking into consideration the “collateral consequences” of 
charging a corporation with a crime, such as the punishment of innocent employees or 
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other economic consequences. It also outlines the potential for using deferred- or non-
prosecution agreements, in which the company agrees to make internal changes in 
exchange for the government withholding prosecution. Key factors the government 
would consider, according to the Holder memo, would include the company’s willingness 
to cooperate, which controversially could include waiver of attorney client privilege and 
trade secrets.107  
The Holder memo would sow the seeds of non-prosecution for the next financial 
crisis, but for the Enron-era officials, the Justice Department’s corporate timidity had not 
yet fully sprouted. In an effort to show toughness in the high profile Enron-era cases and 
convince individuals involved in these corporate crimes to “cooperate with the 
government – or else”, Deputy Attorney General Larry D. Thompson wrote a memo to 
Kathleen Hawk Sawyer, the director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), a 
department within the DOJ. The memo directed Sawyer to change the BOP’s policy of 
placing some non-violent offenders with short sentences in halfway houses when 
recommended by a judge.108 The Department prosecuted systemically important 
executives like Enron’s CEO Kenneth Lay and COO Jeffrey Skilling and Adelphia 
Cable’s Rigas family.109 Additionally, the Enron scandal included corporate prosecutions. 
The criminal prosecution of accounting giant Arthur Andersen in 2002 marked a turning 
point in the Justice Department’s quest to change the criminogenic environment of 
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companies. It was a new concept to many who dealt with corporate fraud that corporate 
executives could gain personal wealth at the expense of the corporation through 
accounting fraud, a lesson not well-enough learned from the savings and loan crisis, in 
which executives looted their own banks through creative accounting.110 A 2010 
American Bar Association (ABA) article praised the Enron prosecutions as a “watershed 
moment” for the Department in pursuing “greedy executives.”111  
“Post-Enron, prosecutors became comfortable with casting a much broader net in 
the pursuit of fraud in the capital market,” wrote Jacob Frenkel, a former federal 
prosecutor and a partner at the suburban Washington firm, Shulman, Rogers, Gandal, 
Pordy & Ecker in the ABA article “The Bush administration and opportunistic 
prosecutors saw the opportunity to bring high-profile, big-dollar cases against corporate 
leaders and public officials for how they conducted business.”112 The Justice Department 
also wanted to prosecute those who facilitated these accounting fraud scandals. And why 
shouldn’t they? These executives cost many Americans significant sums of money; 
putting them in jail would show a prosecutor’s toughness and would be a huge, public 
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win for them personally. The calculus of this decision would change by the time of the 
2008 crisis, but at that moment, it was a difficult but worthy challenge. The Department 
obtained a grand jury indictment in March 2002 for Arthur Andersen, Enron’s long-time 
auditor, charging the firm with obstruction of justice for destroying documents to 
knowingly and willingly prevent an investigation, according to a Department 
statement.113 The Department alleged that Andersen began destroying documents related 
to special business entities that it helped Enron create - an integral part of what would 
later be recognized as Enron’s accounting fraud - after the Securities and Exchange 
Commission began an investigation of the energy company. “As the indictment lays out, 
the destruction initiative began on or about October 10, 2001, as Andersen foresaw 
imminent government investigations and civil litigation. The destruction continued 
through the SEC's announcement that an investigation had been launched and only ended 
nearly one month later when the SEC officially served Andersen with a subpoena for 
Enron documents,”114 said Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson in a March 14, 
2002 statement. A series of follow up press questions focused on the potential that this 
indictment would put Andersen out of business. Thompson, a Republican George W. 
Bush administration political appointee, replied:   
“. . . as I said in our statement, these are serious charges, and it shouldn't be a 
surprise to anyone that serious charges have serious consequences. And again, without 
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talking about any particular matter, but just generally, I think it would be unfortunate for 
our criminal justice system if any individual or any entity could say that he or she or it 
was too big or too important, so as it couldn't be indicted.”115 (emphasis added.)  
 
In reference to individuals, Department memos assert that charges against a 
corporation should not preclude charging individuals within that corporation.116 The 
Holder memo explicity states: “Prosecution of a corporation is not a substitute for the 
prosecution of criminally culpable individuals within or without the corporation. Further, 
imposition of individual criminal liability on such individuals provides a strong deterrent 
against future corporate wrongdoing.”117 They also say the criteria for charging a 
corporation should be the same as for charging an individual.118 Thompson’s iteration of 
the memo reads:  
“Because a corporation can act only through individuals, imposition of individual 
criminal liability may provide the strongest deterrent against future corporate 
wrongdoing. Only rarely should provable individual culpability not be pursued, 
even in the face of offers of corporate guilty pleas.”119 (Emphasis added.)  
 
 
  However, this prosecution wound up causing serious embarrassment for the 
Department, which would have consequences for the 2008 crisis. The Department would 
be blamed for the destruction of an almost one-hundred-year-old, highly respected 
company and the loss of many innocent people’s jobs.  In 2002, Arthur Andersen lost 
most of its employees and clients after it was convicted of obstruction of justice. The firm 
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could not operate without a trustworthy reputation, and a criminal conviction of this kind 
was undoubtedly poisonous.  Thousands of blameless employees lost their jobs, 
shareholders were devastated, and vendors and others dependent on the corporation 
suffered. This could be seen as an unfortunate but perhaps necessary side effect of a 
successful prosecution. However, in 2005, the conviction was reversed by the Supreme 
Court on procedural grounds, making the company’s destruction seem all for naught. The 
high court found that the district court, agreeing with the government’s interpretation of 
the relevant law, failed to properly instruct the jury that it needed to find “consciousness 
of wrongdoing” when Andersen employees shredded documents. The Fifth Circuit court 
of appeals upheld the lower court’s interpretation of the law that the “jury need not find 
any consciousness of wrongdoing to convict.”120 However, the Supreme Court wrote that 
simply shredding documents, even those related to a government investigation, should 
not have been enough to convict.121   
Whether the firm would have been convicted if the jury had received the stricter 
instructions as interpreted by the Supreme Court remains unknown. The Justice 
Department could have retried the case, but by that time Andersen was a shell of its 
former self, and the Department was blamed for destroying the company and 
prosecutorial overreach. 122, 123, 124  
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Although the district court was responsible for the jury instructions, Supreme 
Court Chief Justice William Rehnquist wrote in the 2005 decision that prosecutors 
should have been more careful in their interpretation of the relevant federal laws, since 
the underlying act of shredding documents to hide them from the government is not 
“inherently malign,”  even though the shredding was done on Andersen’s instructions. 
The corporate community and the press accepted Rehnquist’s placement of blame and 
pounced on the Justice Department, which took this backlash seriously. “There’s a big 
lobbying effort by corporations and the white-collar defense bar, saying Justice is abusing 
power,” Eisinger said. “White collar lawyers say the Department of Justice is over-
criminalizing business behavior and that there is prosecutorial abuse.”125 The Justice 
Department responded with more memos and a markedly more cautious approach to 
charging corporations. Somehow, charging individuals, which does not punish innocent 
others like charging companies can, was caught in the web of caution as well, despite 




 The American Bar Association (ABA) lobbied hard against the Holder and 
Thompson memos. Specifically, it objected to the provision seeking a waiver of attorney-
client privilege for a corporation willing to cooperate in exchange for non-prosecution.126 
Acting Deputy Attorney General Robert McCallum sought to allay these concerns with 
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an addendum to the Thompson memo that would require each U. S. Attorney’s office to 
have a written waiver policy. However, as there was no requirement of consistency 
across offices, nor that the policies be made public, the policy did little to soothe the 
ABA’s concerns. Senator Arlen Specter, a former prosecutor, introduced the Attorney-
Client Privilege Protection Act of 2006, which provided increased protections for 
attorney-client privilege in corporate settlement negotiations. Also, Deputy Attorney 
General Paul McNulty issued a new memo to replace the Thompson version, which had 
replaced the Holder iteration. The McNulty memo changed the privilege waiver 
requirement policy to make it sought only if necessary. However, the edit did not bend 
entirely to the ABA and corporate pressure, as prosecutors could still maneuver around 
these restrictions by suggesting to a corporation that a waiver would benefit them even if 
not required.127  
Despite the corporate and legislative pushback, and the Department’s subsequent 
reforms, major embarrassments continued for Justice as the decade drew to a close. In 
2007, a federal judge dismissed thirteen of the sixteen indictments in a tax shelter case 
against former employees of the accounting firm, KPMG. U.S. District Judge Lewis A. 
Kaplan said the defendants’ constitutional rights had been violated when prosecutors 
pressured KPMG not to pay their legal fees in exchange for not indicting the company – a 
practice described in the Thompson memo. An appeals court later upheld the dismissals. 
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128 KPMG may have decided to cooperate with the government for fear that a criminal 
indictment against the company would mean a similar fate to that of Arthur Andersen 
only a few years prior. The Department again looked like it was abusing its power. 
Another high-profile embarrassment for the Justice Department was a botched 
corruption case against a powerful Senator; Ted Stevens of Alaska.129 Although the 
Stevens case did not involve the exact same type of corporate fraud as KPMG and 
Andersen, it was an extremely high-profile white-collar embarrassment for the 
Department, adding another nail in its bold prosecution coffin. In 2009, federal judge 
Emmet Sullivan overturned the Senator’s conviction for failing to disclose thousands of 
dollars in gifts from an oil industry executive.130 The Senator was indicted by the Justice 
Department less than 100 days before the November 2008 election, in which he would be 
seeking reelection. Stevens was found guilty in October 2008, 131 just in time to lose his 
seat to Democratic Anchorage Mayor Mark Begich. Stevens had been the longest serving 
Republican in Senate history at the time.132 Obviously, the loss attracted attention.  
In December 2008, an FBI whistleblower said the government failed to disclose 
exculpatory evidence in Stevens’ trial. Failing to turn over this kind of evidence to the 
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defense is known as a “Brady violation” after the 1963 Supreme Court case Brady v. 
Maryland. Judge Sullivan announced in 2009 that he had appointed a non-government 
attorney to investigate the Justice Department’s misconduct in the Stevens case. Attorney 
General Holder declined to bring a new case against the Senator. 133  Stevens never 
served jail time, but the conviction obviously negatively influenced his reelection. The 
government lawyers were not legally held accountable for misconduct, which would have 
been highly unusual. However, the lead prosecutor on the Stevens case was found to have 
exercised “poor judgment” and left his government job. Two other prosecutors on the 
case were suspended (and later reinstated), and one committed suicide before the 
investigation was completed. Also, before the investigation ended, Stevens died a 2010 
plane crash. 134 
Lastly, the unsuccessful prosecution of two mid-level Bear Stearns fund managers 
by Eastern District of New York attorneys in 2009 amounted to another major 
embarrassment for the Department; a final nail in this metaphorical coffin. The jury 
found the fund managers not guilty of fraud in November 2009, a verdict that William D. 
Cohan, a former Wall Street banker and author, wrote was “surprising – for its failure to 
conform with the zeitgeist,” concluding that the prosecution “blew it.” The response from 
the jury seems to confirm this notion. One juror told the New York Times that the jury felt 
the prosecution failed to make a good case. 135 After this loss, it was clear that the Justice 
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Department had confirmed its own fears that financial crisis cases - based on proving 
fraud with intent, rather than overly zealous or unwise business decisions - were too 
difficult to prosecute successfully. However, I argue this was a self-fulfilling prophecy.  
Some wonder why the case was brought by the Eastern District of New York - 
which includes Brooklyn, Queens, Staten Island, and both Long Island counties (Nassau 
and Suffolk) – rather than the Southern District of New York, which covers Manhattan, 
the Bronx, and several counties in the northern suburbs of New York City. Since 
Manhattan is a global financial Mecca, many major white-collar cases have been tried 
there. This is how the Department of Justice itself describes the office:  
“Today, the Office is at the forefront of many important areas of criminal law 
enforcement, including terrorism, white collar and cybercrime, mortgage fraud, 
public corruption, gang violence, organized crime, international narcotics 
trafficking and civil rights violations. Similarly, the Office litigates among the 
most complex and significant civil cases the Department of Justice handles - from 
large affirmative civil fraud cases to cases in the environmental, health care, 
immigration and bankruptcy areas, as well as cases implicating classified 
information.”136 
 
Attorneys from this office have prosecuted major politicians, insider traders, and 
other prominent figures.137 Known for its aggressive leadership and staff, it has been 
headed by the likes of Rudolph Giuliani, James Comey, and Preet Bharara. Yet the 
Southern District never filed a criminal fraud case against a senior banking executive for 
crisis-era fraud. The Eastern District has prosecuted some important criminal cases, but 
the Southern District is thought to have jurisdiction over Wall Street, and the Eastern 
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District has a reputation for a “blue-collar approach.”138  Also, the Eastern District has 
fewer than 100 Assistant United States Attorneys, a vastly smaller staff than the Southern 
District.139 Even the Bear Stearns defendants themselves argued the Southern District was 
the appropriate jurisdiction choice in this case. They filed to dismiss the case first without 
prejudice and then with prejudice, since the government brought the case in what the 
defendants believed to be an unjustified jurisdiction.140 It is unclear why the defendants 
would demand a jurisdiction that has more seasoned prosecutors, but one plausible 
scenario is the desire to have a Manhattan venue, which could potentially have more Wall 
Street-friendly jurors than Brooklyn, even if they would be taking a chance with more 




Settling for Safety 
Of the ninety-four U.S. Attorney’s offices throughout the country only some 
would have experience bringing major financial crime cases because only a few locations 
have financial centers or major financial firms. These U.S. Attorney’s offices generally 
deal with offenses within their geographical jurisdiction. Since Wall Street firms exist in 
New York City, and not Bangor, Maine, prosecutors working in New York City would 
naturally see more financial cases than in Bangor.  John Moon served as a prosecutor at 
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Main Justice in Washington from 1991 to 1993, during some of the savings and loan 
prosecutions. Some of the cases were brought in New England, and Moon was dispatched 
to help. “I brought some cases in Vermont and Maine. Assistant (United States) 
Attorneys would say, ‘we don’t even know how a bank works.’ They bring lobster 
cases.”141 In other words, most federal prosecutors are not in New York or Washington 
and are focused on local cases. Even in New York or Washington, where financial crimes 
are the region’s “lobster cases,” the Obama-era prosecutors were still gun shy. The 
Justice Department maintains a ninety percent conviction rate for all criminal cases. 
Conscious of their success record, they are unlikely to bring a case if they are not 
confident of victory.142 The series of high-profile embarrassments – especially including 
a wholesale destruction of a prominent business such as Arthur Andersen - created a 
chilling effect within the Department when measuring risk, leaving them even more 
cautious. “They got walloped in the press and they didn’t want to lose again,” said Neil 
Barofsky. This chilling effect means a career prosecutor who wants to move on to a more 
lucrative private practice after a few years will need to be more cautious. Whereas being 
an assertive and tough prosecutor, especially in a high-profile case, used to be a good bet 
for a prosecutor’s future career prospects, the very real possibility of blame for destroying 
a major company now added major weight to the strategy of playing it safe.  
Despite the walloping in the press, there is no evidence the embarrassment ruined 
the careers of the individual attorneys involved. Take Andrew Weissman for example. He 
 
141 Moon interview 
142 United States Attorney’s Annual Statistic Report, 2010. 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao/legacy/2011/09/01/10statrpt.pdf, accessed 




was a key player in the Andersen prosecution. However, he also was instrumental in the 
successful prosecution of Enron executives Kenneth Lay and Jeffrey Skilling and earned 
a reputation as a tough prosecutor. Indeed, he was director of the entire Enron Task 
Force. Clearly, the Andersen loss, while embarrassing for the Department, didn’t tarnish 
Weissman’s tough record. He went on to positions as the General Counsel of the FBI and 
a prosecutor in Robert Mueller’s Special Counsel’s Office while it investigated Russian 
interference in the 2016 presidential election. 143 However, he had high-profile wins as 
well. Not all attorneys stay at the Department for as long as Weissman did. In fact, 
according to Harvard Law School, “a significant portion” of Assistant United States 
Attorneys spend five to seven years in the role before moving on to other work.144 
The Department as a whole took on a more cautious tone anyway. New attorneys 
in this era would be incentivized by the culture of caution and the Departmental 
reputation when thinking of their future careers, instead of taking a cue from the 
Andersen prosecutors. Ultimately, even a young prosecutor looking to repeat Weissman’s 
aggressive approach, despite the risks and damaged Department reputation, may be 
standing alone, which falls far short of what is needed for a complicated government 
prosecution. Weissman had an aggressive task force behind him after all. Additionally, he 
was already in a prominent position, not looking for a career-making or –breaking case.  
By 2010, the Department seemed to be firmly resigned to the safe road, relying 
entirely on settlement agreements with the major players involved in the 2008 financial 
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crisis. Southern District of New York U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara said in an October 
speech at the American Bar Association entitled, “The Future of White Collar 
Enforcement,” that although the Department was committed to its long-standing goals of 
aggressively pursuing financial fraud to ensure the safety and fairness of financial 
markets, “especially now, with the economy down, public frustration up, and epic frauds 
surfacing with increasing frequency,” its attorneys were also conscious of collateral 
consequences. Prosecutors are aware, he emphasized, “that with our subpoena and grand 
jury power comes the power to injure individual lives and destroy corporate 
reputations.  So, we must always take care to exercise our discretion with great care and 
an even hand.”145 In other words, be cautious. It is hard to imagine a prosecutor saying 
this of Enron CEO Ken Lay, or a person accused of robbery, for that matter. 
Bharara said he expected his Assistant U.S. Attorneys to be tough but fair, 
aggressive, creative, open-minded, and “supremely principled.” He also said he was open 
to meeting with defense attorneys personally, if there were a complaint or appeal. 
However, despite private lawsuits and news articles piling up on the reality of toxic  
mortgage-backed products, Bharara spent much of the speech talking about insider 
trading; a seemingly tone-deaf choice. It is unclear why Bharara would focus on insider 
trading, rather than the hot topic of fraud. Based on the cases made from his office, one 
could speculate that he was setting expectations. Insider trading cases might be easier to 
prosecute because the government can show that a person bought or sold a stock and 
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received relevant and non-public information. Wire taps or emails can show what 
information a person received and when he or she received it. Then, the purchase or sale 
of a stock can be easily discerned. A more straightforward case is easier to prove to a jury 
when trying to show intent. Securities fraud cases are more technically complicated, 
allowing for the used car salesman defense: the seller of mortgage bonds can plead that 
he was simply being an aggressive salesman. The remainder of the speech called on 
attorneys and companies to self-police and self-report issues, a strategy that the crisis 
itself showed to be unrealistic.146 Bharara closed his speech by saying, perhaps a bit too 
idealistically given his office’s lack of action:  
And so the truly great lawyer – motivated by conscience, guided by principle, and 
empowered by training – can serve as the greatest antidote against a creeping 
corporate corruption that has so sapped people’s faith in our economic order. In 
the end, the good lawyer makes a living; the great lawyer makes a difference.147 
Contrary to this sentiment, government lawyers relied increasingly on settlements 
known as deferred and non-prosecution agreements. It is worthwhile to note that deferred 
prosecution agreements usually become de facto non-prosecution agreements, as 
prosecutions have never followed from deferred prosecution agreements used in the 
crisis, even when the banks fail to follow all requirements. However, when the initial 
announcement is made that the bank will not face prosecution as long as it “behaves” and 
it comes with a sizeable settlement amount, the Justice Department looks tough. Media 
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attention moves on before anyone checks whether the reforms were made. These 
agreements were attractive for an embattled and gun-shy Department, in that they 
required significantly less time, money and risk than criminal prosecutions and could be 
presented as “wins” to the public, with large dollar amounts making news headlines.  
These settlement agreements attempt to impose various reforms on banks in order to 
correct a criminogenic or unethical environment, but do so without the usual constraints 
applied to both regulation and litigation. 148 This change results from “increased emphasis 
on corporate (rather than individual) liability, skyrocketing monetary penalties, and the 
nearly exclusive imposition of those penalties via innovative legal instruments that 
facilitate out-of-court settlement.”149 There is little or no judicial review, as there would 
be in litigation. For better or worse, the public comment process, interest group input, turf 
battles, congressional involvement and administrative agency actions can be avoided as 
well, unlike in legislation. Additionally, although settlements are made with single 
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Justice Department Settlement Agreement Trends151 
 
The Justice Department increasingly relied on non-prosecution and deferred-prosecution 
agreements in the years after the Supreme Court overturned the Arthur Andersen 
conviction and the Department took the blame for the unnecessary destruction of a 




For example, J.P. Morgan’s $13 billion settlement agreement may have sounded 
impressive to an angry public, but these fines, which punished blameless shareholders, 
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employees, and vendors and not necessarily the individuals responsible, permitted 
corporations to return to normal business operations and profit margins. With little or no 
sign of customers avoiding admittedly guilty companies, the financial services business 
continued as usual; extravagant bonuses to top executives grew unabated. In fact, in the 
midst of the crisis the banks consolidated, aggressively encouraged by government 
officials, becoming even larger. Indeed, they are now even more “too big to fail.”152 
Mortgage securities attorney Isaac Gradman said the reliance on civil settlements creates 
a perverse incentive scenario for “Too Big to Fail” bank executives. 
They fall out in the wash when you factor in how much money the banks made 
from the entire enterprise of packaging and selling subprime Mortgage Backed 
Securities. The only real deterrence that I have found is the threat of criminal 
prosecution and the threat of personal disgorgement of profits from individuals. 
Otherwise there really is no deterrence for them not to perpetuate the exact same 
fraud in the future and just find more creative ways to do that. It’s just the cost of 
doing business in that scenario. 153 
 
In other words, the settlements that the increasingly skittish Justice Department 
began to rely on made no meaningful law enforcement impact, and Department 
prosecutors’ work environment changed. “They all become gun-shy about prosecuting 
individuals,” Eisinger said. “They lose the skill set.”.154  
Despite white collar prosecutions being at a twenty-year low, there was some 
activity in 2010 and 2011. The FBI’s 2010 – 2011 crime report said that as the economy 
began to crater during the crisis, the  
FBI witnessed a steady rise in securities and commodities frauds as investors 
sought alternative investment opportunities … Since 2008, securities and 
commodities fraud investigations have increased by 52 percent, and the FBI 
currently has over 1,800 pending investigations. During this period, the losses 
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associated with these types of schemes have increased to billions of dollars. The 
losses are associated with depreciative market value of businesses, reduced or 
nonexistent return on investments, and legal and investigative costs. The victims 
of securities and commodities frauds include individual investors, financial 
institutions, public and private companies, government entities, pension funds, 
and retirement funds.155 
 
Perhaps the most famous among these cases are Bernard Madoff and Raj 
Rajaratnam. Madoff, who devised a massive Ponzi scheme, was turned in by his sons, 
pleaded guilty, and was sentenced to 150 years in prison in 2009, slightly before the spike 
in cases outlined by the data,.156 In 2011, Rajaratnam, an enormously wealthy insider 
trader, was undone by wire taps, a tactic that had previously been reserved to drug and 
organized crime cases, and sentenced to eleven years in prison. Reporting on the appeals 
court’s ruling, the New York Times’ DealBook column applauded government 
prosecutors for their “aggressive” efforts on insider trading cases.  
The ruling validates the aggressive tactics deployed by federal prosecutors in the 
government’s sweeping investigation into insider trading on Wall Street, which 
has resulted in more than 70 convictions or guilty pleas since 2009.157 
 
 The FBI and its Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force partners conducted 
“Operation Broken Trust,” a sweep targeting companies and individuals for various 
securities fraud schemes occurring between August and December 2010, resulting in both 
civil and criminal cases. 158 On December 6, 2010, Attorney General Holder announced 
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that the results of Operation Broken Trust were 343 criminal defendants – both 
individuals and corporations – including “more than 120,000 victims with losses 
attributable to alleged criminal activity of more than $8 billion.”159 According to the 
report, the most common types of securities and commodities fraud during this time 
period included Ponzi schemes, pyramid schemes, market manipulation schemes, 
confidence scams, foreign currency exchange fraud, precious metals fraud, broker 
embezzlement, and trading shares during prohibited hours. At the end of fiscal year 2011, 
the FBI reported 1,846 cases of securities and commodities fraud, 520 indictments, and 
394 convictions. This is up from approximately 1,200 pending securities and 
commodities fraud cases in fiscal 2008. 160 This may seem like a flurry of activity and 
aggressive enforcement. However, none of these cases were brought against individuals 
in charge of systemically important or “Too Big to Fail” institutions. In other words, 
those executives and companies that were charged criminally were less likely to have 
seemingly endless resources for defense and negotiation than those of the megabanks. 
Nor would it likely have an impact on the global economy. Most importantly, it wasn’t 
much of a deterrent for the leaders of megabanks in the future.  
          If the major cases highlighted in the FBI report included important sounding 
companies with big dollar values, the settlements were such that the banks could 
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generally live with them. The major examples in the FBI report include “Joseph Blimline, 
who orchestrated one of North Texas’ largest oil and gas investment Ponzi schemes, 
defrauding 7,700 investors of over $485 million;” seven officials from A&O Entities of 
Richmond, Virginia, which sold shares in life insurance policies to mostly elderly 
investors in a $100 million Ponzi scheme; and New York-based Nicholas Cosmo, who 
ran a Ponzi scheme worth hundreds of millions of dollars.161  
 The report also details the agency’s efforts in prosecuting mortgage fraud, 
financial institution fraud, and other crimes. The agency boasted 1,223 indictments and 
1,082 convictions; $1.38 billion in restitutions; $116.3 million in fines; $15.7 million in 
seizures; and $7.33 million in forfeitures in fiscal year 2011. The FBI lists such mortgage 
fraud cases in this period as Luis Belevan and The Guardian Group, LLC of Phoenix; 
Howard Shmuckler, The Shmuckler Group of Washington, D.C.; and Carl Cole; David 
Crisp of Sacramento.162 However, Angelo Mozilo, co-founder of Countrywide Financial 
– responsible for billions of dollars in subprime mortgages and one of the biggest 
contributors to the financial crisis – learned in June 2016 that he would face neither a 
criminal nor a civil case from the Justice Department for mortgage fraud. (He settled with 
the Securities and Exchange Commission for $67.5 million, avoiding a civil trial, and the 
Justice Department simply dropped its criminal investigation).163 Mozilo has been an icon 
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for public anger, while those men listed as case highlights in the FBI’s report were 
comparably meaningless or irrelevant to the grander scheme of the subprime mortgage 
crisis.  
Likely as a response to the immense public criticism the Department received for 
not prosecuting important executives, Assistant Attorney General Sally Quillian Yates 
issued her own memo on September 9, 2015, urging prosecutors to charge individuals.  
“One of the most effective ways to combat corporate misconduct is by seeking 
accountability from the individuals who perpetrated the wrongdoing. Such accountability 
is important for several reasons: it deters future illegal activity, it incentivizes changes in 
corporate behavior, it ensures that the proper parties are held responsible for their actions, 
and it promotes the public's confidence in our justice system… There are, however, many 
substantial challenges unique to pursuing individuals for corporate misdeeds. In large 
corporations, where responsibility can be diffuse, and decisions are made at various 
levels, it can be difficult to determine if someone possessed the knowledge and criminal 
intent necessary to establish their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This is particularly 
true when determining the culpability of high-level executives, who may be insulated 
from the day-to-day activity in which the misconduct occurs. As a result, investigators 
often must reconstruct what happened based on a painstaking review of corporate 
documents, which can number in the millions, and which may be difficult to collect due 
to legal restrictions. These challenges make it all the more important that the Department 
fully leverage its resources to identify culpable individuals at all levels in corporate 
cases.”164 
 
This change of tune by a Department that had been increasingly cautious on white 
collar crime again shows how sensitive the Department is to public criticism (usually), as 
the Department took much public flack for not prosecuting any executives from the 2008 
crisis. Yates articulated the challenge of prosecuting any executive individually, 
especially in a megacorporation like an international investment bank, in which there are 
many layers of management to insulate those at the top. Instead of simply tapping 
phones, the government would have had to build mountains of evidence using other 
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methods, like following extensive paper trails and inducing lower level employees to 
testify against their superiors – read: more time consuming and expensive. Yates wrote in 
her memo that the difficulty of reaching well-insulated executives was all the more 
reason the Department should use its might to do so. Her memo, she wrote, was the result 
of a working group that met to outline new and existing measures for the Department to 
achieve these goals. But by 2015, due to a likely five-year statute of limitations, it was 
probably too late. If it that were not the case – it is possible the savings and loan era 
FIRREA law could have been used to extend the limit to ten years - the fact remains, 
these hard cases would have had true public value for their ability to remove the 
incentives for destructive financial fraud crimes and restore public trust in the 
government and its justice system. However, they never occurred. 
This narrative shows what kind of incentive structure prosecutors face within an 
evolving Justice Department that is sensitive to outside criticism. It is reasonable for a 
government agency, funded by taxpayers and run by appointees chosen and monitored by 
democratically elected politicians, to be sensitive to outside criticism, at least to some 
extent. A democratic society necessitates accountability. However, the rule of law, which 
governs the way a fair and democratic society must conduct its affairs, necessitates that 
criminal prosecutions are based on an egalitarian application of the laws as much as 
possible. To be sure, neither total accountability to affected groups, nor an entirely 
unbiased application of the laws is realistic. These two goals are both important and but 
also can be in conflict, not to mention law enforcement is conducted by human beings, 
not emotionless, selfless computers. Do prosecutors act on behalf of a nebulous notion of 




unclear notion of “the masses?” The truth is that prosecutors are human beings who have 
personal interests to consider, such as the ability to support themselves and their families. 
A better salary is a powerful incentive for even those most civic-minded, especially in an 
overwhelmingly expensive city like New York. If the Justice Department’s recent past 
missteps make it clear that a prosecutor who takes too much of a risk to bring justice to 
those most responsive for the 2008 crisis that he could be risking a future livelihood, it is 
hard to imagine many people willing to act counter to these incentives. Before the 
Andersen embarrassment – such as during the savings and loan and earlier Ernon-era 
prosecutions – being aggressive was a great career move. Now it could be career suicide. 







Chapter 4: A Summary of the Crisis  
Mortgage-backed securities (MBS) became a popular investment tool in the last 
few decades of the twentieth century. They were initially seen as a safe investment for 
government pension funds, community banks, and other conservative institutional 
investment funds seeking to create a moderate return for their pile of capital; as few home 
owners were likely to default on their payments, they were presented as highly safe 




Initially, these investments were indeed relatively safe during the era of carefully vetting 
borrowers for the ability to repay before granting them a loan. With borrowers meeting 
loan standards of twenty-percent down, a stable job with enough income to meet a steady 
monthly fixed payment for a thirty-year mortgage, and a good credit score, an investor 
could be relatively sure he would receive the periodic payments promised for buying a 
share in a pool of hundreds or thousands of mortgages. Investors looking for the least 
risky mortgage-based investments - as was the case for many institutional investors - 
were told that the mortgages in the package met traditional underwriting standards like 
those just detailed, making default unlikely. Also, there were other safeguards built into 
the lowest risk-lowest return parts of mortgage investments as well, such as geographic 
diversity, bond insurance and higher-risk-higher reward slices or “tranches” of the 
mortgage bond that would take losses first.165  Figure 4.1 shows how mortgages flow 
from originators, are grouped together in a large pool and then divided into slices or 
“tranches” based on the likelihood of repayment. Most of the mortgages are considered 
highly likely to be repaid and would therefore be considered low risk, yet low yield. 
Ratings agencies would give them a score of AAA, or the same risk level as U.S. 
Government bonds. However, various tranches would be created for those wanting more 
reward for more risk. These “lower” tranches would be paid after those above them, 
making it more likely for them to lose money if any of the homeowners in the mortgage 
pool defaulted on their payments. For taking on these higher risk groups, investors would 
get higher returns. The lowest tranches would sometimes get repackaged themselves.  
 
 





Residential Mortgage Backed Securities Illustration166  
From the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission findings 
 
In the last few decades of the 20th century, the investment banking industry began 
to change, and MBS went along with it. As William D. Cohan writes in Why Wall Street 
Matters (2017), beginning in 1969 these banks began to change from partnerships to 
public corporations. As partnerships, they had drawn on funds from the partners, who 
 




were accordingly risk averse; as corporations, they could draw on vastly greater debt and 
equity financing, other people’s money, and became more willing to gamble; a system of 
executive bonuses heightened the risk-taking incentive.167 Soon the prime borrower 
market was tapped out, and investment banks were left with a demand for more MBS 
investment opportunities than they could deliver. Investment banks received millions in 
fees for packaging and selling these mortgage-based bonds and executives were rewarded 
accordingly. Banks also invested in MBS products themselves, using massive amounts of 
“leverage,” or borrowed money, to do so. Leveraging is risky if the value of an 
investment drops, but much more profitable than investing with only the cash on hand. At 
this point, they needed more loans to package and sell.  
The investment banks began to encourage commercial banks originating the loans 
to be increasingly lenient with their standards to obtain more loans to package and sell to 
investors, as the demand for these investments outpaced the supply of prime mortgages. 
This was in combination with the government’s pressure for the banks to do the same 
through semi-private Government Sponsored Entities (GSE) – Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac - that helped Americans get home loans by buying loans off the books of mortgage 
banks, freeing them up to make more loans.  In the early years of the 21st century in 
particular, after the dot-com bubble burst, investors needed to make more money and the 
Federal Reserve had lowered interest rates. Home buying thus became much more 
attractive, as monthly payments seemed within the reach of many who had considered 
themselves excluded. Mortgage-based investments were the way to go. To obtain more 
loans for these investments, banks began easing down-payment requirements until many 
 




Americans began purchasing homes for no money down and with no documentation 
proving ability to repay. Credit scores and income requirements dropped as well. These 
lower-standard loans were known as “subprime” and were riskier loans to make. Figure 
4.2 shows how subprime loans went from 8.3 percent of all new mortgages in 2003, to 
almost a quarter of new mortgages within three years.  
Figure 4.2  
 
Frequency of Subprime Mortgages168 
From the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission findings 
 
Banks made millions of dollars in fees originating and servicing loans and passed 
on the risk by selling these loans to investment banks to package and sell to investors. 
Banks charged borrowers a myriad of fees when making the loan. Some also had 
“servicing” divisions as well, in which they collected monthly payments, earning fees 
that way, too, and at times charging pre-payment and late fees.  
 




Countrywide Mortgage Lenders LLC is a prime example of an originator bank 
becoming a “fee machine.”169 In 2006, it had revenue of $11.4 billion and pretax income 
of $4.3 billion. 
When borrowers close on their loans, they pay fees for flood and tax 
certifications, appraisals, document preparation, even charges associated with e-
mailing documents or using FedEx to send or receive paperwork, according to 
Countrywide documents. It’s a big business: During the last 12 months, 
Countrywide did 3.5 million flood certifications, conducted 10.8 million credit 
checks and 1.3 million appraisals, its filings show.170 
 
During the peak years of subprime lending, these borrowers were often given 
adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs), as compared to prime borrowers, who typically agree 
to fixed-rate mortgages, with a steady interest rate locked in for the life of the loan.  
These ARMs often had low interest rates to start, which then skyrocketed after two or 
three years, when the introductory “teaser” rate period expired, and the new rates 
fluctuated with market rates. Other subprime loans featured negative amortization, 
meaning the principal balance grew over time. Subprime loans were often so complex 
that average borrowers could hardly be expected to understand the terms, perhaps trusting 
the expert bankers giving them the loan. However, Countrywide and its commissioned 
employees were incentivized to push riskier, high-cost loans on borrowers because they 
garnered more in fees. Riskier loans, like those with prepayment penalties and adjustable 
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interest rates, were more attractive in the secondary market because as borrowers paid 
more, more cash would be flowing to mortgage backed security investors.  
Some borrowers who could have qualified for lower-cost loans – like government-backed 
Federal Housing Administration or Veteran’s Administration loans - were pushed into 
riskier loans for this reason. In this quest for fees, race came into the picture as well.  In 
December 2006, Countrywide settled with then New York Attorney General Elliot 
Spitzer to end a two-year investigation into allegations that the lender was specifically 
pushing black and Latino borrowers into high-cost loans. Countrywide agreed to 
compensate these borrowers, improve internal fair lending policies, and pay three million 
dollars for an independently run mortgage education program targeting minority 
communities. 171  
Although Countrywide was certainly not the only subprime lender fueling the 
bubble and preying on borrowers, “In terms of being unresponsive to what was 
happening, to sticking it out the longest, and continuing to justify the garbage they were 
selling, Countrywide was the worst lender,” Ira Rheingold, executive director of the 
National Association of Consumer Advocates told the New York Times in 2007. “And 
anytime states tried to pass responsible lending laws, Countrywide was fighting it tooth 
and nail.”172 
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Eventually the housing market became saturated, and prices began to drop due to 
excessive supply. At the same time, the Fed increased interest rates again, causing a 
shocking and unaffordable increase in monthly mortgage payments for many Americans 
and an inability to sell off their now unaffordable homes. Many homes were “under 
water,” that is, worth less than what was owed on the house. Housing values continued to 
plummet in a positive feedback loop. Loan defaults and foreclosures began en masse. 173 
The three major rating agencies, Standard and Poor’s Global Ratings, Fitch 
Ratings Inc., and Moody’s Investor Services Inc., which were paid by the investment 
banks to rate their products, initially gave most of these mortgage-backed investments 
AAA ratings, the safest score possible and the same as a U.S. government-backed 
treasury bill. Due to creative packaging, the safest loans could be pooled, protected with 
an insurance buffer and diversified by region. These investments seemed safe, as many 
homeowners would have to default all at once for them to lose money – a prospect that 
seemed impossible before the housing crisis - and they promised relatively high 
returns.174  
However, millions of homeowners did begin to default on their loans all at once, 
and the mortgage securities that relied on these loans began to drop in value, as did more 
complicated variations of the MBS, called collateralized mortgage obligations (CDOs), 
synthetic CDOs, and CDOs squared.175 These investment products further amplified 
losses throughout the system. A full understanding of CDOs is complicated. Figures 4.3 
and 4.4, as well as a previous figure in this chapter, are taken from Stanford Law 
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School’s website. The figures may not demonstrate to the lay reader how these financial 
products truly work with a perfect understanding. However, the figures are intended more 
for the purpose of demonstrating the increasing complexity of these products beyond 
MBS. The lesson to take here is that these products were massaged, manipulated and 
repackaged until the original loans underlying them were a distant memory. Some 
financial products, such as synthetic CDOs, had no actual home loans underlying them at 
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Synthetic CDO Example176 
 
 











The rating agencies dropped the AAA ratings on many investments, as defaults 
continued to mount, eventually lowering many of them to junk status. A 2011 
congressional report blamed this mass downgrade for the financial crisis.177  
Like a massive and dangerous game of musical chairs, when prices began to tank, many 
banks were caught with bad assets on their books, as they invested in mortgage 
securitizations, as well as sold them. Once many began scrutinizing the products more 
closely, they already had them on their books and couldn’t get rid of them, as everyone 
wanted to sell at once. Some investment banks had credit default swaps (CDS) – 
essentially insurance contracts or hedges on the mortgage securitizations, sometimes even 
the very ones they had sold to their own customers.  Others tried to offload these 
mortgage-backed investments as far as possible once they heard the music nearing its 
end. When the music stopped, some banks were in a better financial position than others. 
The increasingly precarious financial condition inside some became known, and they 
stopped lending to each other, which was an essential function for daily operation. 
Investment banks began hoarding cash, and this credit seizure rippled into all corners of 
the economy. 178  
The federal government in the waning days of the Bush administration took 
extensive measures to stabilize the economy, starting with the investment banks. The 
government aided J.P. Morgan in taking over the failing investment bank, Bear Stearns 
Companies Inc., in March 2008, while letting Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. declare 
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bankruptcy in September 2008. Government regulators encouraged other mergers 
designed to rescue banks teetering on the brink of failure, including Bank of America 
Corporation’s purchase of Countrywide Mortgage and Merrill Lynch.179 American 
International Group Inc., known as AIG, was by far the largest issuer of CDS policies, 
and when many insurance payouts all came due at once, the company faced insolvency. 
The insurance company received a $122 billion bailout loan from the government. Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac became insolvent, too, and as already quasi-government agencies, 
they were taken over by the government in 2008. 180 Congress passed a $700 billion 
bailout package known as the Troubled Asset Relief Program designed to provide 
liquidity to the major banks. President Obama took office in 2009 and focused on further 
stabilizing the economy with a massive stimulus package. In 2010, he also oversaw the 
passage of the Dodd-Frank Financial Reform act to help prevent the kind of liquidity and 
credit problems that occurred during the crisis. Banks paid billions of dollars in fines – 
which could be used for tax write offs and was paid by the company rather than by any 
person - for their actions during the crisis. Yet, no executive responsible for the systemic 
damage done to the economy and millions of Americans by the MBS securitization 
machine was criminally prosecuted. This inaction left those responsible for the fraudulent 
misdeeds contributing to the crisis without punishment. There remains little disincentive 
for this type of behavior to reoccur.  
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Chapter 5: Case Studies from the Crisis - Potential Evidence for a Case? 
Was there really fraud? Or was it just a series of bad business decisions and 
irrational overinvestment in a bubble market? Some industry defenders, such as a former 
prosecutor and current white-collar defense attorney, say people were simply overly 
exuberant. Their argument becomes problematic when they acknowledge that the 
government did prosecute for fraud some much less influential mortgage industry people. 
This is evidence that the government recognized there were bad actors in the financial 
crisis. The attorney said investment bankers packaging and selling the securitizations 
based on these loans likely suffered from misunderstanding, bad incentives, and poor 
forecasting, but not bad faith or criminality.181 It seems highly unlikely that all the worst 
actors were those without powerful companies behind them and influential corporate 
executives were simply too bullish. The small fries are criminals, but the big wigs are 
gutsy investors? That scenario strains credibility. 
I will show in this chapter that there is an abundance of evidence for criminality 
and bad faith at the highest levels of investment banking during the 2008 financial crisis. 
The following examples are only a selection of what could have been explored by an able 
team of federal prosecutors with the right incentives structure and the full weight of the 
Justice Department’s resources to make a case with a decent chance of success. No doubt 
these would be difficult cases to win, but it seems negligent on the part of the Justice 
Department to pursue settlements with companies that were essentially get out of jail free 
passes for the individual actors. 
 




 John Moon, a former white-collar federal prosecutor, pointed to the level of 
complexity as the difference between savings and loan-era prosecutions and the subprime 
mortgage and subsequent financial crisis.  He said that the “bad acts” committed during 
the savings and loan era were simply easier to prove in a criminal case than those of the 
more recent crisis. “Everyone can understand giving out bad loans or phonying up 
documents used to apply for the loan. Everyone can figure out that’s bad behavior,” 
Moon said of the earlier crisis. 182 In contrast, the 2008 crisis’ mechanics would have 
been much harder to explain to a jury, Moon said.  
To explore this idea a bit further, we must first understand which laws they may 
have broken. Prosecutors could have brought a case under a variety of statutes, including 
those dealing with mail fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud, securities fraud, and others, as 
outlined in a previous chapter.183 Generally, a criminal conviction would require proof 
that the actor intended to commit the fraudulent act or was willfully blind to it, and that 
the government had proven its case “beyond a reasonable doubt,” rather than the lower 
civil standard of “preponderance of the evidence.” In other words, a criminal conviction 
requires proof with almost total certainty, while a civil case only needs a likelihood of 
more than half. This is a challenge in itself, and rightly so. If the state wishes to deny a 
person of their constitutional right to liberty, it should have to meet a high burden. Still, 
criminal cases are made successfully in American courts of law every day. 
 More specifically, a securities fraud case would be relevant for banks issuing 
mortgage backed securities and related investments. According to the American Bar 
 





Association, most securities fraud cases are brought under section 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), which prohibit any untrue, misleading or omitted “material” 
information in connection with the purchase or sale of a security. This kind of securities 
fraud claim would also need proof of intent or knowledge of wrongdoing, a reliance on 
this information by investors and their related economic loss.184 In other words, did the 
seller knowingly give false or misleading information, or leave out anything important; 
did the buyer rely on the seller’s word, and did the buyer lose money. 
 The major difficulty in bringing these types of cases is proving intent to defraud 
or the “knowingly” part. A person’s knowledge or intent is hard to prove. Company 
officials can claim they could not foresee bad outcomes and were simply aggressively 
doing business with the best knowledge they had at the time, and this claim may very 
well be honest. Salesmen often use puffery as a defense, in other words, pardonable 
exaggeration. However, this explanation is not always the truth. This is the defense used 
successfully in the Bear Stearns hedge fund manager trial in 2009 and is likely the 
biggest obstacle the government would have faced in bringing criminal charges against 
high-level executives. Recent federal court decisions have highlighted, if not increased 
this challenge. For example, in December 2010, a federal appeals court overturned the 
conviction of Prabhat Goyal, the former chief financial officer of Network Associates, on 
fifteen counts of securities fraud, making false filings with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, and making false statements to the company’s auditors, citing lack of 
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sufficient proof of intent to defraud.185 Additionally, executives may be well insulated 
from decision making, citing lower level managers and employees with their names on 
sales documents. Therefore, these cases are challenging to bring successfully even 
without top dollar defense lawyers, which finance executives would obviously employ. I 
am certainly not arguing a criminal case against a high-level executive would be easy.  
However, long-lasting public resentment of “the 1%,” increasing mistrust in the 
American justice system, and the following examples suggest that further efforts were 
warranted. I argue more aggressive prosecutors with the right incentives and resources 
could have brought some effective cases. At the very least, the American rule of law 
required some public efforts to hold finance executives accountable, such as the 
government did in previous financial crises. Even if not all cases were won, there would 
at least be a public discussion on what truly happened at the highest levels of these 
financial institutions. If courts of law found there were no laws broken, these trials would 
at least give the public more information to decide whether new criminal laws were 
necessary. Congressman Al Green, Democrat of Texas, summed up during an April 20, 
2010 hearing on the Lehman bankruptcy the frustrations of the American public and 
many elected officials: 
How can this kind of thing … how can this go on and no one suffers some sort of 
criminal investigation to the extent that the public is aware of it? This is just 
amazing. When I read this information, I was thunderstruck. Because I couldn't 
believe that all of this information is available and we haven't seen anyone 
arrested. The public at some point has to see some sort of effort to bring to justice 
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people who do this and that take advantage of so many others with these 
misleading and incorrect documents.186 
 
 
Clayton Holdings LLC  – When bankers wanted to create a mortgage backed 
security for sale to investors, they needed to purchase thousands of loans for each one. To 
be sure these loans were likely to be repaid, they could examine them for quality. 
However, the purchasers - often investment banks known as the securitizers - found it 
impractical to do so for each one, so they would take a sample to examine instead. A 
sample could be between thirty percent of the loan pool to as little as two or three percent 
at times. They could check a random sample of the loan pool or focus on those loans 
most likely to be problematic. Examiners – who may be in-house at the securitizing 
institution or a third-party company – would use three main criteria in their examination: 
to what extent did the loan comply with the originator’s and sometimes the securitizer’s 
stated underwriting standards; did it comply with federal and state laws; and to what 
extent were there ‘compensating factors’ that may offset any non-compliant parts of the 
loan. For example, an applicant with a lower stated income may have considerable 
savings in the bank or cash from relatives. The examiner would compile a report for the 
pool as a whole based on what they saw. With that knowledge, the securitizer could 
eliminate loans that did not meet these guidelines and negotiate a price for the entire 
pool.187 
Clayton Holdings is a third-party company that examines loan pools for banks. 
Their information has been instrumental in some civil cases and investigations 
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surrounding the financial crisis. Clayton’s executives told the federal government’s 
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission that in the eighteen months preceding June 30, 
2007, it examined 911,039 loans for Citigroup Inc., Credit Suisse Group AG, Deutsche 
Bank AG, Goldman Sachs Group Inc., JP Morgan, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, 
UBS Group AG and Washington Mutual. Out of these nearly one million loans, fifty-four 
percent met all guidelines (known as Grade 1), eighteen percent were approved with 
compensating factors, such as extra savings or assets (known as Grade 2), and thirty-nine 
percent were deficient without sufficient mitigating factors (known as Grade 3). 
However, the securitizers can choose to “wave in” loans anyway, and the banks did so for 
thirty-nine percent of those found deficient, or eleven percent of the total pool.188 One 
possible reason for waiving in so many of these loans was that securitizers were desperate 
for them, according to Clayton President Keith Johnson.189   
Moody’s rating agency told the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission that non-
compliance with standards may be a misleading qualification because banks use different 
measures. In other words, standards aren’t standardized. However, the potentially 
fraudulent behavior was not lack of compliance with standards, it was banks saying they 
complied when they did not. The banks packaging and selling the MBS and related 
products created sales statements, known as prospectuses, in which they categorized the 
nature of the underlying loans. According to Clayton’s data, they knowingly provided 
false information in these statements. “Prospectuses indicated that the loans in the pools 
either met guidelines outright or had compensating factors, even though Clayton’s 
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records show that only a portion of the loans were sampled, and that of those that were 
sampled, a substantial percentage of Grade 3 loans were waved in” according to the FCIC 
report.190 Column E of Figure 5.1 shows high waiver rates at many of the major 
investment banks during the peak months of frenzied securitization, shortly before the 
crash. Recalling our earlier definition of fraud as knowingly providing false or 
misleading information that causes a purchaser to lose money, this should have pricked 
up the ears of government prosecutors. Clayton’s data has been used in various non-
criminal cases. It makes a compelling argument for a criminal one as well. It lays out 
very clearly the knowingly and misleading components, and any quick glance at a 
newspaper from the time period would make it clear that anyone holding an MBS 
investment was losing money. One potential defense is that the purchasers of MBS were 
sophisticated professionals, and therefore should have known better. But caveat emptor is 
not a defense for outright fraud. If a seller is outright untruthful, rather than simply 
exaggerating, there is always an information imbalance and no amount of sophistication 
can overcome this imbalance. This is the very essence of why securities laws were 













Rejected Loans Waived in, by Bank191 




Countrywide Mortgage Chairman, CEO and Co-Founder Angelo Mozilo and 
Bank of America Chairman and CEO Kenneth Lewis – 
At the height of the financial crisis, in January 2008, Bank of America (BofA) 
bought Countrywide as the once-giant mortgage company was collapsing under the 
weight of the subprime mortgage crisis that it had been instrumental in fueling. 
 




Countrywide reported a $1.2 billion loss in the third quarter of 2007 after twenty-five 
years of profit, and saw its shares drop seventy-nine percent in 2007. At the time of the 
BofA purchase, a CNN Money article reported “Bank of America Chairman and CEO 
Kenneth Lewis suggested he was aware of the troubles that his firm was taking on, but 
said acquiring Countrywide was a ‘rare opportunity’ for his company.” Lewis said his 
company was obtaining a valuable mortgage platform for a deeply discounted price. 192  
The office of Assistant U.S. Attorney Stephen A. Cazares, of the Central District 
of California began a grand jury investigation of the former Countrywide executive in 
2008. The district covers  Riverside, San Bernardino, Orange, Los Angeles, San Luis 
Obispo, Santa Barbara, Ventura, and Calabasas, California – the former home of 
Countrywide Financial Corp. However, by 2011, California prosecutors wound down the 
case without filing any criminal charges. "Sometimes the public thinks all you have to do 
is to indict someone and that’s it," an anonymous federal source told the Washington 
Post, regarding the Mozilo case. "But you have to be able to prove your case, and it can 
be worse losing a case than not bringing one at all."193 This quote shows the abundance of 
caution these prosecutors felt. The question is, who is it worse for; the Justice 
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Department, the American people, the economy? No, it was none of the above. Logic 
dictates that the speaker was talking about himself.  
The Justice Department may have different goals depending on the political 
philosophy of those elected and appointed to run it. Which laws it enforces and how 
aggressively it does so is always a decision to be made. Certainly, it could be worse for 
the Department’s reputation and operation if it continues to lose cases or does so in a way 
that harms many Americans, such as Enron’s accounting firm Arthur Andersen going out 
of business, which punished many innocent employees and others. However, in cases 
where there is strong evidence and the very trust in the rule of law and judicial fairness 
hangs in the balance, a somewhat less cautious approach should be taken, lest the 
American public believe there is no justice if one is rich and powerful enough. That, 
arguably, turned out to be the case. The economy depends on enforcement of its basic 
rules to run smoothly. Similar to a National Basketball Association game, if the referees 
never blew the whistle, players would descend into anarchy and score baskets however 
they could. A chaotic basketball game is no game at all. Similarly, an economy without 
proper enforcement of rules – such as contracts, property rights, currency and truthful 
exchange of information – is no economy at all. The economic system would descend 
into a state of nature, a war of man against man. However, if we look at the individual 
prosecutor, it would make sense to be more cautious if the incentives pointed in that 
direction. A big winning case would certainly help a future career, but a high-profile loss 
would certainly look worse than a more cautious settlement when applying for a partner-
track position at a white-collar defense firm a few years later. The Securities and 




which he repaid to shareholders based on what the government said were “ill-gotten 
gains.”194 This settlement avoided a civil trial on charges of fraud and insider trading, and 
the Justice Department simply dropped any criminal inquiry.  
The office of Preet Bharara, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New 
York, brought civil charges against Bank of America as Countrywide’s legal successor, 
as well as against former Countrywide executive Rebecca Mairone, in October 2012 for 
Countrywide’s fraudulent activity. A Manhattan court found Mairone and Bank of 
America guilty in this civil case, which centered on a Countrywide program, headed by 
Mairone, known as “The Hustle.”195 The Hustle is the HSSL or High-Speed Swim Lane 
mortgage lending program of 2007 that quickly processed loans removing traditional 
“toll gates” slowing down the lending process. These gates were important in preventing 
fraud, according to the complaint.196 Bharara released a statement after the verdict was 
handed down in October 2013 saying that Countrywide  
treated quality control and underwriting as a joke… In a rush to feed at the trough 
of easy mortgage money on the eve of the financial crisis, Bank of America 
purchased Countrywide, thinking it had gobbled up a cash cow. That profit, 
however, was built on fraud, as the jury unanimously found.197  
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Bharara’s statement also said, “This Office will never hesitate to go to trial to 
expose fraudulent corporate conduct and to hold companies accountable, particularly 
when it has caused such harm to the public.”198 This is the correct thinking on this issue 
of national importance and public trust in the rule of law. However, his office sought no 
criminal charges against any Countrywide or BofA official. Perhaps vindicating 
Bharara’s decision not to pursue criminal charges, in 2016, an appeals court overturned 
the decision because it said the government failed to prove intent to defraud. It instead 
treated the case as a lesser breach of contract matter. 199 This outcome certainly lends 
credence to the idea that intent, especially to a higher standard of evidence, is hard to 
prove. Mairone was a mid-level manager. Bharara’s neighbors in the Eastern District of 
New York also brought a losing case against mid-level managers of Bear Stearns. I argue 
that they ultimately failed because their efforts were half-measures. Corporate entities 
and mid-level managers were ultimately not responsible for the bad actions. C-suite 
officers are paid increasingly high sums because of what good they can do for the 
company. Mid-level managers and corporate non-humans with many innocent employees 
are not the reason fraud occurs. CEOs’ golden parachutes must not deploy while those 
with less power to set company policy and direction are blamed.  
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The S.E.C.’s civil case was more appropriately targeted. It alleged that Mozilo 
and two other top Countrywide executives - David Sambol, chief operating officer and 
president, and Eric Sieracki, chief financial officer – failed to disclose the increasingly 
lowering lending standards, when it described its company’s lending policies in legally 
required disclosure forms to the government in 2005, 2006, and 2007. Countrywide has 
historically focused on loans that conformed to safer lending standards set by the then-
government sponsored entities, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. However, Countrywide 
approached the booming mortgage market with a “supermarket strategy,” the complaint 
said, seeking to match any lending standard offered by other lenders. For example, if a 
competitor would write a loan for no money down and a low credit score, Countrywide 
would offer that deal as well. As another example, the complaint alleged that Mozilo and 
Sambol knew as of June 2006 that an internal audit showed that fifty percent of the 
“stated income loans” – meaning the borrower need not show proof of income at the time 
of receiving the loan - showed a more than ten percent or greater variance from the 
borrower’s income, as per Internal Revenue Service filings. In other words, half of these 
loans, sometimes called “liars’ loans,” were, not surprisingly, based on lies. Of those 
“liars’ loans”, sixty-nine percent had more than fifty percent difference in stated and 
actual income, as per IRS filings. In other words, a vast majority of half of these loans 
Countrywide made were based on incomes that were half or less than half of what was on 
the document. As a journalist covering MBS litigation, I recall court cases putting 
examples of these “liar’s loans” on display, although they were not limited to one lender. 
The examples showed people employed in careers like restaurant server or hairdresser 




York City or Los Angeles. Some people blame the “liars,” the individuals taking out 
these mortgages. Whether or not they deserve some of the blame, certainly the balance of 
responsibility must go to the lending institution. Firstly, as stated, Countrywide had a 
policy of matching any other bank’s best offer. Additionally, their HSSL policy shows 
how willing they were to make a loan in almost any circumstance. Perhaps most 
compellingly, the most sophisticated home mortgage borrower is still at an information 
disadvantage compared to the bankers, who have inside information on the company and 
perhaps what others in the industry are seeing as well. For example, the borrower may 
not know that a loan officer’s manager is pushing him to make a certain number of loans 
per month, or a certain number of subprime loans per month. It is safe to say that most 
borrowers would not be nearly as sophisticated and educated about home mortgage 
products as those people working for the mortgage lender. It defies logic to argue that 
most Americans understand the various details and myriad complexities involved in 
mortgage policies. Most people go to a mortgage broker to get a mortgage not only 
because they are the ones empowered to lend, but also because they are the experts in 
doing so. Why not trust the expert when he says you should give a higher than accurate 
stated income or take out a mortgage with a low introductory rate that balloons in two 
years? The possibility of a small to vast informational imbalance must put the burden on 
the lender, not the borrower, for selling these products while knowing the danger they 
could cause, and did, in fact cause when the subprime mortgage bubble burst.  
The fraudulent acts occurred when the results of this internal investigation were 
not disclosed to investors, as would have been required by law, according to the SEC 




of the loans they were making would not be sellable to the secondary market, meaning 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, as well as the investment banks packaging and selling 
MBS, but this key information was not disclosed to investors. Mozilo and the other 
executives signed the relevant government disclosure forms in which important or 
“material” information about the company’s practices and risks were not disclosed, 
according to the complaint. 200 Additionally, the government charged: 
Indeed, Mozilo, Sieracki and Sambol each made public statements from 2005 
through 2007 that were intended to mislead investors about the increasingly 
aggressive underwriting at Countrywide and the financial consequences of those 
widened underwriting guidelines.201 
 
 Therefore, it is clear that Mozilo and his co-executives were aware of the serious 
problems with a core part of their business, but failed to tell shareholders in legal 
documents requiring them to do so. This type of information withholding seems like a 
blatant example of what fraud statutes were designed to prevent, and it is the federal 
government itself announcing the proof. It stretches the imagination, at least of someone 
outside the Justice Department, why this wouldn’t make a compelling case for criminal 
fraud.  
  
Lehman Brothers C.E.O. Richard Fuld – For twenty years, Lehman Brothers 
had been heavily involved in the mortgage origination, underwriting, and securitization 
business. But in March 2006, Lehman C.E.O. Dick Fuld announced to the company that 
it would change its strategy to hold more mortgage assets on its books as long-term 
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investments. The investment bank increased its mortgage-related assets investments to 
$111 billion in 2007 from $67 billion in 2006, and Lehman continued to up its ante on 
real estate into early 2008 (before it declared bankruptcy in September 2008). However, 
this investment strategy ignored the firm’s own risk policies and advice from risk 
managers. For example, the firm’s SEC auditor said Lehman should begin selling some 
of its real estate investments to avoid losses. Instead, the firm ignored this warning and 
employed an “accounting gimmick,” as described by Lehman executives. Shortly before 
each reporting period, Lehman would employ a technique known as “Repo 105” that 
moved $50 billion in assets off its balance sheets temporarily, making the company 
appear more financially stable to its shareholders. Lehman’s own president and chief 
operating officer as of June 2008, Bart McDade, wrote in an email that the Repo 105 
transactions were “another drug we R on.” Lehman’s auditor, Ernst & Young Global 
Ltd., was aware of the Repo 105 scheme but did not question the bank’s failure to 
disclose it. The accounting firm maintained it was not required to do so. 202 203 Fuld told 
the United States House of Representatives’ Financial Services Committee on April 20, 
2010 that  
I have absolutely no recollection whatsoever of hearing anything about Repo 105 
transactions while I was CEO of Lehman. Nor do I have any recollection of 
seeing documents that related to Repo 105 transactions. The first time I recall ever 
hearing the term “Repo 105” was a year after the bankruptcy filing in connection 
with questions raised by the Examiner.204  
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 Anton R. Valukas, Lehman’s bankruptcy examiner also testified before the House 
committee on April 20, 2010. He told the committee that Lehman’s usage of the Repo 
105 transaction in the way it did without disclosure was not appropriate. “In light of the 
market’s focus on the leverage of investment banks in late 2007 and 2008, I found that 
sufficient evidence exists for a judge or jury to find that Lehman’s reported net leverage 
ratio was materially misleading during that period.”205 When asked if Fuld’s statement 
that he did not know about the Repo 105 transaction was credible, Valukas replied: 
We concluded in the report that a fact finder could conclude that in fact he did 
know and acted upon information he knew or should have known. There was at 
least one witness who testified that he discussed Repo 105 transactions with him. 
In the magnitude of those transactions, there were documents that were sent to 
him by e-mail and otherwise which reflected the Repo 105 transactions which 
were dealing with balance sheet which were a great issue and concern to Lehman 
Brothers at the time. The two presidents of Lehman Brothers acknowledged they 
knew about Repo 105. The three CFOs during that period of time claim they 
knew about Repo 105 and numerous other executives. Mr. Fuld's position was 
that he did not know about it. If an action is brought, someone will determine 
whether that is or is not credible.206 
 
This example seems to be a slam dunk for the government. Valukas did their job 
for them. Valukas is a litigator and senior partner at the prominent law firm Jenner & 
Block, and a former United States Attorney who was appointed by the court to lead the 
Lehman bankruptcy examination, which was the largest such case in United States 
History.207 The extensive “Valukas Report,” provided a gold mine for federal prosecutors 
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to argue that Fuld knew he was fraudulently deceiving his shareholders about the actual 
amount of toxic mortgage debt on the company’s books.  
 
Citigroup – In November 2007, a senior vice president at CitiFinancial Mortgage, 
Richard M. Bowen III., emailed warnings to company executives, including Executive 
Committee Chairman and former Clinton Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin. As head of 
correspondent lending in the Consumer Lending Group, Bowen had been speaking out 
since June 2006 about problems with the bank’s guarantees made to entities like Fannie 
Mae, Freddie Mac, and others purchasing loan packages for sale to investors. Bowen’s 
group at Citi included 220 underwriters who would examine a small sample of these 
mortgage loans worth approximately $50 billion each year purchased from 1,600 other 
banks, which had originated the loans. Citi had not done the original underwriting on 
these loans, but through examining a sample of them, it would ensure to investors that the 
loans adhered to Citi’s credit standards. Bowen told the Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Commission (FCIC) that an increased volume of loans and staffing limitations made this 
task more difficult. Before selling loan packages up the securitization chain, Citi policy 
demanded that ninety-five percent or more of the loans sold adhere to bank credit 
standards and contain enough documentation to prove it; otherwise, Citi could demand 
that the originator bank repurchase the loans. Bowen told the FCIC that he began warning 
managers in mid-2006 that he found sixty percent of the loans sold were defective, when 
Citi said they were not. He worried that this could trigger massive losses for the bank, as 
these loans would be subject to repurchase agreements, like a money-back guarantee of 




mortgages climbed to eighty percent, he told the Commission. During this time, he also 
watched as the Wall Street Chief Risk Officer overturned the decision on many loan files 
from “denied” to “approved” for sale. “In the sample on one $300+ million Merrill Lynch 
subprime pool the underwriters turned down 716 mortgages as not meeting Citi policy 
guidelines,” Bowen told the FCIC. “The Wall Street Chief Risk Officer personally 
changed 260 of these “turn downs” to “approved.” The pool was purchased.”208 
Bowen then emailed the highest level of bank management, asking for an internal 
investigation outside of the Consumer Lending Group, as his warnings within the group 
had fallen on mostly deaf ears. Bowen’s direct manager was also concerned and 
continued to press for changes. By early 2007, however, the manager’s responsibilities 
were distributed to others and he then retired.209 If Bowen had come forward as a 
whistleblower, it would have been an explosive event. However, among the other 
testimony given to the FCIC, it seems to have only stood out mildly. This is one of many 
examples of outright lying that was documented and brought to the attention of 
executives. They knowingly continued operations which can be likened to piling clearly 
rotten meat into a stew and calling it fresh. (The idea for this analogy is credited to a 
demonstration by Anthony Bourdain in the movie version of The Big Short) Certainly if 
the most egregious cases, such as this won’t be pursued by law enforcement, the 
incentive remains to repeat it.  
 
   
AIG Financial Products C.E.O. Joseph J. Cassano - American International 
Group, the largest insurance company in the world as of 2004, had a problem child. AIG 
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had a AAA credit rating from Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s. This highest possible 
rating was exceptionally rare for a private company, and it allowed AIG to borrow money 
cheaply. Capitalizing on the perfect credit rating and easy capital through its parent, in 
1998, a unit of the company, AIG Financial Products (FP), began a lucrative business 
issuing unregulated insurance contracts for Wall Street. Investors in CDOs210 could buy 
so-called Credit Default Swap contracts to hedge against any potential losses in the value 
of the CDO. (For a visual explanation, see a very condescendingly explained version to 
the only female in the room in the movie Too Big to Fail.) In other words, in exchange 
for paying a regular premium to AIG, investors could guarantee they would not lose 
money on their CDO investment because AIG would pay out if the CDO value drops. 
This isn’t too far from the way many insurance policies work, except instead of 
promising a payment to help you fix your car if it is damaged in exchange for monthly 
payments, CDSs are more like hedging bets in Vegas. Essentially, AIG was betting 
CDOs wouldn’t take much losses because the housing market would never go down 
enough for them to do so. Those buying the CDSs were betting the market might go 
down, while they also purchased CDOs, meaning a bet that the market would rise. Hence, 
they were hedging their bets. AIG made hundreds of millions of dollars each year in fees 
selling these CDS contracts on CDOs and other types of bonds as well.211  
However, since CDS policies were not actually a regulated type                                                                                                                                                            
of insurance, they were not subject to requirements that the insurer have a reserve pool of 
money for payouts. Also, by having protective CDS contracts on these mortgage backed 
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CDO investments, banks were subject to much lower requirements to hold cash on their 
own books. Lower requirements for cash meant more money that could be invested for 
higher returns. Goldman Sachs was AIG’s biggest customer for these policies.212    
Banks and hedge funds sold CDS policies as well, but they were on both sides of 
these CDS trades, whereas AIG only sold them. This was a fine business model for AIG, 
so long as the assets – home mortgages - underlying the bonds they insured maintained 
steady payments. However, when the subprime mortgage crisis hit and many CDOs and 
related bonds lost value all at once, AIG could not pay out on so many policies at once. In 
hindsight, this seems like a disaster waiting to happen, but many will say no one could 
have foreseen the traditionally reliable housing marking crashing so dramatically. Clearly 
there was no way to know they would be in trouble, right? 
In 2005, before the worst of the crisis hit, AIG lost its AAA credit rating when 
auditors discovered it inflated its earnings in the previous five years by $3.9 billion. 
Maurice “Hank” Greenberg, who had been C.E.O. for thirty-eight years and was forced 
out by the company’s board, told the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission that the 
Financial Products group should have stopped writing these risky CDS policies at that 
time. Cassano, head of the Financial Products group, allowed his team to write another 
$36 billion in CDS contracts for another year, despite warnings from some of his 
executives about the increasingly precarious state of the housing market. Meanwhile 
Cassano took home at least thirty-eight million dollars in each year between 2002 and 
2007. 213  
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Cassano knew about risks the company was taking that were not disclosed to his 
executives or investors via SEC filings, as they are legally required to do. AIG Financial 
Products executive Gene Park said that by June 2007, most executives at AIG FP knew 
the company would need to pay out if many borrowers defaulted on their loans. However, 
they did not know that payouts would be triggered if the market value of the bonds 
declined or credit rating agencies downgraded the bonds. This meant that payouts may be 
owed even if no cash losses occurred. Cassano told the FCIC that he was aware of this 
provision, but AIG’s regulator, the Office of Thrift Supervision was not.214 The FCIC 
also reported that Cassano was generally less than cooperative with the regulator.215  
On July 27 Goldman Sachs officially requested a $1.8 billion payout, claiming the 
market value of $20 billion in insured CDOs had dropped fifteen percent, a more 
aggressive markdown than other CDS policy holders would claim. AIG disagreed with 
this calculation, a battle that was likely predictable since there was little transparency or 
liquidity in this type of trading. It wasn’t exactly the New York Stock Exchange with a 
ticker in Times Square. On the same day as this collateral request, Goldman purchased 
$100 million in protection from another firm against the possibility that AIG might 
default on its obligations; a hedge on a hedge. In the next year, Goldman would continue 
to purchase CDS contracts against AIG, while battling the company for payouts on its 
CDOs insurance contracts, sending AIG a demand daily. By this point, AIG FP had 
insured $79 billion in bonds that were mostly backed by subprime and Alt-A (nearly 
subprime) home loans. AIG’s parent company only reported $95.8 billion in capital and 
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AIG FP had done almost no hedging of its own because AIG FP executives believed 
“there could never be losses.” The company initially purchased a $150 million hedge, but 
had begun to lose money on it, so Cassano refused to spend any more. “I don’t think the 
world is going to blow up,” Park quoted Cassano as saying.216 The world didn’t so much 
blow up as implode.  
In 2007, the CDS contracts threatened to take down the entire company that had 
only a few years prior been rated AAA. On a third quarter earnings call in November 
2007, AIG disclosed a $352 million claim for payout on its CDS portfolio, based on a 
new valuation model. This was a new model – in the sense that it never had one before, 
not that it replaced an old one - to mark the current value of its CDS portfolio. AIG had 
previously relied on companies like Goldman – one that would demand a payout - to let 
them know when a market price changed. That is like if Geico relied on my word to 
decide how much I should get for damage to my Subaru Outback. On the earnings call, 
Cassano said AIG had more than enough money to make any payouts that may be 
necessary, but he believed it was highly unlikely they would have to pay. To further the 
analogy, so what if I tell Geico my car is worth $20 million. I am a great driver. They 
should just trust me not to plow into my neighbor’s mailbox. 
However, Cassano did not disclose on the call that AIG’s private auditor, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, pointed out various significant problems with the new 
model and questioned its relevance. By the end of the month, the model was 
abandoned.217 On a December 5th call with investors, a bank analyst asked about disputes 
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with banks regarding payouts and the valuation model mentioned in the third quarter call. 
Cassano responded that there was no hostile disagreement about payouts owed. 
Sometimes companies came calling with higher requests than AIG believed they owed, 
and either the requesting company would “go away” or they would negotiate a 
compromise. According to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission:  
Cassano did not reveal the $2 billion collateral posted to Goldman, the several 
hundred million dollars posted to other counterparties, and the daily demands 
from Goldman and the others for additional cash… Investors …did not know that 
AIG’s earnings were overstated by $3.6 billion – and they would not learn that 
information until February 11, 2008.218 
 
 Clearly, Goldman wasn’t going away.  
Pricewaterhouse auditors concluded in late 2007 that AIG’s publicly reported 
numbers were wrong. They cited a lack of effective and experienced leadership at AIG 
FP. They agreed to continue auditing AIG as long as Cassano did not “interfere in the 
process.” When the overstated earnings were announced on February 11, 2008, the 
ratings agencies again downgraded AIG. Goldman continued to demand more payments 
from AIG and buy hedges against its failure at the same time. On February 28, AIG 
announced a net loss of $5.29 billion, mostly due to AIG FP’s $11.12 billion in losses in 
value, as well as $2.6 billion in losses by another AIG subsidiary that had been investing 
in mortgage backed securities itself. Cassano’s retirement was also announced that day. 
However, he was still retained as a consultant making a million dollars a month in 
addition to the $300 million he had earned between 1987 and 2008.219  
 
218 FCIC Report p. 272 




 By September 2008, AIG FP was severely weighing down AIG. Although the 
company had a trillion dollars in assets, most of the liquid assets were held by more 
regulated subsidiaries that could not provide cash for AIG FP. The subsidiary now faced 
$23.4 billion in requests for payment. At the same time, the banks that lend money to 
other companies to operate daily – the lifeblood of the financial industry - refused to 
provide AIG with cash, and a different AIG subsidiary that had invested $75 billion in 
mortgage backed securities hemorrhaged billions as well. Lastly, as if to rub salt on 
AIG’s wound, Goldman Sachs analysts had written a report in August warning clients not 
to invest in AIG due to severe losses and another potential ratings downgrade for AIG. 
The insurer was rapidly running out of funding, having only days to live, particularly if it 
was downgraded again. Fearing a run on AIG’s remaining assets and a subsequent 
bankruptcy, which would in turn cause massive losses for the twelve largest banks in the 
United States and Europe, AIG received an $85 billion loan from the Federal Reserve, 
which could only lend to non-banks in this way under extreme circumstances. The 
government later added another $49.1 billion under the congressionally approved TARP 
bailout program.220 While Goldman seems like the bully in this scenario, AIG FP was not 
a helpless middle schooler on the playground. Cassano knew what he was doing, did not 
disclose it, and caused economic havoc in the process.  
  
Ratings Agencies - When banks packaged and sold mortgage backed securities 
and CDOs, they needed ratings for the various components of these investment products. 
After all, investors want to know how much risk they can expect. Some investment 
 




managers, such as those in charge of a public employee retirement fund or a university 
endowment, will be required to invest only in AAA-rated products – ostensibly the safest 
one could get - since they are playing with the ability for teachers to retire or schools to 
build new libraries. Many investors, even those willing to risk losing money in turn for 
higher returns, will only invest in the BBB-rated or higher slices of MBSs or CDOs. A 
rating of BBB or higher is considered “investment grade.”221 The ratings range all the 
way down to DDD. Regardless, investors want to know what they can expect.  
Representative Henry A. Waxman, Chairman of the House Committee on 
Oversight and Government Reform, said at an October 22, 2008 hearing on the rating 
agencies’ role in the financial crisis that although the C.E.O.s of the three major ratings 
agencies – Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch –would testify that they could not have 
foreseen the crisis, documentary evidence obtained by his committee would prove 
otherwise.222 The problem for the three major agencies was they portrayed themselves as 
independent assessors, but they were anything but. Indeed, they were paid by the banks 
for rating their investment products. This is a clear conflict of interest, and it is almost 
impossible to imagine how they could keep from becoming fraudulent with two 
fundamentally opposed directives – make money and provide “objective” bond ratings. 
Standard & Poor’s, for example, charged hundreds of thousands of dollars for 
each individual MBS or CDO it rated and continued to monitor. The global CDO rating 
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division saw revenues of ninety-six million dollars in 2005 grow to $182 million in 2006 
and to $203 million in 2007. Another division rating similar bonds took in revenues of 
more than $278 million in 2006 and $243 million in 2007. If a bank does not like the 
policies of one rating agency, it can threaten to take its business elsewhere. Therefore, 
banks have the agencies at a financial gunpoint. Clearly, the loss of any deal, let alone all 
of a bank’s business, would be a major financial loss to the agency. For a profit-seeking 
institution like a ratings agency, that simply isn’t an option.  
 The government alleged that S&P represented its ratings as “objective, 
independent and uninfluenced by any conflict of interest,” and therefore knowingly and 
intentionally defrauded investors. Internal emails cited in the complaint show debates 
about lowering rating standards to remain competitive with Moody’s. Meanwhile the 
company’s executives continued to tout its objectivity in rating and monitoring mortgage-
related securities. 223  
In February 2013, the Justice Department filed a civil case against Standard & 
Poor’s and its parent company, McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., for mail fraud, wire fraud, 
and financial institution fraud under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and 
Enforcement Act of 1989. “To date, the government has identified more than $5 billion in 
losses suffered by federally insured financial institutions in connection with the failure of 
CDOs rated by S&P from March to October 2007,” according to a Justice Department 
press release.224 The complaint was filed against the company, but it named specific 
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executives who were responsible for corporate policies and decision-making. Some of 
these individuals could have been held responsible individually and criminally.   
Employees doing the ratings work were keenly aware of the dangers of the 
perverse incentive system and corporate policies. The following except from the 
complaint deserves to be included in its entirety: 
“On or about April 5, 2007, two S&P CDO analysts engage in an instant message 
exchange expressing their belief that the S&P CDO rating model severely 
underestimated credit risks:  
 [Analyst 1] btw that deal is ridiculous 
 [Analyst 2] I know right…model def[initely] does not capture half of the … risk 
 [Analyst 1] We should not be rating it 
[Analyst 2] we rate every deal….it could be structured by cows and we would rate 
it 
[Analyst 1] but there’s a lot of risk associated with it – I personally don’t feel 
comfy signing off as a committee member225 
  
The complaint lays out the myriad ways in which Standard & Poor’s “scheme to 
defraud investors” breaks the FIRREA law. It also notes that FIRREA, a savings and loan 
crisis-era statute enacted to combat this very type of behavior, can carry criminal, as well 
as civil penalties. 226 But by February 2015, Standard & Poor’s settled this and other 
cases with nineteen states and the District of Columbia for a total of $1.5 billion. Why not 
pursue charges against the individuals responsible for this company that knowingly 
mislead investors, causing massive losses? In portraying themselves as independent 
arbiters of bond quality and an entire financial industry relying on these ratings, one 
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could argue the agencies should be an obvious target for serious and meaningful law 
enforcement efforts. Yet the entire effort to hold them liable went out with a whimper. 
But at the time, $1.5 billion makes a good headline, prosecutors look tough without 
trying too hard, and everyone goes home.  
 
Chapter conclusion 
In conclusion, I have shown that various industry executives knew important and 
relevant facts about their company’s financial products and chose not to disclose them, 
causing millions in losses. These seem to be textbook examples of criminal fraud. So why 
didn’t any of these people face criminal prosecution? To be sure, prosecuting financial 
crime is difficult. It may be true that the 2008 crisis was in some ways more complicated 
than previous ones. The more complicated the scheme, ostensibly, the harder it would be 
to prosecute. However, the overwhelming amount of evidence I have offered in this 
chapter makes a total lack of criminal prosecution after the 2008 financial crisis hard to 
defend and there’s no reason to believe government prosecutors aren’t smart or skilled 
enough. Indeed, they are consistently picked from the most prestigious law schools.  
In a criminal trial, a jury would not necessarily be familiar with the financial 
products involved. Selling someone a fake share in a company is simple to explain. 
Insider trading is easy to understand. Someone sold another something that didn’t exist, 
someone bought or sold a stock based on information they shouldn’t have known. Those 
are unfair. Those are illegal. Those are simple. Even Ponzi or pyramid schemes aren’t 




most people can understand the logic behind and problem with what is essentially a game 
of hot potato or musical chairs. We played these in our childhoods.  
Additionally, as I have shown in this chapter, there are ways to tell the stories of 
the 2008 crisis in a manner so the average juror could not only understand but feel 
enraged and wronged by these people. The narrative and the emotion it evokes, after all, 
is what sways the jury. Simply put, the story would be told about people who lied and 
said their product was good when they knew it was actually dangerous. The finance 
industry likes to compare itself to car salesmen and promotes a caveat emptor mentality. 
Unfortunately for them, there is only so far that idea will take them until they run afoul of 
criminal fraud statutes. The problem for both victims of financial fraud (and car 
manufacturer malfeasance, among others), is not so much the ability to make a criminal 
case against a powerful entity or individual, as the willingness to do so. In subsequent 
chapters, I will show why government prosecutors lost this willingness after 2008, but 





Chapter 6: Justice Department Prosecutors’ Incentives/Prosecutorial Discretion 
Prosecutors, like everyone else, respond to incentives. What incentives affect 
prosecutorial decisions? In this chapter I will show that government prosecutors facing 
the prospect of a high-profile trial against systemically important finance executives had 




compared to only a decade prior in the Enron era. Specifically, the amount of money 
these prosecutors could make in the private sector as a partner in a prestigious law firm 
had drastically risen, compared to the top government salary they could expect to make. 
These law firms prize government experience in their white-collar defense practices, as 
evidenced by the staff bios on firm websites that tout this background. For example, elite 
white-collar defense firms Debevoise & Plimpton and Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & 
Garrison both list approximately half of their attorneys as having federal government 
experience. They figure a former government prosecutor would be the best defensive 
weapon against current government prosecutions, as they would best understand the 
thinking and strategies of the Justice Department. However, someone who spent his or 
her time at the Department focused on one or two very high-profile case or cases that 
resulted in a very public loss would be a much less attractive candidate than someone 
who took the gettable wins, such as a multi-million- or billion-dollar settlement. In the 
past, as this chapter will show, top government prosecutors would expect to earn salaries 
that were more comparable to their private sector counterparts. However, around the turn 
of the 21st century, that gap began to widen. This change in incentives provides a 
compelling argument for why these prosecutors were not willing to risk the possibility of 
losing a high-profile case.  
Very often, the incentives driving employees that are not looking to run for office, 
but simply are trying to succeed in their careers, involve status and money. Moral 
satisfaction – “doing good” or “helping society” - may often come into play as well, 
particularly among those in government service. However, lawyers often carry significant 




this work with at least a comfortable life for themselves and their families. Particularly 
those attorneys living in the most expensive cities like New York - or even California or 
Washington D.C. - where most high-level finance cases would be prosecuted - would 
need to consider salary as a major incentive.  
New York City and its metropolitan area in particular is where high-profile white-
collar cases are normally brought. New York is home to the country’s major financial 
exchanges; NASDAQ, American Stock Exchange, New York Mercantile Exchange, and 
New York Stock Exchange; as well as major investment banking and other important 
financial corporations. The Southern District of New York, which covers Manhattan, the 
Bronx and suburban counties of New York City, has a long history with high-profile 
white-collar prosecutions, with the infrastructure in place to conduct them. This U.S. 
Attorney’s office’s criminal division includes Securities and Commodities Fraud Task 
Forces and a Complex Frauds and Cybercrime Unit.227 It is reasonable to assume that a 
talented and ambitious government prosecutor would be likely to work in New York City 
while at the Justice Department and continue to seek employment there in the private 
sector as well. Many of the white-collar defense firms are in New York as well. This also 
makes sense considering New York is where their clients in the finance industry do 
business and where their clients would face prosecution as well. Therefore, I will focus 
on New York City as the strongest example of the living environment that would help 
shape the incentives faced by a government prosecutor.  







Living in New York City is incredibly expensive. According to a Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology study estimates that a sole provider would need to make at least 
$61,800 to make a bare minimum living wage for a family of four in Manhattan. This 
doesn’t consider the added expense of law school student loan payments or any upgrades 
a person may want in terms of material comfort in exchange for their advanced education 
and hard work, including private schools, comfortable housing, travel or entertainment. 
For example, the MIT assumes a monthly housing cost of $1,637.228 There are few places 
one could find safe and clean housing in New York City for that amount. According to a 
report by Douglas Elliman Real Estate and Miller Samuel Real Estate Appraisers & 
Consultants, the average price per month to rent a New York City apartment as of May 
2018 was $4,881 for a two bedroom and $7,959 for a three bedroom. Lest a reader 
assume this number is skewed by a handful of outrageous outliers at the high end, the 
median cost for a two bedroom in Manhattan as of May 2018 was $4,295 per month and 
$5,650 for a three-bedroom (or larger) apartment. The price doesn’t drop much even 
when a family considers living in an outer borough in New York City. The median rental 
price in Brooklyn for a two-bedroom apartment was $3,092 and $3,700 for a three-
bedroom (or larger) apartment as of May 2018. Northwest Queens is even more 
expensive, with median rates at $3,450 for a two-bedroom apartment and $3,750 for a 
three-bedroom (or larger) apartment as of May 2018. A family wanting to purchase a 
home on a government salary in New York City would be even more hard pressed, with 
the median 2-bedroom co-op in Manhattan selling for approximately $2 million and the 
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median three-bedroom co-op selling for $4.025 million as of May 2018. As with the 
rental market, sales prices are relatively comparable in parts of Brooklyn and Queens that 
would allow for reasonable commutes to Manhattan.229 These examples only consider the 
extremely high cost of housing in New York City. Schools, entertainment, food and other 
daily necessities and pleasures of life are similarly cost-inflated in New York. Clearly the 
MIT estimate of the cost of living in New York City is quite underestimated. A recent 
survey conducted by Purdue University and GoBankRates.com found that in order to “be 
happy” in New York City, residents feel they need to make $220,000 per year. In San 
Francisco, the figure people reported needing to be happy was $319,935. Nationally, the 
average was much lower at $105,000.230 
High prices in New York is not a recent phenomenon. It has long been a relatively 
expensive city compared to others in the United States. Comparing the federal 
government’s Consumer Price Index for 1985 through 2015 for all United States urban 
areas and New York, one can see New York is always somewhat more expensive than 
other cities. There are periods of real estate slumps in New York City, but the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, as illustrated in two charts below, shows that on average, New 
York is a relatively more expensive city compared to the national average for all urban 
areas. Therefore, average cost of living in New York was just as expensive for 
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prosecutors pursuing white collar cases out of the Southern District of New York in the 







































Figure 6.1  
 











Figure 6.2  
Consumer Price Index for New York City Metropolitan Area 




























Compared to Figure 6.1, this figure shows the New York City Consumer Price Index is 
consistently higher than the consumer price index for all ubran areas by about 20 points 
at any time.  
 
But if we look a bit closer, there is a financial change that occurred in New York 
City between the time prosecutors would have worked on savings and loan cases and 
immediately after the 2008 financial crisis. In 1994, the city took a step to decrease rent 
stabilization rules that had been in place since 1969. This move had a lasting impact for 
the ensuing decades, driving up the city’s cost of rent. Known as “vacancy control,” the 
city council and mayor allowed landlords to increased rents to market rates when tenants 
move out of apartments costing $2,000 a month or more. Although at the time, few 


























apartments garnered that price, as the median rent was $600 a month. Landlords 
exploited loopholes to take advantage of the new law, using renovations to push up rent 
prices as well. In 1997, the state legislature took away the city’s power to reverse the 
vacancy control law by voting it into state law. In 2003, the city also allowed landlords to 
jack up rents when a lease comes up for renewal if they had not increased them in the 
previous years. Since the mid-1990s, 250,000 of the 860,000 rent stabilized units in the 
city have been taken off rent stabilization protection and the median city’s rent has 
doubled or more in some places. 231 Therefore, late 1980s and 1990s and early 2000s 
New Yorkers, including attorneys working on earlier financial crime cases, generally saw 
lower rent prices than those post-2003. Of course, not all cases have been filed in New 
York. For example, Charles Keating of Lincoln Savings and Loan Association was 
convicted of racketeering, fraud and conspiracy in a Los Angeles district court. However, 
it can hardly be said that Los Angeles or Washington, D.C. have been in the past few 
decades so much less expensive than New York that it creates an entirely different 
incentive structure. Additionally, the last few decades of the 20th century saw 
deregulatory trends in all sectors, nation-wide. Therefore, while New York is the best 
estimation of white-collar criminal case’s jurisdiction, Washington D.C., L.A. and San 
Francisco, some of the U.S.’s largest cities, would also serve as case studies in the need 
for more money to live a comfortable life as the 20th century turned into the 21st century. 
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The main difference for attorneys prosecuting white collar cases – whether in 
New York, Washington D.C. or Los Angeles - between the earlier crises and the 2008 
crisis is the change in public versus private sector salary. The Bureau of Labor Statistics 
placed the average salary in 2015 for a New York or District of Columbia metropolitan 
area private sector attorney at approximately $167,000.232 The average compensation for 
a partner in one of American Lawyer’s top 100 firms was $1.1 million in 2015, with some 
earning much more. 233 In contrast, the most an Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) 
could make, and only after nine or more years of service, is $136,874. However, that 
same experienced attorney, or even one on the job for decades, could make as little as 
$80,514. The average salary for an AUSA with nine or more years of experience was 
$108,694. 234 Even Attorney General Eric Holder – the top public prosecutor in the 
country, made $199,700 in his job as AG, according to the National Law Journal. In 
2009 at Covington & Burling, he made $2.5 million. If less than $200,000 is the most that 
anyone could ever earn as a public prosecutor, and of course it’s very unlikely to become 
the USAG, a rational person would look to the private sector. On average, the difference 
in pay for a white shoe law firm partner and an average U.S. attorney is almost $1 million 
per year.  
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This pay gap was not always so extreme. The pay differential between 
government prosecutor and law firm partner was narrower in the savings and loan crisis 
days. Generally, the government employee top rate in 1985 was $84,157.235 In 
comparison, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that in 1985 the average for top-level 
corporate attorneys was $91,690236 and a partner in a top firm made approximately 
$300,000 per year.237 This means that in jumping from a top job in the public sector to a 
private sector partnership would certainly have been a boost in pay – it could have meant 
a raise of about $215,000 - but significantly less than jump meant in 2015. In 1996, a 
partner in one of the top 100-grossing law firms averaged $489,753 per year238, while a 
senior executive attorney in the Justice Department – meaning a political appointee level 
or similar - could make up to $118,400 per year.239 The attorney looking to move to a 
private sector partnership would likely have gotten a raise of approximately $371,000. 
This is a better raise than ten years earlier, but still a fraction of 2015’s differential. 
Something changed in the last years of the 20th century and the first few years of the 21st 
century. It is difficult to say whether the pay differential would have occurred before, 
after or during the accounting scandal crises of the early 2000s, but certainly by the time 
cases would have been made for the 2008 crisis, the landscape had changed.  
 
Figure 6.3  
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$84,157                      $300,000                       $215,000 
1996     
 
$118,400                    $489,753                       $371,000 
2005    
 
 
$162,100                    $1,070,000                     $907,900 
2015 
          
$199,700                    $1,100,000 $900,300 
 
In 2005, the average top-100 firm partner made $1.07 million per year, while the 
highest paid government attorneys could make up to $162,100.240 By this time, the 
difference between government salary and private practice was enormous. A partner 
could now move into millionaire territory. Average partner salary has not grown much 
since 2005, but it has also become harder to achieve equity partner status. In the past ten 
years, firms have turned more to non-equity partnership. Indeed, the number of non-
equity partners has almost doubled to forty percent of the top 100 firm’s partners. 241 In 
1985, thirty-six percent of all lawyers at the top fifty law firms were equity partners. By 
2017, that number had dropped to twenty percent. Therefore, prosecutors looking to 
become equity partners would need to become as attractive to these firms as possible. 
This is certainly a powerful incentive to choose settlement agreements over riskier 
prosecutions.  
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What Firms Want 
To understand how important previous government experience is to these white-
collar defense firms in New York or Washington, D.C. that were paying top dollar, I 
looked at what they choose to advertise on their websites in their attorney biographies. I 
chose law firms – Debevoise & Plimpton; Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison; 
Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft; Davis Polk; Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler; 
Covington & Burling; and Ropes & Gray -  with a presence in New York City and ranked 
National Tier 1 in Criminal Defense: White-Collar by U.S. News and World Report242. 
The importance of government prosecutorial experience is evident on these sites. 
Debevoise lists forty-four attorneys on its firm website under the “white collar and 
regulatory defense practice” heading. Eight of those attorneys are listed as practicing 
outside of the United States. Out of the remaining thirty-five, eighteen, or fifty-seven 
percent have either Justice Department or Securities and Exchange Commission 
experience. Some of these attorneys have high-level experience, such as former SEC 
Chairwoman Mary Jo White; some were line attorneys at DOJ, an AUSA office or the 
SEC; and a few were both. Andrew J. Ceresney spent time as Deputy Chief Appellate 
Attorney for the Southern District of New York before he joined the firm in 2003. During 
his 10 years at Debevoise he became co-chair of the White Collar and Regulatory 
Defense Group and he “played an integral role in negotiating the historic $25 billion 
national mortgage settlement between the federal government, 49 state attorneys general 
 




and some of the country’s largest banks.”243 Choosing to highlight this in a short online 
bio shows Ceresney is valued at the firm precisely for his role in a huge monetary 
settlement. This shows clients that he is tough and smart, exactly the kind of lawyer 
they’d want on their side now. Additionally, the site says from 2013 to 2017 he served as 
director of enforcement at the SEC and returned to the firm as a partner in 2017.244 
Again, this boasts that he led the enforcement charge against banks, so he has the best 
understanding of how to defend against this fight.  
The Debevoise website boasts many more attorneys with prosecutorial 
experience. Another white-collar litigation defense partner at the firm, David A. O’Neil, 
worked in various high-level positions at the Justice Department for eight years – 
including, heading the Criminal Division at the Southern District of New York.245 David 
Sarratt, now a partner at the firm, worked as an Assistant United Sates Attorney for the 
Eastern District of New York from 2010 to 2014. James Johnson, Winston M. Paes, Mark 
P. Goodman, Matthew E. Fishbein, Robert N. Shwartz, Helen V. Cantwell and Matthew 
L. Biben all spent time as Assistant U.S. Attorneys in the Southern or Eastern Districts of 
New York. Many of their website biographies boast the number of trials and appellate 
hearings they prosecuted while at the U.S. Attorney’s offices. Like Ceresney, Goodman 
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 As for Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, the firm lists forty-three 
attorneys in its “white collar and regulatory defense practice.” Nineteen of these attorneys 
have experience as government prosecutors, or a total of forty-four percent of the 
practice.  Like Debevoise, their biographies boast government experience, including how 
many cases they have tried and any major figures they have successfully prosecuted. For 
example, Richard C. Tarlowe spent eight years as a federal prosecutor,  
“where he was Chief of the Complex Frauds and Cybercrime Unit and a member 
of its Securities & Commodities Fraud Task Force … He played a critical role in 
the government's crackdown on insider trading and litigated some of the most 
significant and high-profile securities fraud trials in the country, including the 
successful insider trading prosecution of Rajat Gupta, a former Goldman Sachs 
board member and chair of McKinsey & Co. Richard also handled cases 
involving public corruption, investment advisor fraud, accounting fraud and 
market manipulation.”247 
 
 Various attorneys on Paul Weiss’s white-collar defense roster spent 
approximately six years as an Assistant United States Attorney, according to the firm’s 
website. These attorneys include Roberto Finzi, Justin Anderson, Harris Fischman, 
Christopher D. Frey, Michelle K. Parikh, and Adam B. Schwartz.248  
At Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, Jodi Avergun, chair of the firm’s White 
Collar Defense and Investigations Group, spent time as an Assistant U. S. Attorney in the 
Eastern District of New York.249 Daniel S. Ruzumna, a partner in Patterson Bellknap’s 
white collar defense practice, spent six years as an Assistant United States Attorney in the 
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Southern District of New York. Joshua A. Goldberg, also a partner in the firm’s white-
collar litigation defense practice, served as an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Southern 
District for eight years, according to the firm’s website. 250  The story looks similar on the 
Davis Polk website. Greg Andres, a partner in the white-collar defense litigation 
department, served as the Deputy Assistant Attorney General at the Criminal Division at 
the Justice Department and Chief of the Criminal Division of the U.S. Attorney’s Office 
of the Eastern District of New York. While at Main Justice, he served on the Financial 
Fraud Enforcement Task Force (and before that, the Corporate Fraud Task Force).251 
Martine M. Beamon, also a partner in Davis Polk’s white collar litigation defense 
practice, worked as an Assistant United States Attorney for the Southern District of New 
York for five years.  The firm’s white-collar defense litigation department’s partner roster 
also boasts Denis J. McInerny, who returned to the firm after serving as Chief of the 
Fraud Section (2010 – 2013) and then Deputy Assistant Attorney General (2013 – 2014) 
of the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice. He previously served as 
Deputy Chief of the Criminal Division at the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern 
District of New York (1989 – 1994). In between his government service, he worked at 
Davis Polk, representing Arthur Andersen in the infamous obstruction of justice case.252      
Michael G. McGovern, a partner in Ropes & Gray’s white-collar litigation 
defense practice, spent seven years as an Assistant United States Attorney for the 
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Southern District of New York.253 Ropes & Gray Partner Joshua S. Levy also practices 
white collar litigation defense. He worked as a federal prosecutor for the United States 
Attorney’s office in Massachusetts for seven years, and before that worked at Ropes & 
Gray, as a litigation associate.254 Covington & Burling’s white collar litigation defense 
practice boasts such partners as Lanny Breuer (Assistant Attorney General for the 
Criminal Division at Main Justice from 2009 – 2013) and Eric H. Holder, Jr. (United 
States Attorney General from February 2009 to April 2015). Both men were political 
appointees during the window when a case against prominent bank executives could have 
been brought. Although they would not have been tasked with making these difficult 
cases, they could have made a serious effort to demand and direct resources to aggressive 
fraud cases. President Obama established by executive order the Financial Fraud 
Enforcement Task Force in November 2009. The order placed the Department of Justice 
at the head of the task force. “But that was just a coordinating body. The only resource 
was one guy. It wasn’t a task force. A task force is having dedicated resources,” said Neil 
Barofsky, a task force member and Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset 
Relief Program, otherwise known as “the bailout.”  
 While there may be some additional considerations for the highest-level political 
appointees in the Department – such as the desire to avoid embarrassment and criticism 
for the Department - the incentives faced by prosecutors at the Department are relevant 
from the line prosecutor to the Attorney General. These personal and institutional 
incentives are particularly important when considering the immense amount of 
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prosecutorial discretion given to government prosecutors, who conduct their business 
almost entirely outside of public view, since almost all federal cases are settled before 
reaching a courtroom. Although it isn’t apparent publicly which attorneys would have 
potentially worked on a financial crisis case against major executives, we can infer this 
information by looking at the roster of white collar and regulatory defense practices at 
prominent New York and D.C. law firms. Their online biographies boast any federal 
prosecutorial service. While the evidence is anecdotal at this point, we see a number of 
attorneys who have worked at the Southern District of New York, the Eastern District of 
New York, or the Eastern District of Virginia, which are offices most likely to prosecute 
this kind of case. For example, Adam B. Schwartz is now listed as counsel at the 
Washington D.C. office of the white shoe law firm Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & 
Garrison. According to the firm’s website, Schwartz spent six years as an Assistant 
United States Attorney at the United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of 
Virginia. He served as a federal prosecutor in the precise window of time (2008 – 2014) 
during which a case could have been prosecuted against a bank executive for the financial 
crisis. The firm’s website says that he tried more than 40 federal cases and “argued 
numerous evidentiary motions and appeals.” It doesn’t specify the nature of these cases 
specifically, other than to say they involve supervision of “the investigation, indictment, 
and trial of complex conspiracies, homicides, public corruption and racketeering.” 255 For 
another example, David Sarratt served as an Assistant United States Attorney in the 
Eastern District of New York from 2010 to 2014 and is now a partner at the elite law firm 
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Debevoise & Plimpton. The law firm’s website boasts that as an Assistant United States 
Attorney he successfully supervised and participated in a variety of investigations and 
prosecutions, successfully tried numerous cases and briefed and argued appeals to the 
appeals court. Although the biography on the firm’s website doesn’t offer specifics, it 
lists financial fraud among Sarratt’s cases.256  
It is easy to see why white shoe firms would prefer lawyers with government 
experience. These lawyers would understand how the system works from the adversary’s 
perspective and doubtless could boast many useful contacts. Similarly, while some 
prosecutors spend their careers working for the Department, there has been a stronger 
incentive for these attorneys to leave for white shoe firms, as the difference in salaries has 
widened over time.  
 
Reacting to Justice Strategy 
Additionally, what the defense firms are looking for in their former Justice 
Department attorneys have changed as the Justice Department’s strategy itself has 
changed. This then becomes a positive feedback loop, wherein the Justice Department 
gravitates toward flashy settlement agreements and the private firms want attorneys who 
can get their clients the best outcome using this strategy. In the past, although many 
federal cases were settled before they reached trial phase, prosecutors also tried many 
cases in a court of law. However, as I have already shown, by the time the financial crisis 
hit, the Department was primed to rely on settlement agreements. After the Andersen, 
KPMG, Ted Stevens, and Bear Stearns embarrassments and the subsequent backlash 
 




from the media, the American Bar Association, and corporate America, the Department’s 
reliance on settlements meant that white collar defense firms also had to change their 
strategy. Like changes in evolutionary patterns when an animal’s environment changes, 
the defense firms had to adapt. Firms now needed former government attorneys who had 
experience in these types of settlement negotiations, precisely what the firms would need 
to defend against for their clients.  
The relative ease of settlements creates a strong disincentive for the Department 
and its ambitious attorneys to do the work necessary to flip lower level individuals as per 
usual in cases seeking to charge individuals. As Rakoff observed: 
You’d have to get into a long-term investigation still to make a high-level case. 
And second you’d have already gotten the political bang with a big press 
conference announcing a big fine and compliance terms. You didn’t have quite 
the same incentive to put seven assistant US attorneys on the case.” 257 
 
Bill Black, who was involved in the jailing of hundreds of executives during the 
savings and loan crisis, also stressed the need to flip lower- and mid-level employees to 
testify against executives, though he acknowledged that a settlement is faster and less 
expensive. Similarly, Rakoff noted, “You can see why a Department would be attracted 
to a different resources allocation.” U.S. Attorneys’ offices are notoriously big on 
production and numbers, said Black. The chance of success in a financial fraud case is 
lower than others, especially considering that executives have tremendous resources to 
mount the best defense. “You get very low numbers if you do complicated fraud cases 
that are ultra-fact-heavy,” Black said. Prosecutors “are almost exclusively in the business 
of negotiating a plea deal. Many prosecutors view this case as having very little ‘jury 
 




appeal’ because they are more jargon paper cases.” A successful prosecution, moreover, 
may only result in probation or little jail time. “That’s the kind of thing that drives US 
Attorneys crazy.”  
Government attorneys want to bring high-profile cases, but losing such a case 
would be worse than not bringing one at all. The Bear Stearns case was difficult for the 
jury to understand, Moon said. “They lost their first major case they brought,” he said. 
“No one wants to go around losing cases. That was a big wake-up call for Justice … A lot 
of times they do go harder, their career will be better if they make a splashy case. But if 
you lose a splashy case you are hammered.” Therefore, settlements are much safer bet.  
Jonathan T. Molot argued in a University of Chicago Law Review article that 
litigation risk is especially undesirable in the corporate world because it cannot be spread 
or eliminated through market mechanisms, like other corporate risks. For example, an 
airline worried about spikes in fuel prices may use hedge contracts or trade in futures 
contracts, Molot says. This kind of hedge is not available for litigation risk. 258  
“…even if lawyers could price the risk and find capital providers to absorb 
it (as I argue is feasible in this Article), the lawyer’s professional 
role nonetheless inhibits lawyers from using their skills as market participants 
in their own right, or as brokers for profit-seeking capital 
providers, rather than simply as agents for risk-bearing clients.”259 
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Regardless of social pressure realities within these kinds of settlement deals, there 
is the individual incentive for prosecuting attorneys that looms large – a much higher 
salary in the private sector.  
 
Conclusion 
As I have shown, the changes in salary differences over the past few decades, as 
well as the cost of living where attorneys live, provide a powerful incentive to behave in 
a way the defense firms would find attractive. Behavior attractive to private sector firms 
has always been a successful record as a prosecutor. Clients pay top dollar to these 
defense firms because they believe they are their best chance against a government 
prosecution, and who better to defend against a government strategy than someone who 
worked on the inside of a government prosecutor’s office. The attorney must not only 
have worked as a government prosecutor, he must be seen as a success. She must be 
looked upon as the toughest, smartest and most knowledgeable in what would be a good 
defense against a prosecution. Because of the Department’s own gradual change in 
strategy after a series of embarrassments toward safer settlement agreements, the defense 
firms have had to change strategy as well. As the Department relied more upon these 
settlements, defense attorneys with settlement experience would be needed. And in turn, 
this incentivized Justice Department attorneys to focus more on negotiating impressive 
settlement agreements, to become more attractive for future defense firm employment. In 
the past, when the salary differences were less significant, and the Department itself had 
not suffered recent high-level embarrassments, government prosecutors could be more 




Department attorneys would have had to decide between a prosecution or settlement 
agreement for the 2008 financial crisis, the risk would not have been worth the potential 
high-profile loss and all it could mean for one’s future career and lifestyle. In the next 
chapter, I will explore alternative explanations as to why no major executives were 
prosecuted for the 2008 financial crisis, including popular explanations like money in 
politics, presidential leadership and the clubby nature of Washington. Ultimately these 
intuitive explanations will be rejected, however, as there was certainly lobbying and 
money, presidential influence and in-group beltway preferences during previous crises 
when major executives did see prosecution and jail time. The factor of resources 
available for the Justice Department will be explored last in the next chapter. It will be 





Chapter 7: Alternative Explanations 
Money in Politics/Capture/Interest Group Influence 
Perhaps the most popular explanation for why no major executives were 
criminally prosecuted for the 2008 financial crisis is the idea that they simply are too 
powerful to jail because they give a lot of money to politicians. This is a tempting theory 
considering how powerful the finance industry had become by the end of the twentieth 
century. However, upon closer examination, this theory has weaknesses when 




In the twenty-five years preceding the 2008 financial crisis, the financial services 
industry grew from five percent to eight percent of gross domestic product (GDP), 
growing sixty percent faster than the economy itself, as part of the country’s late-20th 
century move from an industrial economy to a service-based one.260 Additionally, 
individual compensation grew dramatically in the financial services industry, when 
investment banks went from private partnership to public companies in the 1980s and 
1990s. By 2005, financial sector executive pay was the highest of any industry, averaging 
$3.4 million per year.261  The finance industry’s contribution total to federal candidates 
increased dramatically from $70 million in 1990 to $518 million in 2008 and $677 
million in 2012. Adjusted for inflation, this is still a big increase, with $70 million in 
1990 equating to $122.97 million in 2012 dollars.262 Lobbying efforts have also increased 
with the industry having spent $200 million in 1998 ($264 million in 2008 dollars263) and 
close to $500 million each year since 2008.264  
Former Securities and Exchange Commission chairman Arthur Levitt told the 
(Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission) that once word of a proposed regulation 
got out, industry lobbyists would rush to complain to members of the 
congressional committee with jurisdiction over the financial activity at issue. 
According to Levitt, these members would then “harass the SEC with frequent 
letters demanding answers to complex questions and appearances of officials 
before Congress. These requests consumed much of the agency’s time and 
discouraged it from making regulations. 265 
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However, a large increase of money pouring into politics from the financial 
services industry from one crisis to the next does not necessarily mean the executives 
could buy their way out of trouble in the years after 2008 but not in the 1990s and early 
2000s. Certainly spending has increased, but so have the cost of elections. For example, 
the total cost of congressional elections in 2008 was approximately $37 million more 
expensive than in 1998, adjusted for inflation.266 267 
Indeed, Calavita, Pontell and Tillman argue that political connections and 
donations were at the heart of the savings and loan (also known as thrift) crisis of the 
1980s and 1990s. They quote Federal Home Loan Bank Board 
Chairman Edwin J. Gray as saying “The thrift crisis is, and has been from the beginning, 
a political crisis.”268 More than 160 political action committees (PACs) represented the 
savings and loan industry in the years leading up to the peak of the crisis and actually 
ramped up contributions significantly as the worst of the crisis approached. Between 
1983 and 1988, these PACs gave $4.5 million in campaign contributions for House and 
Senate races and $1 million for individual members of the banking committee. In total, 
estimates show the industry is responsible for approximately $12 million in political 
contributions to federal candidates and political parties during the 1980s.269 At the time 
the financial industry was also the largest contributor of money for speeches, known as 
“honoraria” and regulated as personal income, not campaign finance. The Reagan 
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administration and congressional Republicans at the time were certainly ideologically on 
board with the deregulation that benefited savings and loan banks and ultimately 
contributed to the crisis. But Calavita, Pontell and Tillman argue that the politically 
influential industry played a major role in shaping the details of that deregulation.270 
House Banking Committee Chairman Congressman Fernand St. Germain had called in 
the 1970s for greater uniformity in regulations in the wake of the failure of Citizens State 
Bank due to the actions of “fraudulent insiders and affiliated outsiders.”271 By the early 
1980s, St. Germain had co-sponsored two major pieces of legislation that phased out 
interest rate caps, greatly increasing the ability of these federally-insured institutions.  
Political science literature is mixed on whether or not money buys influence in 
politics, but Hall and Wayman showed in 1990 that interest groups and individuals do 
receive something for their money; time. This access can be helpful in lobbying 
lawmakers on what types of legislation they should support, how they conduct oversight 
of agencies and even what language to use when writing legislation. Especially when 
focused at the committee level, political donations and lobbying money may not buy 
votes or influence elections directly, so much as buy extremely valuable time and 
attention from an elected official. Giving money to politicians who sit on the relevant 
committee makes the money work harder, as it targets lawmakers who have the keenest 
interest in the issue at hand and therefore likely to be sympathetic to the interest group. 
Additionally, the committee level provides a less formal environment with less public 
scrutiny that floor votes. Therefore, politicians can respond to monied interests more 
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safely at this stage in the lawmaking process. 272 In 2002, Thomas Stratmann sought to 
discover whether money influences votes or interest-group friendly lawmakers attract 
donations with their votes. In other words, in what direction does the arrow of causation 
point? He studied voting behavior of Congressmembers on key pieces of legislation in 
1991 and 1998 that sought to dismantle the regulations set out in the Great Depression 
era Glass-Steagall law, which separated investment banking, insurance and commercial 
banking companies. He found that higher contributions led to a higher probability of a 
lawmaker voting in the group’s interests, as well as against an opposing group’s interests. 
273 The disagreement in political science literature over evidence for a measurable 
influence of money in politics often comes down to how we measure influence. 
University of Kansas researchers in 2009 found a useful empirical measure for lobbying 
efficacy by measuring the amount of money spent influencing the American Jobs 
Creation Act of 2004. This bill allowed multinational corporations to repatriate earnings 
for a one-time lower tax rate. With these companies subject to public disclosures, the 
researchers could compare the company’s savings achieved in that single tax year to the 
amount it spent to push for the policy, providing a unique opportunity to measure the 
effect of lobbying and money in finance. Indeed, the researchers found the companies on 
average gained $220 for every $1 spent lobbying lawmakers regarding this Act, for a 
22,000% return on their investment.274 While the efficacy of lobbying – or at least the 
best way to measure its efficacy – is not universally accepted in the political science field, 
an abundance of research, as well as common sense, dictates that companies and groups 
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spend money on lobbying because it gets them something beneficial in return. Certainly, 
there is compelling evidence for the idea that lobbying is a powerful tool, even if there 
isn’t a consensus for precise causal effects.  
However, we must not forget that this discussion is about prosecution by 
government lawyers, not policies or laws made by politicians. Lobbyists focus their 
attention on elected officials, not prosecutors, for the most part. There are groups, like the 
American Bar Association, that lobby the Justice Department in a sense, but not as 
directly trying to influence specific outcomes as is done in the legislative arena. Indeed, a 
prosecutor’s deliberations and decision making is a secretive process, whereas 
lawmaking is both public and multi-staged, providing ample access points for lobbyists. 
Could being a powerful political donor really extend to an effective get out of jail card for 
the 2008 financial crisis, despite Justice Department’s relatively apolitical reputation and 
mission? It is true that these same wealthy donors can afford the best attorneys to 
negotiate with government prosecutors even before any charges would be filed and this 
has myriad benefits. Aside from the ability to negotiate away charges, these attorneys can 
also provide the most skilled defense, as well as other benefits that are described in other 
chapters. However, the best defense money can buy is not the same as the notion that 
campaign donations or lobbying is what saved these finance executives, as the popular 
narrative would hold.  
Political influence by monied interests, whether it comes in the form of direct 
campaign or political contributions, influence-peddling or access-buying is the popular 
reason for why Wall Street executives didn’t face prosecution for the 2008 crisis. 




political system in the late 1980’s and early 1990s when the savings and loan crisis saw 
hundreds of bank executives criminally prosecuted and in the early 2000s when company 
executives like Enron’s Chairman Kenneth Lay were successfully prosecuted for their 
corporate crimes. Additionally, lobbyists do not have access to the prosecutorial decision-
making process like they do to the public and multi-access point law-making process. 
Therefore, despite the popularity of this explanation, it ultimately fails as a satisfying 
answer at this time as capture and political influence have been consistent factors across 
financial crises of recent decades and elected officials were not the decision makers in the 
choice whether or not to prosecute. 
 
Presidential Leadership Style  
 To understand whether presidential leadership style could explain why executives 
were prosecuted during earlier crises and not in 2008, the role of the president must be 
examined across these events. The relevant presidents for this discussion are George H. 
W. Bush, George W. Bush and Barack Obama. When considering the 2008 crisis, 
President Obama is the only player I will consider. President George W. Bush left office 
while the crisis was still raging, and he and his administration were focused on the 
immediate danger. Therefore, it would have been unreasonable to expect him to focus on 
prosecuting executives with the extensive efforts needed for success, at the same time he 
was dealing with the severe crisis at hand. George W. Bush, however, was in office when 
prominent executives were criminally prosecuted for the accounting scandals in the early 
2000s, and his father George H.W. Bush held the presidency when many cases were filed 




popular theory, it ultimately falls flat when considering the norm of generally allowing 
the Justice Department substantial political distance from the Oval Office. Exceptions, 
such as Trump and political firings under the later years of the George W. Bush 
administration, are considered scandalous, and therefore are exceptions that prove the 
rule. To be sure, the president appoints the most senior leadership of the Justice 
Department, including the Attorney General and the United States Attorneys in the 
various federal districts. A president can and does appoint like-minded individuals to lead 
these offices. Ultimately, I find the President to be too far removed from the decision-
making point to have made a substantial difference. It should be noted that Congress 
could also be examined as a factor for this study. Congress’ relevancy here would be in 
allocating the federal budget, including that of the Justice Department. I ultimately 
declined to include Congress, as it is one step further removed from the decision-making 
process than the president and therefore outside the scope of this inquiry.  
 
How presidents influence 
The primary ways that a president would have influenced the decision to 
prosecute, at least in the pre-Trump era, would be through appointees, allocation of 
existing resources and rhetoric. However, I will first examine the idea that a president 
can, as the head of the executive branch, direct the Justice Department in its decision 
making. The Justice Department is ostensibly the most apolitical of all government 
actors, along with the judiciary. Fordham University Law School Chair Bruce A. Green 
and New York Law School Professor Rebecca Roiphe call prosecutorial independence 




Richard Nixon and Donald J. Trump put this idea to the test. While Nixon fired Attorneys 
General until he found one that would act according to his wishes, but did not explicitly 
claim he could order the Justice Department to make specific decisions, Trump has done 
both.275 He directly called for his political enemies to be prosecuted innumerable times 
and claimed that he has absolute control over the Justice Department.  
Donald Trump, however, did not adhere to preexisting norms, therefore 
highlighting their existence. Trump sparked a conversation around what a president could 
or could not do. Americans quickly realized that many things thought impossible for a 
president, like interfering in criminal prosecutions, were simply norms and traditions, 
which could be broken. Trump has certainly broken through those norms in many ways, 
such as with his attempts to call for his political enemies to be criminally investigated and 
prosecuted and finding an attorney general, Bill Barr, who will do his best to be Trump’s 
political ally. For example, Barr’s Justice Department filed a motion to withdraw the 
criminal case against former National Security Adviser Michael Flynn. Jonathan 
Stevenson, a Senior Fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies and a 
former National Security Council Director for Political-Military Affairs, Middle East and 
Africa from 2010 to 2013, wrote in the New York Review of Books that this move is 
unprecedented for the Justice Department because it came after Flynn already plead 
guilty more than two years ago to lying to the FBI regarding his involvement with 
Russian interference in the 2016 election.276  
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Such motions are extremely rare to begin with, and after guilty pleas they are 
unprecedented. This particular motion is also a freakish document that distorts the 
law and misrepresents the views of former senior Justice Department officials 
involved in the Flynn case. Bureaucratic and legal outrages—from officials’ 
systematic subversion of the mission of the departments they head to the “unitary 
executive” theory espoused by Attorney General William Barr—are routine in the 
Trump administration. But this latest instance is a major advance in the 
president’s and Barr’s political weaponization of the Justice Department. The 
motion was signed only by Timothy Shea, a Barr loyalist and acting US attorney 
for the District of Columbia, and not by any of the prosecutors involved, one of 
whom withdrew from the case. 
 277 
 
Trump makes it clear that although he hasn’t had much success in jailing those 
that threaten his power, he can get his allies out of jail. However, Trump’s use of the 
Justice Department in this way only has the support of a few of the most loyal members 
of his inner circle, like Barr. His previous Attorney General, Jeff Sessions, despite being 
a solidly Republican partisan, refused to bend justice to Trumps will. He was 
subsequently forced to resign as Attorney General in November 2018 when he recused 
himself from investigating the Russian interference of the 2016 campaign, of which he 
was an active member.278 Despite his intense loyalty to Trump, Sessions ultimately put 
the rule of law over partisanship in this instance. This example echoes Green and 
Roiphe’s argument that the professional norms instilled in the minds of all lawyers help 
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make it possible for Justice Department norms of prosecutorial independence to be 
largely upheld, despite the few Trump loyalists that do his bidding at Justice. “In order to 
ensure democratic accountability, the President’s legitimate policy agenda may shape 
prosecutorial priorities, but partisan politics and personal interest must play no role in 
determining the course of individual cases.” 279 
They and other scholars argue that there is abundant evidence against a true 
unitary executive, but more of a complicated web of departments checking each other 
within the Executive Branch. In addition to the long-established rule-of-law norms 
instilled in all lawyers during school and training, the Constitution can be referenced to 
assess the president’s power over the Justice Department. While it doesn’t specifically 
prevent the president from directing the Justice Department, it also does not permit him 
to do so. It ultimately gives Congress the power to determine whether a president can 
interfere in specific prosecutorial decisions rather than setting general policy and 
appointing leaders.280 However, Congress and the president have battled since the 
country’s founding over control of the bureaucracy. Scholars debate the issue, while 
presidents and Congressional leaders put theories to the test with specific actions that 
push the boundaries and in the process shape norms. Therefore, it is a de facto ongoing 
conversation about who controls the Justice Department. Certainly, it began as and 
continues to remain among the most independent parts of the bureaucracy.  
Moving on from direct orders, I will examine the softer powers a president may 
use to control prosecutions. Barack Obama took office in January 2009, also preoccupied 
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with easing the crisis and stabilizing the economy. However, by the end of 2009, though 
a full recovery was far off in the future, the recession was over, and the economy was 
growing again. This was the time when he could have focused on correcting the ills that 
caused the crisis. Indeed, his administration did focus extensively on passing the Dodd-
Frank financial reform law in 2010. Additionally, he was responsible for setting the 
rhetoric during this time. Would he set a tone of a sheriff going after lawbreakers or a 
negotiator trying to find resolution? He brought at group of thirteen major bank leaders 
into his White House to discuss the crisis. He told them that he and his White House were 
the only thing standing between them and “the pitchforks.” He would be the negotiator, 
the peacemaker and the healer. Certainly, he did not take on a tone of “sheriff,” looking 
to round up lawbreakers and bring them to justice. This approach could explain an 
abundance of settlement agreements over prosecutions, which is what occurred after the 
2008 crisis. In comparison, prosecutions for the savings and loan and accounting scandal 
crises under the George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush administrations respectively 
may be surprising for business-friendly administrations. 
It is possible that the Bush presidents focused more on law enforcement rather 
than new regulation, such as the Dodd-Frank law of 2010 pushed by the Obama 
administration. But both Bush administrations did see prosecutions, as well as new high-
profile laws like the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 
1989 and the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, otherwise known as McCain-
Feingold. Another possible explanation is that the notoriously business-friendly Bush 
administrations had to prosecute these cases, lest they look unwilling to hold their own 




corporations in check. Conversely, President Obama was thought of as left-leaning or 
liberal and therefore may not have wanted to appear too harsh on corporations. The 
Obama administration also had to handle the optics of the first black presidency. Looking 
too aggressive in certain areas may have been more difficult with this already ground-
breaking presidency. He entered office with much political capital based on an electorate 
wanting “hope” and “change” after eight years of the Bush Administration and two wars 
and simply focused that capital on other things. Obama’s political capital was essentially 
spent on the Affordable Care Act (known as Obamacare), the $787 billion American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (known as the stimulus), the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010,281 not encouraging white collar 
criminal enforcement. 
              Certainly, President Obama may be described as assertive in many ways. Indeed, 
for a person to win election to the presidency of the United States, let alone to accomplish 
this twice, he must be intensely driven. However, it seems to be part of Obama’s 
personality style to seek compromise, rather than battle. Similarly, the Obama Justice 
Department’s approach to white collar crime, specifically, may be one example of that 
“negotiator” approach. It is reasonable to assume that a president would appoint like-
minded individuals to his cabinet, which includes the Attorney General. Then the 
Attorney General can set a general tone of the Justice Department. Indeed, some have 
said the Department suffered from an overabundance of caution.282 “I think the Holder 
Justice Department was very risk averse,” said Neil Barofsky, former Special Inspector 
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General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (otherwise known as the “bailout”) and a 
former Southern District of New York prosecutor. During previous crises, the 
administration created a task force, made of up members from various relevant federal 
agencies, to coordinate enforcement efforts. Those earlier task forces were taken much 
more seriously than the one established by President Obama in 2009.283 “The Obama task 
force did nothing. I am told by people on the task force that they weren’t asked to do 
anything. If not for political pressure, they wouldn’t have done what they did (civil 
settlements). They kept upping the fines – that’s just the cost of doing business,” 
according to a knowledgeable source.284  
          Of course, it is hard to know whether this reflected an overabundance of caution or 
the correct amount of caution, for we cannot know the consequences of more aggressive 
prosecutions during that time period. The Department may have feared spooking the 
recovering market by looking “too tough” on the banks into which it had just poured 
massive federal resources. On the other hand, if criminal charges had been brought after 
the crisis had ebbed – the statute of limitations was five years for some charges and ten 
for others – perhaps this negative impact would no longer have been an issue.285 
Additionally, cases against individuals could be framed as brought against “bad actors” 
rather than institutions as a whole. Although the longer they waited, the harder it would 
have been to make the case, as memories of potential witnesses would have faded and 
some evidence might have been lost, Barofsky said. Previous administrations took the 
stance that charging individuals was an important component of corporate law 
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enforcement. Indeed, a memo written by George W. Bush administration Assistant 
Attorney General Mark Filip on August 28, 2008, calls for individuals to face prosecution 
for corporate crimes. 
Because a corporation can act only through individuals, imposition of individual 
criminal liability may provide the strongest deterrent against future corporate 
wrongdoing … Only rarely should provable individual culpability not be pursued, 
particularly if it relates to high-level corporate officers, even in the face of an 
offer of a corporate guilty plea or some other disposition of the charges against 
the corporation. 286 
 
It is unclear how much the overall Department “tone” impacts specific 
prosecutorial decisions, especially when it comes to the work of prosecutors making the 
cases, rather than those who are politically appointed. What leadership pushes for, either 
publicly or privately, may be an important factor for those bringing the cases. Ultimately, 
direct incentives for the prosecutors making the cases are more compelling than an 
intangible tone in the Department overall, especially since the memo’s tone would have 
competed with a serious note of caution, as described in an earlier chapter.   
 
How presidents are influenced 
I have discussed what influence presidents have in prosecutions, but what 
influences their decision-making? Many things factor into decision-making and it 
certainly varies for each president. Ultimately, we can never know how or why a 
president truly came to a decision in his mind. He is influenced by a variety of factors, 
including advisors, his political party, voter opinion polls and Congressmembers. Perhaps 
the most popular explanation for what motivates any elected official is money. Indeed, 
 




money to run a successful election or reelection campaign is essential, especially in the 
current age of television ads and the personality-focused presidency. Voters want to get 
to know the candidates personally and television ads are very expensive. Enter, political 
donors. Specifically, it is easy to see how important the finance industry is to presidential 
campaigns. In the 2004 presidential election, the list of the top five largest donors to both 
the George W. Bush campaign and John Kerry’s campaign include financial services 
companies. John Kerry’s fourth and fifth largest donors were Goldman Sachs ($314,000) 
and Citigroup Inc., ($300,325) respectively. All five of Bush’s top donors were financial 




Figure 7.1  
 
Top Campaign Contributions to George W. Bush 2004 Election Cycle288 
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George W Bush (2004) 
Morgan Stanley $604,280 
Merrill Lynch $558,804 
PricewaterhouseCoopers $508,500 
UBS AG $442,325 






Financial services companies contributing large sums of money to presidential 
campaigns, especially the business-friendly George W. Bush, does not come as a 
surprise. However, the industry’s donation patterns in 2008 may have been unexpected. 
McCain’s top five donor list includes more financial service companies, but the financial 











Figure 7.2  
 
Top Campaign Contributors to Barack Obama and John McCain 2008 Election Cycle 
 
Data from Opensecrets.org 
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Barack Obama                                               
University of California   -  $1,799,460       
Goldman Sachs -   $1,034,615       
Harvard University - $900,909          
Microsoft Corp -   $854,717          
JPMorgan Chase & Co. -   $847,895             
John McCain 
Merrill Lynch - $354,570 
J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. - $336,605  
Citigroup Inc. - $330,502  
Morgan Stanley - $264,501 
U.S. Government - $235,304 
290 
The finance industry gave large sums to John McCain, but they gave much more 
to Barack Obama overall; $43,744,789 to Obama compared to $31,043,978 to McCain.291  
Do these large campaign donations from the financial elite explain why the Obama 
Administration declined to prosecute them? This is certainly a common refrain heard 
among the lay public, but it falls short as an explanation because presidents have taken 
money for their campaigns from financial services companies across the crises in 
question. To be sure, logic dictates that it would be difficult to aggressively prosecute 
people responsible for hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars in campaign support. 
However, this theory is ultimately not compelling because of the distance between the 
president and federal prosecutorial decision making. Additionally, prosecution of major 
political benefactors in previous crises also makes the argument weak.  
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The starkest example of the flaw in the idea that campaign donations bought a get 
out of jail free card is Kenneth Lay, the founder and chairman of Enron Corporation. Lay, 
nicknamed “Kenny Boy” by President George W. Bush, had given more than $550,000 to 
Bush’s campaigns for governor and president over the years of their friendship back in 
Texas. Not only was Lay a major donor for Bush, but both men agreed on major policy 
areas, such as energy market deregulation. Lay also helped to fundraise for Bush’s father, 
President George H. W. Bush, and helped to bring the Bush Presidential Library to 
Houston. Yet, once the accounting fraud scandal within Enron came to light in the early 
2000s, the Bush White House sought to distance itself from Lay and the Bush Justice 
Department created a task force to pursue criminal charges within Enron.292 Lay was 
ultimately convicted in May 2006 of six counts of fraud and conspiracy, with each count 
carrying a maximum sentence of five to ten years jail time. However, he died in July 
2006 at his home in Aspen, Colorado at the age of 64 before the court handed down a 
sentence, which was scheduled for the fall of that year. He had been free on a $5 million 
bond.293  
 
Cultural Capture  
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Cultural capture is different from traditional capture in the sense that it is 
emotional and mental processes that make a regulator favor someone, rather than direct 
or future monetary gain. Cultural capture has three components; in-group preferencing - 
the idea that people in the same social and cultural circles tend to favor each other; status 
– admiring and treating preferentially those who are perceived as higher status; and social 
connections – treating preferentially those with whom we have social connections. This 
theory provides an interesting possible explanation for a non-prosecution scenario. 
However, it is a difficult theory to investigate and more importantly, this phenomenon 
existed across all crises in question. Nonetheless, it is worth a discussion, at the very least 
to consider another popular narrative that says Wall Street executives have connections 
that get them out of jail. Imagine prosecutors and wall street executives in a room 
together. They all look like middle- or upper-class people. They might all be white. 
Whether or not their clothes and grooming cost a lot of money, or just look smart for the 
price, they are all dressed in a suit and are clean cut. They look like they belong in a room 
together. On the other hand, a “common street criminal” may appear very different from 
a prosecutor. They would be dressed more casually and may have vastly different 
hairstyles, body adornment, speech patterns, etc. They appear to be adversaries.  
While it is reasonable to assume that as humans we are more likely to favor those 
with whom we identify, it is difficult to gauge what components of a person’s identity 
will motivate them the most. It may be appearance, as in the scenario above, or it may be 
education, social class, race, geographic region, religion, etc. According to Jesse Eisinger, 
Pro Publica reporter and Pulitzer Prize winning author of a book on the Obama Justice 




those who are educated at more elite institutions and favor the “professional class.” “The 
Obama administration is a bunch of technocrats, beltway establishment Democrats with 
corporate backers. They are very smart people, very accomplished. They think they are 
very reasonable. They do not see corporations as malefactors or enemies or systemically 
rotten,” Eisinger said.  
Eisinger painted a picture from his interviews of the well-appointed conference 
room, in which attorneys for the government and a bank or bank executive would meet to 
discuss a settlement deal. 
No one comes in and blusters and fights and has a lapel that’s too wide. No one is 
making any class faux pas in these meetings. They are all reasonable, calm and 
smart and give a beautifully detailed PowerPoint presentation about why there 
hasn’t been a crime here, why a settlement would be reasonable, if you really 
want to go for something and why you’re going to lose in court. It all comes 
across at the time very reasonable. 294  
 
 The idea is to look tough but not unreasonable, and, above all, not to alienate 
superiors in the Department or prospective defense firm employers. Moreover, as these 
cases are likely very difficult, their superior will not want to invest in these cases at the 
expense of relatively simpler cases, Eisinger said. It is also often the case that the young 
Justice Department or U.S. attorneys may be negotiating with their former superiors, who 
have already made the jump from Justice Department to defense firm, adding further 
social pressure to come to a settlement agreement.295 
In contrast, the George W. Bush administration began with prosecutors who were 
more eager to enforce laws aggressively, according to Eisinger. Certainly, the Bush 
administration could not be called unfriendly to corporations. What was it about these 
 
294 Eisinger interview 




prosecutors that prevented them from identifying with corporate executives? It is hard to 
say, and I don’t see much reason to believe they wouldn’t identify as in-group peers. 
Eisinger explains the change of focus in the Justice Department by looking at the way 
prosecutors in the Obama administration saw themselves, compared with Bush-era 
prosecutors. With the later years of the Bush Justice Department plagued by politically-
motivated U.S. Attorney firings, the Obama Justice appointees saw a need to 
professionalize the Department, Eisinger said. Eisinger claims the Obama Justice 
Department heads like Attorney General Holder and Criminal Division Chief Breuer 
preferred prosecutors from “big law,” who are hesitant to bring aggressive cases.  
Holder may be contrasted with Dick Thornburgh, for example, whose Justice 
Department successfully prosecuted hundreds of executives in the savings and loan crisis. 
While Holder explained publicly why a criminal prosecution was generally not wise or 
possible, Thornburg spoke very differently about the financial executives of his day: “My 
experience as a United States Attorney and Assistant Attorney General, and as Attorney 
General teaches that the best way to deter fraud is with tough, timely and effective law 
enforcement,” Thornburgh told the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affairs on February 9, 1989.296 The Justice Department during this era indeed prosecuted 
hundreds of bank executives for the misdeeds of the savings and loan crisis. Did 
prosecutors really see themselves as more aligned with corporate executives in the 
Obama years compared to the Bush administrations? Obama-era prosecutors may have 
seen themselves as more professional, intellectual and reasonable, akin to the corporate 
executives they negotiated settlement agreements with. They may have even sent their 
 




children to the same private schools or were members of the same country club. This 
could explain why they hesitated to jail those they saw as their “friends” or at least peers. 
But how do we truly know what these or any other prosecutors felt most important to 
their identity. For example, President Obama’s Attorney General Eric Holder may 
identify as an upper class, Harvard-educated corporate lawyer, he may identify as a 
middle aged African American or anything else that he finds meaningful. Identities may 
also be situational and fluctuate over time. To make matters more complicated, Holder 
may not be fully aware of what factors shape his identity most. James Kwak, a University 
of Connecticut Law professor and a prolific writer on corporations, economics and 
policy, provides a compelling narrative for cultural capture in his book 13 Bankers, but 
he ultimately also acknowledges the difficulty in proving cultural identity and its 
influence on a person’s decision making. 297  
More importantly for this study, the George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush 
administrations’ prosecutors may have been less polished in some ways than Obama-era 
prosecutors, they hardly excluded Harvard-educated attorneys and clubby relationships 
with industry executives. A close relationship between regulator and regulated could not 
be illustrated better than that of George W. Bush and Enron executive Kenneth Lay, 
whom Bush affectionately referred to as “Kenny Boy.” As detailed in a previous section, 
Lay was also a major contributor to Bush’s campaigns. Calavita, Pontell and Tillman 
write that during the savings and loan crisis, regulators also saw themselves not as foes of 
the finance industry, but protectors of the economic system. In the case of the savings and 
loan crisis, regulators saw the crackdown on fraudulent actors in the industry as a way to 
 




stabilize the economy.298 If regulators see themselves as the same type of professional as 
finance industry executives and see the government’s job as protecting the economy 
across the various crises discussed here, it isn’t reasonable to assume that the Bushes 
appointed business-friendly regulators in its agencies except the Justice Department. The 
fact that cultural capture has been present across all crises in question means it is weak as 
a variable explaining a change in prosecutions. Kwak said as much in a 2013 article on 
the financial crisis and cultural capture:  
Cultural capture is not a complete explanation of financial regulators’ behavior in 
the run-up to the financial crisis for another reason: the mechanisms that produce 
cultural capture are basic features of human interactions and therefore predate the 
recent cycle of financial deregulation. 299 
 
However, he argues it is an important part of the explanatory picture. He writes 
about regulators, though, which need to be examined separately from prosecutors. As 
discussed earlier, legal industry norms promote a more rational and neutral mentality than 
regulators, who are free to pursue a certain philosophy of the public good, i.e. boosting 
Wall Street helps the public by creating a strong economy. Kwak argues that the status of 
financial services people rose in the decades leading up to the financial crisis, as banks 
used increasingly complicated mathematical and computer models in trading, 
necessitating and attracting employees from elite universities. Kwak points to this as a 
reason to take the potential resultant cultural capture into consideration in explaining the 
financial crisis of 2008 because it may have prevented regulators from taking a firm 
approach with industry.300 However, since the increased status accumulated over decades, 
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it can’t explain the difference in treatment after the 2008 crisis compared to previous 
crises discussed here, as they all took place within the same few decades.  
 
Resources - Counterterrorism & Case Referrals  
 An important corollary to prosecutorial incentives is a lack of available resources 
to make a strong case. This is a second factor that changed between crises, along with a 
change in private sector compensation for white collar criminal defense attorneys. 
Whether the topic of resources deserves to be a co-equal factor, or a supporting factor is 
unclear, but it is certainly a contributing factor. If a prosecutor must be extra cautious 
against a high-profile loss to please the needs of future employers, certainly having less 
money and no case referrals from other agencies further increases the risk. In the 
previous crises I have examined, prosecutors had more resources both inside the Justice 
Department and from other regulators. A Justice Department Office of the Inspector 
General Report said in September 2005: 
In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Justice Department, including the 
FBI, saw a massive shift in money and manpower to counterterrorism at the expense of other areas 
of law enforcement. we found that prior to 9/11, although the FBI identified counterterrorism in its 
top priorities, the FBI utilized the majority of its agent resources in traditional criminal 
investigative areas, such as white-collar crime, violent crime, organized crime, and 
drugs. Following 9/11, agent usage on terrorism-related matters dramatically increased.301 
 
Former FBI director, Robert Mueller said mortgage fraud needed to be considered 
“in the context of other priorities,” such as terrorism. Mueller told the Financial Crisis 
Inquiry Commission that the agency had asked for more resources to fight mortgage 
fraud during its budget process with Congress, but the Bureau did not get as much as 
 




requested, and its resources may have been insufficient.302 By 2008, the FBI lost 625 
agents investigating white collar crime, or 36 percent of its 2001 levels.303 
At the peak of the subprime mortgage frenzy and just before the crash, Bush’s 
Attorneys General Alberto Gonzalez (2005-2007) and Michael B. Mukasey (2007-2008) 
were aware of or might have done more about white-collar crime related to mortgages but 
had other pressing issues, namely terrorism.304 It seems like the federal white collar crime 
cops had almost all left the beat. “I was in DOJ on 9-11” Barofsky said, “and I saw all my 
really good FBI agents go over to terrorism. The best agents before who wanted to do 
complex fraud cases wanted to get Bin Laden.”305 
 This is in stark contrast with the savings and loan era, where Congress devoted 
more resources to prosecutorial efforts, both legally and monetarily with the broad-based 
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) of 1989. The 
law also increased prison sentences for financial institution crimes committed after 
August 9, 1989; extended the statute of limitations for these crimes to ten years from five; 
authorized increases in FBI and prosecutorial staff; and added seventy-five million 
dollars annually for three years to prosecute these crimes. The Crime Control Act of 1990 
increased the annual dollar amount for prosecution to $162.5 for 1991 through 1993.306 
Proving criminal fraud in front of a jury, whether against an executive or a director or a 
company, both with tremendous defense budgets and some of the best lawyers in the 
world, would prove more difficult for the government’s lawyers with reduced financial 
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resources. This put increased pressure on prosecutors thinking about the defense firm’s 
preference for successful DOJ attorneys to settle with those companies responsible for the 
crisis. They could seek large civil fines to appease an angry public and look tough 
without much risk.  
 Additionally, the Justice Department lacked help from other federal agencies that 
they had in previous prosecutions of finance executives. Regulatory agencies may have 
more familiarity with the financial institutions and products at the heart of any potential 
fraud and can be an important source of support in making a complicated and difficult 
case. William Black has spoken out about the importance of case referrals from 
regulatory agencies in building financial fraud cases. Black, a former litigation director of 
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and senior deputy chief counsel at the Office of 
Thrift Supervision (the Bank Board’s successor), said during the savings and loan era, his 
agency filed more than ten thousand referrals to the Justice Department. It also gave 
Justice attorneys guidance on to how to spot, track, and document financial crimes, 
resulting in more than a thousand criminal convictions with a success rate of ninety-one 
percent.307  However, Black says in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, which he 
categorizes as seven times larger than the savings and loan crisis, federal regulators 
referred a total of zero cases.308 Without these case referrals, which would provide a 
wealth of background information on potentially fraudulent behavior, the risk of a very 
public loss is higher. 
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 The underlying question here is why there were no case referrals. There has been 
a fundamental shift in the federal financial regulatory environment since Black’s tenure, 
he said. As this industry has pushed for increased deregulation, it was able to consolidate 
its power through major financial mergers made legal by the 1999 repeal of the 
Depression-era Glass Steagall Act, which disallowed savings banks and investment banks 
or insurance companies to operate under the same parent company, as well as disallowing 
nationwide megabanks to form. Consolidated bank holding companies formed and could 
in turn use their increased financial and political power to lobby for their own interests. 
Although basic Depression-era fraud laws remained intact, new financial products that 
emerged in this period remained unregulated. Credit Default Swaps are an important 
example of this phenomenon, as they played a major role in the financial crisis, allowing 
banks to take on increased risk and exposing AIG to massive losses.309  
With less supervision of the sometimes newly created and often poorly 
understood financial products that were at the heart of the financial crisis, it is no wonder 
regulators did not refer material for criminal cases to Justice. According to Black, the 
shift in case referrals came with the Clinton administration and the “New Democrats.” 
Bill Clinton and the Democratic Leadership Coalition (DLC) took a turn away from New 
Deal Democratic policies that some saw as hostile to the wealthy. It could be categorized 
as a centrist or right-wing economic turn for the Democratic party that helped it gain 
Wall Street backers and win back the White House after twelve years of Republican, 
deregulatory leadership. Black said he left his job as a government regulator when he was 
 




told to defer to the bankers and “treat them as our customers.”310  Thomas Frank, in his 
book, Listen Liberal, says the DLC favored upper-class professionalism and abandoned 
the New Deal economic coalition that supported working-class policies.311 When viewing 
bankers as customers, regulators are encouraged to work with them, rather than maintain 
an adversarial stance. Neil Barofsky also describes the friendly relationship between 
bankers and regulators during his time in Washington as the Special Inspector General of 
the bailout fund.312 It should be noted that putting this change at the Clinton 
Administration makes referrals a weaker explanatory variable since it does not explain 
why the Enron-era accounting scandal era executives were prosecuted and 2008 financial 
crisis executives were not.  
Nonetheless, case referrals establishing some of the evidentiary groundwork for a 
case or much technical assistance from regulatory experts would have been helpful for 
Justice Department prosecutors who wanted to make a successful fraud case against any 
banking industry executive after 2008. While the federal government has a tremendous 
amount of resources at its disposal, one class of defendants can notoriously outspend the 
government on the best attorneys money can buy – white collar defendants. This has been 
the case throughout the past few decades. However, as we have seen, the government’s 
massive resource shift within the Justice Department after September 11, 2001 puts it at a 
further disadvantage against the wealthiest, highest profile defendants in the finance 
world – executives at major systemically-important institutions. Lack of resources for 
aggressive government prosecutions must not be ruled out as a possibly contributing 
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factor in the change in prosecution of finance executives in light of the post 9-11 resource 
shift at Justice, with September 11, 2001 marking a dividing line between crises that saw 








Chapter 8: Conclusions 
Throughout this project I have shown that the answer for one of the most 
important political questions of our time is not necessarily the most obvious or popular 
one. The response I get from most people when I tell them I am researching the question 
of why no high-level executives were jailed for the financial crisis is often the same. 
Most people say rich people who have connections to government officials through the 
power of their money can get away with anything. To be sure, there is much reason to 
think that money influences the political process in many ways. It seems obvious to many 
people that a person or group would not pay for lobbying or campaign donations without 
any expectation of benefits, and political science research bears this out, as outlined in a 
previous chapter. Additionally, the Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled, in cases like 




speech and therefore should be subject to the same strict scrutiny.313 What’s more, neither 
major political party has the monopoly on significant donations and lobbying from the 
financial services industry.314  
While this aspect of the political process may have had a hand in the weakening 
of regulations and regulatory enforcement leading up to the crisis, it could not be a 
sufficient explanation for why no major executives faced jail time afterward. Although 
political appointees run the Justice Department and U.S. Attorney’s Offices, the majority 
of case work is done by career attorneys who are by-definition not influenced by 
campaign donations. Lawyers’ professional norms and education also instill the values of 
due process, rule of law, etc. Therefore, they are highly sensitive to criticisms of 
politicization. Recent exceptions prove the rule. FBI Director James Comey’s disclosure 
of an investigation into Hillary Clinton’s emails shortly before the 2016 presidential 
election caused intense uproar. He followed up with a book written to in part make his 
case that his decision was a well-intentioned attempt to be non-partisan. Additionally, 
Comey writes that Trump demanded mobster-like loyalty from the FBI, which Comey 
decries in the book. 315 Trump has also often stated on Twitter his frustration over his 
inability to control the Justice Department.316 He found in Bill Barr an attorney general 
willing to act in his interest, but he has not found widespread support following his lead 
at Justice, as shown previously. However, by the time Trump took office, the financial 
 
313 Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 2010 
314 Opensecrets.org 
315 Kakutani, Michiko. April 12, 2018. “James Comey Has a Story to Tell. It’s Very 
Persuasive.” New York Times. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/12/books/review/james-comey-a-higher-loyalty.html, 





crisis was well in the rear-view mirror, and statutes of limitations passed. President 
Obama made no attempts, at least publicly, to influence Justice prosecutions. In fact, his 
background as a lawyer and the professional norms most lawyers follow make it unlikely 
that he would secretly influence the process as well.  
Most importantly, for this study, however, is the fact that monetary influence in 
the political process was at work across the savings and loan, Enron-era and 2008 
financial crisis eras, as detailed in a previous chapter. Therefore, it is reasonable to 
conclude that capture - money in politics for Congressional campaigns, lawmaker and 
agency lobbying, or any presidential influence that it might by - falls short as an 
explanation as to why there were no systemically influential executives criminally 
prosecuted for the 2008 financial crisis. Presidential control of the charging process is 
also a week explanation, as the Justice Department was relatively independent across 
crises and the presidents in office during the earlier crises were very business friendly.  
  Cultural capture is also a compelling theory, but it does not explain the change in 
approach by the Justice Department toward high-level finance executives either, as it has 
been in effect across all three crises as well. It may be intuitive to ask the question: since 
humans are more likely to give the benefit of the doubt to those with whom they identify, 
socialize and admire, are ivy-league educated, white-collar attorneys less aggressive in 
prosecuting white collar criminals than street criminals? The answer very well may be 
sure, but this is nothing new.  Cultural capture appears as an explanatory variable in Jesse 
Eisinger’s Chickenshit Club, Matt Taibbi’s The Divide, and James Kwak’s 13 Bankers, 
but Kwak says this is a difficult theory to prove and says that it needs more study.317 As 
 




Kwak points out, it is at least a potential factor to consider and further explore, but again, 
this is not a phenomenon unique to 2008. Although Eisinger argues that the Obama 
Justice Department officials saw themselves as educated elite like the increasingly 
educated elite finance professionals, we cannot know for sure how a prosecutor may see 
him or herself, and therefore know with whom they identify and admire. Additionally, it 
is a further assumption to apply a particular identity to a whole group of prosecutors. For 
example, an Assistant U.S. Attorney may come from a poor neighborhood, attend an Ivy 
League school on scholarship, belong to a country club, volunteer with underprivileged 
children and send his own children to a top private school. Does this attorney identify 
with the upper class or the poor? Would he admire a Wall Street executive or a working-
poor family who lost their home? Even if he could tell us, would he tell the truth? Would 
he even really know the truth, or would his unconscious motivations be unknown to him? 
Also, Wall Street executives are not always seen as consistent entities. Sometimes they 
are glamourized in novels and films, and sometimes they are vilified. These masters of 
the universe may have been depicted as smart people who got into a jam, but they also 
could have been seen as greedy and unethical as well. Therefore, we not only have 
trouble measuring what prosecutors might truly feel and think, but it is also unclear 
whether Wall Street executives are figures that they admire, resent or anything in 
between.  
 Resource availability is a compelling explanation for the purposes of this study. It 
is indeed difficult to make an effective criminal case when Department resources are 
shifted in large quantities to other priorities. In the case of this post 9-11 shift of 




prior to the 2008 financial crisis but after the savings and loan and Enron-era crises cases 
were made. In itself this is an incomplete explanation because it leaves out the agency of 
those actors bringing the cases. They are not faceless bureaucrats. They are individuals 
with pressures from both inside and outside of the Justice Department. They must 
consider how much money and manpower the Department has for a case to be sure, but 
they also must consider the needs of those employers likely to provide them with 
significant raises upon completion of a successful stint at the Justice Department. A 
winning high-profile aggressive prosecution would be a bonus for a young prosecutor’s 
career. However, at a time when the Justice Department focused on lucrative settlement 
agreements rather than seeking jail time after a series of embarrassments, such as the 
Arthur Andersen case, a high-profile loss would seem to be unnecessary career suicide. 
What’s important here is not what it actually would mean for this prosecutor’s future 
career, but what he or she believed it would mean. Why go out on a limb and take the risk 
- assuming an AUSA team could even do so without being chastised internally for taking 
on too much risk - when the Justice Department’s focus was lower-risk, impressive 
sounding settlement agreements. White collar defense firms, having responded to this 
change in Justice’s strategy, also sought people who could succeed in negotiations and 
settlement agreements, rather than litigators. By the time of the 2008 financial crisis, a 
change in strategy inside Justice and the defense firms facing it, and the amount of money 
being offered as a private sector partner, just became too great to throw away one’s 
chance at it for a prosecution that would be an incredible challenge.  
The people given the great power and responsibility of prosecutorial discretion 




New York or Washington, it would be particularly difficult to expect them not to want a 
significantly higher salary to support a family. It is clear that while a career prosecutor 
could make more money in the private sector for a long time, the pay differential between 
practicing government prosecution of white collar crime and defense against it as a 
partner in a top firm has ballooned in the 21st century, compared to the latter decades of 
the 20th. There may be many individuals who are motivated to remain in public service 
and are driven by that desire above all else, but even the most ideal among us are 
motivated by the need to support ourselves and our families. A young, talented Assistant 
United States Attorney may face six figures in debt from law school, an astronomically 
high cost of living for a family in New York or Washington, and other expenses in life. 
While a top salary of almost $200,000 is enviable for most people, it is hard to argue with 
being paid $1 million or more for the same hard work on the other side of the courtroom. 
Therefore, a smart attorney would have a strong incentive to create a resume necessary to 
obtain this prestigious and lucrative partnership by working on shorter and less risky 
positive outcomes.  
All employees respond to the incentives placed before them within the context of 
the established institutional structures. Although there are many moral and social reasons 
why one may choose a career, a job’s primary purpose is to sustain one’s ability to 
support themselves and those that depend on them. If we expect these human beings to 
uphold justice as disinterested robots, we are being naïve and unrealistic as a society.  
If our goal as a society is to create a Justice Department that upholds and enforces the law 
in the most even-handed, egalitarian way possible, we must design an institution that 




opposite scenario. Pay disparity between the private sector and government service has 
risen to an unsustainable level. If we wish to incentivize bright and ambitious prosecutors 
to take on difficult, time-consuming, but nationally important tasks, such as either 
prosecuting or investigating evidence of widespread and massively damaging fraud, we 
must give prosecutors the institutional support and financial incentives to do so.  Is the 
solution to pay top government prosecutors $1 million per year to prevent them from 
moving to the private sector? That very well may be what is needed, or there may be 
alternative institutional designs that could incentivize these attorneys to act more in the 
public interest and not shy away from a difficult, but important case. Regardless, it is 
unreasonable to expect enough hard-working and ambitious attorneys to take these 
difficult but important cases out of a sense of moral obligation, overriding an instinctual 
and powerful need to have a comfortable life for them and their families.  
A high level of difficulty should not preclude a fair application of criminal justice, 
but I am not insensitive to the tremendous challenge posed by these cases. Neil Barofsky 
said that a serious task force should have been well funded and organized by the Justice 
Department to overcome the challenge of making a successful criminal case. If no 
charges were warranted, a task force report could have explained this to an angry 
American public, he said. This would have been a step toward trying to restore faith in 
the rule of law and justice for all, regardless of financial status, and may have changed 
the course of populist anger in the years that would follow. Instead, we witnessed the 
Trump era, somewhat spurred on by those voters who felt government was not on their 
side, wherein the move away from rule of law has become even more pronounced. 




persistent suspicion of unpunished criminality on Wall Street, regardless of outcome, 
would have been worth government resources. In times of major public crisis, such as the 
Kennedy Assassination, Watergate, and Trump’s Russia scandal, independent 
investigations and subsequent reporting have been warranted, even if no criminal 
prosecutions resulted. To be sure, government commissions do not always restore public 
faith. The Warren Commission investigated the Kennedy Assassination and concluded 
Oswald was the lone gunman, yet many conspiracy theories remain popular. Yet, imagine 
if no commission or a skeleton of one were created? Imagine how much more 
government mistrust there would have been in that case. There is no guarantee that a 
commission report would have cured what ails the American public’s faith in the rule of 
law. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission did a thorough investigation on the causes 
of the crisis and pointed to instances of potential fraud.318 A similar criminal investigation 
resulting in either a public report or criminal charges would have been appropriate to at 
least give the American public an answer to this open and important question, as long as 
the investigation was thorough and as nonpartisan as possible. 
 Instead, we received vague explanations that seemed more like excuses from the 
Obama Justice Department, and the public retained a deep sense of unfairness. The 
Trump campaign successfully played on this idea that Washington worked only for the 
rich and powerful. The idea that no fraud existed is difficult to take seriously, as one 
would have to ignore a mountain of potential evidence from civil government cases, 
settlements and private civil cases, as detailed in earlier chapters. At a time when 
Democratic norms are crumbling under the Trump presidency, it is at least important to 
 




use this example to rethink the incentives structures that exist in the Justice Department. 
In the Madisonian notion that we cannot rely on humans to be angels, so therefore 
government must be designed to check our worst impulses and foster our best, we must 
be sure that institutional design does so as well in the Justice Department, an important 
bulwark against those who would have the United States abandon the rule of law for 
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